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 A noticeable civil-military gap has emerged in American society where the public 
does not fully understand the mission of the military, and the military does not 
understand the expectations and demands of the public in a liberal democracy.  Basically, 
maintaining a good rapport with the media is vital to bridge this ‘civil-military gap.’ 
Military cooperation with the media by allowing appropriate access enables journalists to 
communicate with the military base of support in the public, and thus may prove vital to 
effective military operations. As a result, the public will be better prepared to embrace 
‘good news’ stories that are introduced by the military and prepared also to accept the 
times when a negative story breaks in the news.   
      From an online survey administered to the unrestricted line (URL) community of 
Navy officers, this research identifies instances of Navy officer bias that is derived from 
family background, limited interaction and experience in working with the media, and 
inherently from bias that is subordinated from senior naval leadership.  Based on these 
findings, the author believes that the U.S. Navy may not continue to mold individuals to 
think in new and innovative ways for future naval missions unless they are given a much 
more broader and thorough roadmap of critical thinking and analytical skills; which 
invariably includes the consideration of military-media relationships when planning and 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
A. PURPOSE 
The underlying problem is that the military and the media hate 
each other because neither soldiers [or sailors] nor reporters 
understand the nature of war.  The soldiers [and sailors] understand 
fighting.  The journalists understand communications. Neither 
group knows that the political impact of combat depends on the 
communication of the fighting.  The military-media relationship is 
symbiotic.  We [the military] need for them [the media] to see it, 
because battle is meaningless until it is credibly communicated to 
the world.1 
It has been almost two hundred years since both the military and media began a 
relationship in reporting modern day conflict; starting from the early days of William 
Howard Russell in 1850 (one of the first professional war correspondents), through two 
World Wars, up to the current War on Terrorism.  However, time has not softened the 
animosity between them. Their conflicts seem to be cyclical, spawning numerous efforts 
to mitigate the friction between the two entities.  As an example, from its inception in 
1992, the McCormick Tribune Foundation has sponsored a neutral forum from which 
journalists and military officers alike discuss issues that arise from their very dissimilar 
roles in defending America’s freedoms.2  This forum and a host of other formats, such as 
print and multimedia, have been dedicated to the veritable topic of military-media 
relationships. These efforts were focused on the description of the many differences 
between the military and the media, yet overlooked is the value both entities brought in 
sustaining U.S. democratic ideals. This study seeks to highlight the positive 
characteristics of both organizations and how military-media relationships, especially the 
interactive dynamics of both entities, affect the decision-making process of U.S. Navy 
officers and, ultimately, influences the perception of the civilian community who 
oberseves them both. 
                                                 
1  Harry F. Noyes, III, Maj., USAR, “Like It or Not, The Armed Forces Need the Media,”  ARMY 42 
(June 1992), p. 33. Emphasis in original. 
2 Ethiel, Nancy. “The Military, the Media and the Administration: An Irregular Triangle.”  The 
McCormick Tribune Foundation, Copyright 2002, p. 5. Cantigny Conference Series, Conference Report. 
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According to General Bernard Trainor, both the [sailor] and the reporter seem to 
be idealists.  They look for the ideal world.  They are both mission-oriented.  They treat 
their mission as a sacred trust.  They are both basically honest, yet they know that their 
honesty is sometimes fungible, because let’s face it, there is dishonesty in the military 
and in the journalist’s profession.  Finally, they are both dedicated to what they are 
doing.3 
Therefore, the recommendations from this thesis serve to prescribe means to 
foster institutional trust in the military-media relationship.  In particular, the focus is upon 
U.S. Navy officers and the news media; creating trust beyond mere personal 
relationships. Meaningful, mutually beneficial, collaborative relationships between the 
media and the military are vital to the existence of a democratic society. However, there 
are inherent tensions in this relationship. 
Part of the problem is the disparate roles of the military and media in society.  
Both serve to defend the right of free speech afforded by the First Amendment of the U.S. 
Constitution.  However, the military and the media differ in their methods of executing 
this defense. The press has been given the inherent right to report to the American public 
transgressions of government and since the military is under civilian control, the military 
falls under the same circumstance.  The military on the other hand is sworn to defend 
these ideals by taking up arms in its defense.  Both have very different organizational 
agendas and objectives; to meet these objectives the media must gather information while 
the military must restrict information. 
An adequately informed populace can more effectively communicate their desires 
to their elected officials but to be adequately informed, the populace requires and 
demands accurate information.  The U.S. population receives a majority of their 
information through mass media whether it is in the form of newspapers, magazines, 
television, or documentaries.  Therefore it behooves the military to provide the public 
with the most timely and accurate information that national security will allow.  Trust, 
                                                 
3 Trainor, Bernard E.  Military Perspectives on Humanitarian Intervention and Military-Media 
Relations. Chester W. Nimitz Memoral  Lectures in National Security Affairs, Departments of Military 
Education, International and Area Studies, UC Berkeley, 1995.  p. 31. 
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integrity, and accountability between both the military and news institutions have been 
central themes that have crept up from time to time in the process of building their 
relationship.  However, elements of mistrust, misunderstanding, and a misalignment of 
organizational obligations, and basic miscommunication are factors that “stain” a 
beautiful thing. 
This thesis and the recommendations provide a means of identifying possible 
factors that may create bias in U.S. Navy officers against the media.  Once identified, 
these bias factors, through planned and coordinated education and operational experience, 
can be mitigated.   A reduction, or elimination of bias against the media should result in 
improved information flow to the American public, thereby creating more understanding 
of the military’s mission (by the American public), thereby garnering greater public 
support for the military mission, which ultimately improves the military’s ability to 
conduct its mission and reach operational objectives. 
 
B. AREA OF RESEARCH  
The term media, which this thesis uses abundantly, alludes to both the 
organizations as well as the people that make up the “news business.”  Its Latin 
translation medius means middle or medium, however, the term media has a usage 
problem with its definition.4   In the context of this thesis media are defined as a means of 
mass news, such as newspapers, magazines, radio, or television.  Nevertheless, media can 
also be interpreted to include the group of journalists and others who constitute the news 
industry and profession as part of its definition (e.g., CNN, Fox News, CBS, and NBC 
etc.).  It is also important to note that as the author’s message is key so is the medium 
through which that message is transmitted.  It would therefore be safe to assume that 
media includes the technical and non-technical means of transmission of the data.   
The military in the study is limited to Navy officers of the unrestricted line (URL) 
community (not Navy officers which would include Marine Corps Officers in the 
population).5  The Navy URL represents the demographic of Navy officials most sought 
                                                 
 4   Defined from http://dictionary.reference.com/search?r=2&q=media. 
 5 An Unrestricted Line Officer in the Navy are those officers who are eligible for command at sea 
(surface Warfare Officers, Aviators, and Submariners). 
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by the media for information regarding military events, therefore, if a negative media bias 
exists in this demographic it is most likely to cause the information flow from the 
military to the public (through the media) to be corrupted.6  The focus on surface, 
aviation, and submarine officers is made because not only are these leaders at the 
frontline of the battle so to speak, but they also command, train, and set the standards of 
naval military professionalism.  Moreover, if a shift in attitudes is to occur, this is the 
subset of the overall Navy officer population that would have the most influence in 
changing the policies and procedures that allow bias to exist in the first place. 
For the purposes of this research, bias is understood as something akin to 
prejudice.  If one wants to discuss bias and its affect on relationships, especially between 
the Navy and the media, one should start with the work of Gordon Allport. In his 
definitive work – “The Nature of Prejudice,” he concludes that prejudice exists in our 
society but it does not serve a functional purpose. In fact he mentions that prejudice 
within the social and personality structure are “simultaneously present and form parts of 
single story.”7  Organizations as well as individuals who practice prejudice fall into two 
groups – those who are proactive and those who are complicit.  Even though Navy 
officers display strains of both qualities, the U.S. Navy, just like Allport, concludes that 
prejudices have no business “in the workplace” much less a military operation.  Navy 
officers, especially those in the URL communities are at the “tip of the operational spear” 
for U.S. policy enforcement.  They have the propensity to provide first-hand accounts and 
commentary on the events of a military operation.  The news media are the conduit for 
the successful (and failed) transmission of the messages of these missions to the 
American public.  Therefore, any interruption of this vital communication link causes an 
imbalance not only amongst military professionals and journalists, but also among the 
government and civilian leaders the U.S. Navy receives orders from.  For Allport, any 
                                                 
 6 Raja Holavanahali and CDR John C. Fuller from SWONET support provided one means of accessing 
the URL community, specifically Surface Warfare Officers through their professional website 
http://www.swonet.com. 
 
7 Allport, Gordon W.  The Nature of Prejudice. Cambridge, MA., Addison-Wesley Publishing 
Company, Inc., 1954. p.  514. 
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entrance of prejudice [or bias] into a functioning process such as military-media 
relationships would not be appropriate. 
This thesis follows the work of LT Shawn Bohrer whose research provided a 
historical review of the military-media relationships.8  Using case studies of news media 
coverage of modern armed conflict, LT Bohrer chronicled the straining of military-media 
relationships and explored the necessity of both the media and military in maintaining a 
strong America.  He concluded that military commanders need to understand the purpose 
and function of the media’s role in war reporting: the news media serve as an 
independent and honest link between the military at war and the wider civilian society it 
is sworn to defend.9  
While LT Bohrer takes a broad view of military-media relationships, this study 
delves into the root causes that may upset the balance between Navy military 
professionals and the news media.  To a large degree, the bias displayed by Navy officers 
in this sample study is derived from experiences in their childhood prior to the start their 
military service.  By identifying and improving upon this relationship, the Navy officer, 
specifically those within the unrestricted line communities (URL: aviation, surface, and 
submariners), will understand that the media is not only essential to a strong democratic 
society, but also a valuable ally when managing military operations ranging from 
peacetime to strategic planning.  
So what is an effective mechanism that ensures an uninterrupted pathway in the 
military-media relationship process? Education is one of the keys towards improving, 
defending against, and preventing bias from interfering with a smooth operating process.  
This is what Allport surmised when he asked the question, “Are better educated people 
more tolerant than less educated?”  For him, it seems that higher education lessens 
feelings of insecurity and anxiety.  Education also enables the individual to see the social 
                                                 
8 Bohrer, Shawn A.  Military-Media Relationships: Identifying and Mitigating Military-Media Biases 
To Improve Future Military Operations.  The Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, March 2003. 
Information Systems and Operations (ISO) Code 356 Thesis. 
9 Offley, Ed. Pen & Sword, A Journalist’s Guide to Covering the Military. Oak Park, Il., Marion Street 
Press, Inc., 2001. p. 15. 
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scene as a whole, hence, the welfare of one group is linked to the welfare of all groups.10  
In order to educate the individual, factors that create bias need to be identified.  
Through an online survey given to a sample of Navy officer, this thesis was able 
to identify possible biases. The study suggests that over the course of the Navy officer’s 
career, during specific opportunities of continuing education, such as commissioning 
source, professional military education, and career warfare school refreshers (Department 
Head, Prospective Executive Officer (PXO), Prospective Commanding Office (PCO), 
etc.), the Department of the Navy can optimize the time and resources of its officer corps 
towards mitigating these sources of bias. It is through this multi-faceted approach 
(education, training, experience) that Navy officers can effectively navigate potential 
military-media issues thus molding officers into innovative multi-tasked & multi-thinking 
individuals. 
 
C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS  
1. Primary Research Question 
a) This study presupposes that U.S. Navy officers are biased against the 
news media.  What is the likely source of this bias? 
2. Subsidiary Research Questions 
a) Why is a better military-media relationship important to the U.S. 
Navy? 
b) What can be done to mitigate bias and foster better communication 
and mutual understanding between Navy officers and the news media? 
 
D. METHODOLOGY AND ORGANIZATION 
The study first seeks to verify that a military-media bias exists and then develop 
mitigating measures to alleviate the adverse affects of bias.  The identification of bias is 
done through an online survey; mitigation recommendations are developed through a 
study of educational opportunities.  An online web survey was developed to meet three 
                                                 
10 Allport, Gordon W.  The Nature of Prejudice. Cambridge, MA., Addison-Wesley Publishing 
Company, Inc., 1954. p.  433. 
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specific objectives- first, to gather demographic data of the active duty Navy officer 
respondents; second, determine if there is possible bias by this same Navy officer 
population towards the news media; and finally, determine how the respondents feel 
about the military’s, specifically the Navy’s, role in a post-Cold War/9-11environment.11   
 
E. BENEFITS OF STUDY 
The benefit of a targeted study such as this is to identify bias that could interfere 
with effective military operations.  If this study can identify evidence of bias amongst an 
operational-oriented corps of Navy officers (aviators, submariners, and surface officers), 
it might be possible to use the vast resources of the Navy’s existing training and 
education establishment to outline steps to alleviate this bias and enhance military-media 
relationships.  Such a step will transform the Department of Defense by giving its 
professional military leadership better leverage in preparing for future military 
operations. 
Although this thesis focuses on a single demographic within a single service 
(Unrestricted Line Officers in the U.S. Navy) the results provide a methodology 
applicable to all military and government branches as a means of identifying bias 
between the military and the media.  The news media play a pivotal role in American 
society and should be duly considered in all aspects of military planning.   The media are 
the primary conduit of information from the military to the public.  It is through this 
conduit that the public will see the military as competent defenders of U.S. national 
security or a bungling, aloof organization more interested in self-preservation than 
defending the principles of democracy. 
 7
                                                 
11 Data were collected on the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) Internet server and exported into 
both the survey software, Survey Said™, database file and spreadsheet format. Using Microsoft Excel™, 
the data was analyzed with emphasis on the frequency of responses to certain questions, the median of 
ranked responses to questions, and a selection of several categories to describe respondent’s views and 
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II. MILITARY AND MEDIA BACKGROUND 
For most…the matter of learning is one of personal preference.  But for 
[military] officers, the obligation to learn, to grow in their profession, is 
clearly a public duty. 
-- General Omar N. Bradley12 
The noted war theorist Carl von Clausewitz states that popular support is a main 
factor in achieving strategic success on the battlefield.13  With the ability of the news 
media to keep the public immediately informed of events around the globe, popular 
support is more critical than ever for today’s military commanders.  To this end, both the 
news media and the officer corps of America’s military must do more to understand each 
other.  Recent trends in the media coverage of armed conflicts have shown a tendency for 
military commanders to either not understand the purpose of the news media in modern 
warfare or to have not been prepared to utilize the media as a valuable resource in 
winning popular support at home. 
Not long ago, threats to the United States’ national security could easily be 
generalized into the countries that made up the Communist Bloc (WARSAW PACT 
nations.).  With the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991, the nature of national threats was 
changed.  Previous doctrine was concerned with a possible massive Soviet invasion 
through the Fulda Gap in Europe; however, the threats to United States’ national 
objectives and interests in the post-Cold War era are ambiguous and regionally focused.  
Current American military doctrine refers to operations at the opposite end of the 
spectrum of conflict as Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW). MOOTW 
require high levels of public support since the purpose for U.S. involvement is sometimes 
vague.  Most people do not readily understand how, for instance, the inability to get 
humanitarian aid to a starving population is a U.S. national objective (as in Somalia).14 
 9
                                                 
 12 Quoted in “Professional Military Education: An Asset for Peace and Progress,” [The Cheney 
Report] Washington, DC:  The Center for Strategic and International Studies, March 1997, p. 17. 
 13 von Clausewitz, Carl.  1976.  On War.  Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, p. 363.  
 14  Bohrer, Shawn A.  Military-Media Relationships: Identifying and Mitigating Military-Media Biases 
To Improve Future Military Operations.  The Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, March 2003. 
 












Perceived Threat Enemy Invasion Nuclear War 
Subnational (e.g., ethnic violence, 
terrorism) 
Force Structure Mass army, conscription 
Large professional 
army Small professional army 
Major Mission 
Definition 
Defense of homeland Support of alliance New missions (e.g., peacekeeping, humanitarian) 
Public Attitude 
toward Military 
Supportive Ambivalent Indifferent 
Media Relations Incorporated Manipulated Courted 
Conscientious 
Objection 
Limited or prohibited Routinely permitted Subsumed under civilian service 
 
Table 1, illustrates the changes in threats, attitudes, and force structure with 
regards to the United States’ armed forces.  The trend of our forces is toward smaller and 
much smarter compositions, while the threat has become more complex and infers that 
the threat in any conflict can never be absolutely discounted.  Of special note are the 
attitudes of the civilian populace and the military-media relationship.  The notice of the 
public’s once supportive attitude towards the military to their current feeling of 
indifference, supports the existence of a civil-military gap that was highlighted all the 
more by former Secretary of Defense William Cohen stating that: 
A chasm…developing between the military and civilian worlds, where the 
civilian world doesn’t fully grasp the mission of the military, and the 
military doesn’t understand why the memories of our citizens and civilian 
policy-makers are so short, or why the criticism is so quick and 
unrelenting.16  
The military-media relationship has been in a state of flux since the end of World 
War II.  World War II marked a high point and set the benchmark for a mutually 
                                                 
Information Systems and Operations (ISO) Code 356 Thesis. 
 15 Moskos, Charles C.  The Postmodern Military: Armed Forces After the Cold War.  New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2000. 
 16  Cohen, William.  From 1997 speech at Yale University. 
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supportive military-media relationship.  In more recent conflicts such as Operation 
Enduring Freedom (OEF) and the subsequent Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), there is a 
better more cooperative stance taken by Pentagon and Department of Defense officials 
with regards to military-media relationships.  Embedded reporters within military units, 
media training “boot camps” where journalists are put through the rigors of simulated 
combat are just a few of the examples where a more tolerant, and sensitive policy towards 
the media’s role in reporting has come about.  But this relationship has been shaped from 
a bedrock of fundamental values: trust, mutual respect, and professionalism despite the 
very different agendas of each organization.  Essentially, the responses to the survey 
(Navy officers strive to do their job well given the opportunity to learn more skills to do 
it) convey to the Navy leadership that there is more that they can do.  To build 
institutional trust between two veritable entities such as the military and the media, the 
Navy must equip its future leaders with the tools to breach the short-term goal of personal 
readiness, but set its sights further – the future readiness of the U.S. Navy depends on a 
well-educated, innovative, and adaptive force structure.  This begins with a renewed 
focus on solidifying military-media relationships in light of the changing 21st century 
environment.  
The media have, since the beginning of the United States, been a crucial element 
of American society.  Journalists keep the public informed of local, regional, national and 
international happenings, and act as watchdogs for the American public.  While some 
have argued over the extent the media should question the government, especially in time 
of war, the media do serve a valuable role in American society. They help to ensure the 
rights and freedoms of Americans are protected by providing information on actions that 
would threaten these ideals.  A recent ABC News survey found that nearly 90% of 
Americans say that a free press is either ‘very important’ or ‘essential’ to them, going 
further to say that the media should work mainly to question rather than to support the 
government. 17  However, during a time of war nearly two thirds of the people polled said 
that the government has the right to prevent the media from reporting information that 
may divulge military or operational secrets.  Looking back to public perceptions during 
 11
                                                 
 17 This survey was conducted on January 12th, 2003; “ABC News Nightline Poll:  The Media in 
Wartime”. 
Desert Storm, a 1991 Gallup survey found that four out of five Americans believed that 
military censorship was a “good idea.”18 
A rift between the military and the media prevents the military from reaching the 
public with its own story. Fostering a healthy and mutually understanding relationship 
with the media has big advantages for the military, so long as the media also appreciates 
and respects the necessity of national security and the effects their far-reaching message 
can have on strategy and operations.  The military-media relationship has been, for the 
most part, mutually beneficial.  In the United States, the First Amendment of the 
Constitution guarantees freedom of the press, yet during warfare it has always been 
necessary to limit this freedom for reasons of military secrecy and security. 19 
Just as the Gulf War illustrated new methods of bringing the front lines of battle 
to the American (and international) public, technology is making the public thirstier than 
ever for up-to-the-minute news coverage.  The rise of 24-hour a day cable news stations 
and news outlets based on Internet technology have connected the public to all corners of 
the globe, and created a need to feed information to the public.20  As illustrated as far 
back as the Civil War and Spanish-American War, wars sell newspapers, and in today’s 
case, garner television viewers and hits on Internet websites. 21 
To what extent then should the media have access to and report on military 
operations? Most Navy officers in this study say that the media should have complete 
access, with few exceptions; and even those are debatable (see Appendix G – SECDEF 
CJCS media guidance).  “In recent years, the tendency to formulate U.S. foreign policy 
with little or no formal debate between the administration and the Congress has left a 
                                                 
 18 Fialka, John.  Hotel Warriors: Covering the Gulf War.  Woodrow Wilson Press: Washington DC, 
1992, p.  61-62. 
 19 Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise 
thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; right of the people peaceably to assemble, and 
to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.  The Constitution of the United States of America 
As Amended. 106th Congress 2d Session, House of Representatives. Document No. 106-214. U.S. 
Government Printing Office Washington DC: 2000. p. 13. 
 20 Fox News, MSNBC, CNN, etc. 
 21 When William Randolph Hearst instructed his reporter to stay in Cuba because if he would furnish 
the pictures, Hearst would furnish the War.  Quoted in Knightley’s The First Casualty, p. 56.  
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vacuum that the media has rushed to fill.”22   The need for operational secrecy as well as 
the requirement to keep the public informed is a delicate balance that, when mishandled, 
can send the military-media relationship into a disastrous tailspin much like the aftermath 
of the Vietnam War.  However, in the United States the press serves as the first guarantor 
of our most basic civil rights, and thus has the responsibility to inquire why national 
policy does not match national strategy. Without the media present on the battlefield, the 
only story that would reach the American public is that of the government.  While the 
American government undoubtedly prides itself on being the authority of democratic 
liberties, without the checks and balances provided by the media, rampant mistrust by the 
American public would be sure to plague reports that are solely provided by the military.  
For instance, trusted media personnel provide a conduit for military officers to voice their 
dissension of senior leaders’ decisions by way of unofficial “leaks” of privileged 
information.  The media report this information, it gets debated, a better informed 
decision is made, and all parties concerned continue their respective roles in the process. 
Hence, the media serve the function of communicating the conflict to the American 
people. So, preparation in working with the media must be incorporated into military 
operations to ensure that reliable, truthful, information is reported and meaningful 
interaction fostered between both organizations.  This will set the stage of shifting 
military attitudes against the media in the direction of championing concerted efforts with 
the media. 
More recently, in preparation for impending conflict with Iraq, the press pools of 
the 1990s have been abandoned in favor of the embedded reporter, similar to the days of 
Vietnam, “when reporters traveled with front-line troops. The Pentagon allowed about 
500 reporters to “embed” with various fighting units—living with and reporting on them 
from deployment right into battle and back home again.”23 Self imposed guidelines, such 
as those used in Korea and Vietnam, are being used in conjunction with new rules—
which are a result of the improvements in telecommunications and enemy capabilities to 
                                                 
 22 Porch, Douglas.  No Bad Stories: The American Media-Military Relationship.  Navy War College 
Review, Winter 2002. 
 23 Johnson, Peter.  Reporters Have Own Rules of War,  USA Today, February 16, 2003.  
http://www.usatoday.com/life/2003-02-17-war-sidebar.htm (March 2003). 
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geo-locate electronic emissions.  Embedding reporters with military units will allow 
mutual trust to foster between soldiers and reporters and allow the American public to 
experience the sacrifices made by their soldiers, airmen, and sailors. 
 
A. URL EDUCATION AND TRAINING 
Historically, advances in communications, transportation and weapon systems 
have had profound impacts on military organization, strategy and doctrine. The evolution 
of mass communications through the 19th and 20th centuries is no exception.  Although 
the media and mass communications exist exclusive of the military, they impact the way 
militaries conduct operations.  Moreover, military operations affect the type of education 
and training leaders receive, specifically U.S. Navy officerNavy officers in the 
unrestricted line (URL) communities. 
The Navy has an overriding self-interest in getting its overwhelmingly positive 
story out.  To do so, it must communicate the leadership’s views from the top down, and 
improve public affairs education at all levels, but especially among the young officers 
who will become the next generation of leaders.  According to Aukofer and Lawrence, 
future military leaders do not receive adequate news media education and training as they 
move through the ranks.24 Senior Navy officers get the media training, Junior officers 
(JO) do not (unless they are a Public Affairs Officer).  Survey analysis show that senior 
leaders may soften to the media but that is because they receive training.  Those senior 
officers, who do not become hardened or calcified in their attitudes towards the news 
media, make the best advocates for a more cooperative Navy-media relationship.   JO’s 
are young and innovative and if given the media training, at least piecemeal versions of it 
over their career, they learn a useful skill set over time.  Moreover, the analysis indicates 
that JO’s who do not know how to handle the media take a subordinated view passed 
directly or, in most cases indirectly, from their seniors who may have had a bad 
experience with the press in the past. Either way, long-term readiness and preparation is 
key here for young Navy officers. 
                                                 
24 Aukofer, Frank and William P. Lawrence.  America’s Team; The Odd Couple—A Report on the 
Relationship Between the Media and the Military.  The Freedom Forum First Amendment Center: 
Nashville, TN, 1995, p 5. 
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Since the media are an organization of people, ultimately the critical human 
relationship skills in dealing with the media can only be taught through lifelong 
systematic experiential and schoolhouse pedagogy.  It would therefore be useful and 
germane to the subject of this chapter to explain how a Navy officer’s training and 
education path can give insight into possible solutions towards building and fostering a 
better military-media relationship.  
1. Flag Officer Media Training 
U.S Navy officers aspire to command ships at sea; successful command at sea is a 
prerequisite to achieving Flag rank (Rear Admiral and above).  Whereas the ship’s 
captain makes policy onboard his or her own vessel, Admiral’s make Navy-wide policy.  
More significant, however, is that Admiral’s may be called upon to advise on U.S. 
national policy.  This highly visible role will inevitably place the Admiral in the media 
spotlight at some point.   
Commander William R. Fenick, the News Desk Director within the Department 
of the Navy Office of Information is responsible for preparing and training these senior 
Navy officers to deal with the media. Adhering to the military-media tenets of openness, 
honesty, and access, he was able to describe the specifics of the type of training senior 
officers go through as well as the theory behind the curricula.25   
The responsibility of training and preparing sailors and marines for any measure 
of conflict falls under the responsibility of its senior leadership.  This same philosophy of 
preparation holds true when it comes to military-media relationships.  In the war of words 
and messages, education and preparation are key factors. According to this excerpt from 
the U.S. Air Force Public Affairs Center of Excellence (PACE), media preparation is an 
all-hands effort (the Depart of Navy Office of Information, would be the closest 
comparison). 
                                                 
25 Department of Defense (DoD) Directive 5400.13: Current DOD Principles of Information can be 
found in the final coordination draft of Joint Publication 3-61, Doctrine for Public Affairs in Joint 
Operations (19 August 2002).  This document can be located at www.dtic.mil/doctrine. The finished 
document is expected to be published in August 03. In implementing the DOD Principles of Information, 
the combatant commanders shall grant the news media, both civilian and military, access to unclassified 
joint, combined and unilateral operations, consistent with operations security and prevailing public affairs 
guidance (PAG).  
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So that an organization is not caught off guard when the media come 
calling, it must prepare its senior officials to deal with reporters. In this 
era, anyone can be tapped to be the company spokesman with very little 
warning, and the person selected should not be thrust into the spotlight 
unprepared. In the Air Force, not only should every commander, every 
program manager, every senior officer know and be able to apply the 
techniques required to deal effectively with the media, but all Air Force 
personnel, officer, enlisted, and civilian, should be prepared to talk to the 
press about their individual pieces of the Air Force story. They must be 
aware of reporters’ styles and techniques, and they must understand how 
to react in situations in which they’re confronted by the media.26 
This same philosophy applies to the U.S. Navy and since this study analyzes the 
attitudes of Navy officers towards the communications media, it is important to address 
and outline “the standard” for media training in the Navy.  According to CDR Fenick, 
many non-Navy senior officers request this type of customized media training the Navy 
gives to its senior officers. The popularity, in addition to the effectiveness of this 
program, may be due in large part to its customization features.  The Navy’s media 
training program is tailored to the trainee to provide them with the factors and skills they 
require.  Appendix E outlines a sample training request for National Aeronautics and 
Space Agency (NASA) Shuttle Program Officials, Bryan O’Conner and Bill Parsons.  
Because it is personalized, the duration of training may vary, but in the media training 
example in Appendix E, the training took approximately three hours. General highlights 
of the training, include a media training brief (of which the notes are included in 
Appendix E), an interview, remote interview, media ambush (involves a question the 
trainee might not be prepared to answer), and a press conference.  Every stage of the 
training allows the trainee the opportunity for self-assessment and critique by the 
individual themselves (they are being recorded as part of on-camera practice) as well as 
the media center staff.  
Comparing this type of preparation to a commercially available product like 
MediaWorks Group, a company founded by Mark Berheimer, for business and 
professional executives is necessary because the same skills taught by the U.S. Navy is 
                                                 
26   “Meeting the Media:  A practical guide to assist military personnel and DoD civilians in preparing 
to speak with representatives of the news media.”  Compiled and edited by the U.S. Air Force Public 
Affairs Center of Excellence 2002 edition.  College of Aerospace Doctrine, Research and Education, Air 
University. p 8. 
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also valued in the private sector.27  Berheimer’s organization provides important media 
training tips to business clients to help them gain effective media communications skills.  
A summary of some of the advice he gives follow: 
• “Never lie” 
• Educate reporters in the course of answering questions, few reporters 
know the topics they are covering. Calmly correct misconceptions, and 
refer to the reporter for sources of information 
• Never say “no comment.” Learn various ways to present your basic 
message and to transition to other points you want to make. 
• Never repeat negative language. 
• Always answer questions in your own words. 
• Treat the interview as a conversation rather than an interrogation, but 
resist the temptation to buddy-up to a reporter. Also, never use off-color 
language and don’t try to preface any of your remarks with “this is off the 
record.” 
• Most reporters will conclude an interview by asking a variation of the 
question: “Anything else?” Use that opportunity to repeat the message. 
• Do not be a robot; let your charisma shine through. 
  The Navy leadership should find comfort in the fact that there are resources 
available within the naval organization that conduct this type of customized media 
training and preparation (as outlined in Appendix E).  As a result, it is not unreasonable 
that this media program for senior officers should be made available to junior officers 
over specific points in their career.  There has been a steady call by civil and military 
leadership to strengthen civil-military instruction in professional military education. 
Furthermore, because a professional working relationship between the military and the 
media is important, young Navy officers should get training in dealing with the media; 
they are trainable.  Such a step of steady, sustained education coupled with operational 
experience, will help properly prepare our future Navy leadership.  Senior officers that 
have this practical training are armed with the basic tenets to successfully conduct 
effective media communications. For instance, in an article by Mark McGuire in which 
                                                 
27   Rowe, Jeff. “Business Tuneup, Mark Bernheimer: Teaching people to deal successfully with the 
media,” Orange County Register, Copyright 2000-2002 my orangecounty.com.  Mark Bernheimer’s web 
site is www.mediaworksgroup.com.  
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he discusses senior officer and strategic leadership development, several respondents he 
polled recommended conducting professional military education earlier in officers’ 
careers to provide an enhanced awareness of national and international security 
strategy.28 
2. Navy officer Education and Training 
Clearly, it should be easier to mold the attitudes among personnel in the Navy, 
since it is more homogeneous, hierarchical, and disciplined than the news media.  
Additionally, the military profession is unique in that there is little or no middle- or top-
level entry.  Personnel start at the bottom and work their way up, providing an extended 
period in which education and attitude development can be accomplished. 
Research for this study indicates that military leaders need to better explain to 
personnel, particularly those in the junior ranks, that the democratic system is vitally 
dependent on an informed public and that the news media is society’s key institution for 
this function.  For the good of this country, therefore, Navy officers, have an obligation to 
help the press fulfill its role.  Military leaders should stress that, because war is such a 
significant national event, the American people deserve to know as much as possible 
about its conduct. 
The armed forces have a well-defined system of formal Professional Military 
Education (PME) which is separate and distinct from training in such warfare skills, 
tactics, weapon systems operation, etc. (see Figures 1, 2, & 3).  It is through this system 
that the URL officers receive formal education and can learn their responsibilities 
towards the news media. 
There are five levels of PME, each available to officers of certain 
rank/experience, as follows: pre-commissioning (cadets, midshipmen, officer candidates), 
primary(O-3), intermediate (O-4), senior (O-5, O-6) and Capstone (O-7).  Most of the 
programs at the intermediate and senior level are nine- to 10-months duration taught at 
the Army War College, Naval War College, Air University, Marine Corps University, the 
National War College, the Industrial College of the Armed Forces, Army Command and 
                                                 
28 McGuire, Mark A. Senior Officers and Senior Leader Development.  JFQ Autumn/Winter 2001-02, 
p. 91-96.  http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/jfq_pubs/1829.pdf. 
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General Staff College and the Armed Forces Staff College.  Looking at the options 
above, it seems that the military finds it important to educate its senior officers in media 
relations, but not the junior officers. 
The major role of the pre-commissioning source schools is to establish the 
attitudinal foundation on which future military officers build throughout their careers, and 
this is the area where the most emphasis should be given.  In addition to the prescribed 
academic course load, media training can be accomplished through lectures and 
discussions with academy leaders and guest speakers, including those from the media 
professions.  It is absolutely vital that fledgling officers adopt a healthy attitude towards 
the news media, for this sets the course for the remainder of their careers.29 
At the U.S. Naval Academy (USNA), in addition to education and training in 
military operational arts, every midshipman’s academic program begins with a core 
curriculum that includes courses in engineering, science, mathematics, humanities and 
social science. This is designed to give midshipmen a broad-based education that will 
qualify them for practically any career field in the Navy or Marine Corps. At the same 
time, the USNA majors program gives midshipmen the opportunity to develop a 
particular area of academic interest. 
At leading universities across the country, Navy Reserve Officer and Training 
Corps (NROTC) midshipmen professional and leadership training is developed and 
nurtured as opposed to just telling future Navy officers about life in the Navy and Marine 
Corps. Over the course of four years both NROTC and at the Naval Academy 
midshipmen have professional classroom studies backed by many hours of practical 
experience in leadership and naval operations, including assignments with Navy and 
Marine Corps units during summer months. 
Over the course of four years, cadets and midshipmen concurrently take military 
courses that instruct them in warfare fundamentals such as navigation, amphibious 
warfare, and weapons systems to name a few.   Unfortunately, NROTC, OCS, and the 
                                                 
29 Aukofer, Frank and William P. Lawrence.  America’s Team; The Odd Couple—A Report on the 
Relationship Between the Media and the Military.  The Freedom Forum First Amendment Center: 
Nashville, TN, 1995, p 81. 
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academy programs offer no training concerning the news media.  The NROTC program 
provides a singular opportunity to increase contacts between the military and future 
civilian leaders.  It should be recognized that NROTC not only recruits high-quality 
young officers, but could also create relationships between elite youth and the military.  It 
could provide the opportunity to expand courses in military history and national security 
for college students, which are popular courses that are also useful in teaching new 
generations of leaders about military affairs. 
This investment in professional and collegiate education is evidence that 
institutional education is one of the primary vehicles in which to process the experiences 
Navy officers will encounter in operational assignments and synthesize into new 
frameworks for the future. Thus the placement of institutional education that 
complements and enhances operational assignments is a critical component towards 
developing successful, well-rounded Navy officers.  
Although the Navy has effective senior leader development programs, there is 
cause for concern. Given increasing mission demands coupled with the broadening 
complexity, uncertainty, and ambiguity of the global environment, the naval forces must 
continuously strive to improve professional development, ensuring that leaders are 
prepared to meet future challenges, including dealing with a rapidly evolving public 
information environment. There are no easy options, but there are clearly requirements 
for additional initiatives to offset the effects of a relentless operational tempo.30 
                                                 
 30  McGuire, Mark A. Senior Officers and Senior Leader Development.  JFQ Autumn/Winter 2001-02, P 91-96.  
http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/jfq_pubs/1829.pdf. 
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B. NEWS MEDIA  
The military, as an institution, fares very well in public esteem compared to non-
governmental institutions such as the media and public schools.32 However, the media 
are a part of the military operations landscape.  The story of the events unfolding for a 
particular mission will be told, therefore, military leaders, specifically young Navy 
officers have to influence the message and how it is being transmitted by the news media. 
The media, like our young Navy officers, need the experiences, the training, and the 
interaction in order to become better reporters.  Navy officers would be wise to learn how 
the media conveys their stories and to utilize the media to tell Department of Defense 
stories!  Ultimately, Americans want to trust the commanders to whom they have 
entrusted the lives of their sons and daughters. 
1. Definition and Purpose 
There is a functionalist perspective when sociologists refer to the media.    
Functionalists approach the study of mass media from the standpoint that the media 
contribute to the benefit of society as a whole.  In his classic 1975 work, Charles Wright 
outlines four ways in which the mass media contribute to creating equilibrium in 
society:33  
a.  The media coordinate and correlate information that is valuable to the culture.  
b.  The media are powerful agents of socialization. Through the media, cultural 
norms and values are communicated to the masses.  
c.  The media serve society through social control.  
d.  By providing entertainment, the media act as stress relievers for members of 
society, which keeps social conflicts to a minimum.  
News reporting has been a focus of sociological research into the functions of the 
media. Both Paul Lazersfeld and Robert Merton argue that news essentially has two 
functions when it comes to transmitting social values and norms:  
                                                 
32 Feaver, P.D. and Kohn, R.H. Soldiers and Civilians: The Civil-Military Gap & National Security. 
MIT Press, Cambridge, MA 2001, p. 133. 
33   Wright, Charles. Mass Communication: A Sociological Perspective. New York: Random House, 
1986. 
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a.  Status conferral refers to the importance given some social issues over others 
in the news media. The fact that certain issues receive attention raises their importance in 
the eyes of the culture.  
b.  The ethicizing effect suggests that society's norms, values, and beliefs (ethics) 
are reinforced through media surveillance. By focusing on wrongdoings in society, the 
media act as a kind of "morality squad." By giving attention to the consequences of 
criminal and other behavior, the media reinforce ideas of what is good and what is right. 
This is true not only when the media report facts about crime and deviance (murders, 
robberies, etc.), but also when they shed light on issues that were intended to remain 
private, particularly in the case of corporations and governments. President Clinton's 
encounters with Monica Lewinsky and Prime Minister Chrétien's alleged involvement in 
the handling of the APEC protesters in 1997 are excellent examples of the media's 
ethicizing effect.  
While these aspects of the mass media can be seen as functional, they also can be 
interpreted as dysfunctional. For example, the media's over-reporting of a bad year in 
Navy ship mishaps may lead the American public to feel that the U.S. Navy is not safe to 
get underway, when in fact the opposite may be true.34 
Finally, one cannot talk of news media and not mention information technology, 
particularly the Internet, as playing a role in military-media dynamics.   Just a few years 
ago there was a mid-air collision off Hainan Island in the South China Sea involving a 
U.S. Navy EP-3 Aries II reconnaissance aircraft and a Chinese F-8 fighter on April 1, 
2001.  Both the Chinese and U.S. governments took starkly different political positions 
over the incident.  What was interesting was how information from both sides became 
accessible to reporters, common citizens, in the U.S. and around the world.  This allowed 
both countries to have an influence on events as they unfolded real-time.  According to 
Ed Offley, four technological capabilities played key roles in the EP-3 incident:  (1) the 
use of Internet portals and websites by both governments to disseminate and update 
information on the ongoing incident; (2) the widespread publishing of independent, 
                                                 
 34 Maurin, Peter. “Mass Media, A Canadian Perspective.” Mohawk College  
http://www.prenticehall.ca/divisions/hss/macionis/massmedia.html. 
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civilian satellite photographs of the aircraft to confirm and show its location on Hainan 
Island; (3) the use of digital videophone images by CNN to make a covert, live broadcast 
of the EP-3 aircrew boarding a commercial aircraft upon release from detention; and (4) 
the fusion of video, audio and text into true multimedia presentations via media Internet 
sites.35  The point here is the military and the media alike are navigating new terrain, 
from the proliferation of news outlets to new circumstances in the battlefield to the 
instantaneous dissemination of information. By and large, each institution is meeting the 
other’s needs. 
Now, more than ever, the Internet directly involves American journalists and 
ordinary citizens in our nation’s operations – in peace and in war.  Not only does this 
increase the complexities of how the military presents its message to the public, so too 
must the news media find a balance in how the U.S. military’s message is reported to 
American citizens; and in some cases the world. 
The unique requirements of wartime news coverage impose extraordinary 
demands on both the military and the press. Special effort is required for the press to 
report on wars without jeopardizing the military’s battlefield effectiveness and without 
revealing information valuable to the enemy.  This can only be accomplished by effective 
planning and close cooperation with the news media, both before and during a 
conflict/crisis.  It is vital that this be thoroughly understood by all in the military. 
Since this section discusses the need to educate Navy officers to change their 
attitudes, the next section cites the necessary evidence of the root causes of military bias 
against the news media. 
                                                 
35  Offley, Ed. Pen & Sword, A Journalist’s Guide to Covering the Military. Marion Street Press, Inc., 
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III.   MILITARY-MEDIA RELATIONSHIP SURVEY 
…we in the armed forces of the United States must account for our actions 
with the American people whom we serve, by dealing openly and well 
with the representatives of the nation’s free press.   We are also 
responsible for protecting classified or sensitive information related to the 
national security and will be challenged by the news media concerning 
such information.  It is our duty as members of the Armed Forces to 
balance these demands in a responsible and intelligent fashion. 
--Joint Pub 1, Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces of the United States 
A.   BACKGROUND 
In 1999, as part of the Cantigny Conference Series, a survey commissioned by the 
Robert R. McCormick Tribune Foundation and conducted by the Gallup Organization, 
polled the American public, one-and two-star officers in the United States military, and 
representatives of the media.  The study showed that considerable bias exists between the 
media and the military and points to specific reasons for that bias—with the major 
reasons for bias being that military officers, editors, and other media “gatekeepers” are 
more interested in selling “their” news rather than accurate reporting.  Moreover, the 
media, through negligence and lack of ethos in their reporting, threaten national security 
and military operations.  The McCormick survey demonstrated military bias against the 
media at the upper tier of military leadership, this thesis’ survey was engineered to extend 
the military polling to the more junior ranks of Navy officerNavy officers.  Doing so may 
reveal a clear, distinct point in an officer's lifetime in which these biases are developed 
towards the media. 
  
B.   THE SURVEY 
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Using the 1999 survey conducted by the Gallup organization as the control 
survey, this study modeled its questions in the same format.  The intent was to see if 
answers from the 1999 survey given to senior officers differed from those given to junior 
officers in the 2003 survey, Appendix B gives a sample of the same questions that were 
administered to the survey respondents in 1999.  The demographic data allow the 
researcher to identify cases of bias based on age, rank, gender, educational background, 
upbringing, commissioning source, and political views.  Once root causes for military-
media biases are uncovered, proposed methods to mitigate those biases are recommended 
to foster a better relationship between these two entities. 36 
Survey Said ™ was the software package used to develop and implement the 
online survey. 37   It was chosen for three specific reasons: ease of use, cost efficiency, 
and all-around analytic capabilities.  Below is a brief overview of the details the software 
package offers. 
Survey Design  
General Specifications 
* Questions and Answers in surveys can be used as libraries 
* Duplicate Question facility enables rapid question creation 
* Keyword association with question for rapid identification 
* Search feature finds questions in survey by word or phrase 
* Question text length can be well over 500 characters 
* Individual answer lengths can be well over 100 characters 
* Up to 2000 questions/survey with up to 115 answers/question 
* No Limit to the number of respondents/survey (Survey Said 3) 
* 100% automatic generation of survey onto the mail out diskette 
* 100% automatic generation of printed survey producing survey form 
* 100% automatic generation of HTML and JAVA Internet/Intranet survey 
* Ability to void individual respondents in database 




* Touch Screen PC systems 
                                                 
 36   Bohrer, Shawn A.  Military-Media Relationships: Identifying and Mitigating Military-Media 
Biases To Improve Future Military Operations.  The Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, March 
2003. Information Systems and Operations (ISO) Code 356 Thesis. 
 37   The user is required to download the demo version of the software package.  Once this is done you 
must work with the Education Analyst within the Office of Academic Administration at NPS in order to 
have the survey hosted on the NPS internet host server (http://www.surveysaid.com/). 
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* Standalone desktop PCs 
* Networked PCs on a LAN 
* Networked PCs on a WAN 
* Laptop PCs (road warriors) 
* WEB via Internet Browsers 
* Surveys by Mail Diskette 
* Printed Paper Form Surveys 
 
Cost Effective Licensing 
* Single or Multiple concurrent administrator licenses 
* Single or Multiple concurrent respondent licenses 
* Extremely Cost effective concurrent use licenses 
* Licenses can be purchased from 1 to 1000 administrators 
* Licenses can be purchased from 1 to 1000 respondents 




* Frequency of answers by Count and Percent 
* Banner grouping of four questions by a primary 
* Cross tables by primary, secondary and tertiary 
* Verbatim analysis by keyword or phrase matching 
* Code verbatim responses for quantitative analysis 
* Verbatim sorting by a fixed choice question (e.g. age, etc.) 
* Two-dimensional Ranking tables and graphs 
* Multi-Field numeric grouping in variable window size 
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C.   IMPLEMENTING THE SURVEY 
The survey was conducted on the Internet, hosted on a Naval Postgraduate School 
(NPS) server, and directed towards unrestricted line officers (URL) in the United States 
Navy.  In order to comply with NAVPGSCOLINST 3900.4, Protection of Human 
Subjects, a request, outlined in Appendix A, was submitted to the Institutional Review 
Board (IRB), along with a copy of the intended survey questions listed in Appendix B.   
Once approved, the survey, entered into the online survey software processing package, 
was posted as a link on a website hosted on an NPS server.  Email invitations were sent 
out to Surface Warfare, Aviation, and Submarine Officers within NPS, Department Head 
School in Newport Rhode Island, Naval War College students, Public Affairs Officers 
(PAO) of Naval Air Pacific as well as Atlantic, and SWONET – a dedicated website for 
Surface Officers, and a public website open to URL officers.  The form letter, sent via 
electronic mail, sought random participants to take the survey.  Respondents who took 
the survey remained anonymous and were encouraged to distribute the form via e-mail 
with attached link to the survey to other officers within their respective commands, 
schools, or personal email address list.   This process introduced possible errors, which 
will be discussed later, and made tracking the number or controlling who answered (or 
did not) the survey difficult. 
1. Discussions on Conducting Web-based Surveys 
The growth of the Internet has impacted virtually every aspect of society; survey 
research is no exception.  Four years ago in an informal search of Yahoo, Kay and 
Johnson identified over 2,000 Web-based surveys in 59 areas.38 The interest in Web-
based surveying is not surprising as it offers a number of distinct advantages over more 
traditional mail and phone techniques. These advantages include reducing the time and 
cost of conducting a survey and avoiding the often error prone and tedious task of data 
entry.39  
                                                 
38 Kaye B.K. & Johnson T.J. (1999) .Research Methodology: Taming the Cyber Frontier. Social 
Science Computer Review, 17, P 323-337. 
39 Medin, C., Roy, S. & Ann, T. (1999) World Wide Web versus mail surveys: A comparison and 
report.. Paper presentation at ANZMAC99 Conference, Marketing in the Third Millennium, Sydney, 
Australia, available from http://www.anzmac99.unsw.edu.au/anzmacfiles/papers.htm. 
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Email offers one option for distributing Internet surveys. Up until a few years ago 
email surveys were the predominate means of Internet surveying. As the World Wide 
Web (WWW) has grown in popularity, the use of Hypertext Markup Language (HTML) 
forms or Web-based surveys are becoming the dominant method of gathering survey 
data. These forms streamline the data collection process formatting and entering 
responses directly into a database for analysis. Since HTML forms can be made 
programmable, it is also possible to have real time error checking and correction 
increasing the accuracy of the data collection process. The formatting capabilities of 
HTML allow the creation of easy-to-read and attractive forms that may improve response 
rates. In addition, the programmability of HTML forms makes it possible to randomly 
order responses and tailor options based on information the respondent supplies earlier in 
the survey.  
Combining an email "cover letter" as a means of contacting sampled people with 
the use of an HTML form for data collection provides an especially effective and 
efficient approach to Internet surveying. Modern email packages automatically convert 
universal resource locators (URLs) or web-addresses in the text of an email into 
hyperlinks. Placing the URL of the survey form in a cover letter email allows the 
respondent to "click" their mouse on the URL to display the survey form and 
subsequently fill it out.  
 a.  Concerns about Web-based Surveying  
 Although Web-based surveying is very attractive, because it is still a 
relatively new way of conducting survey compared to the gold-standard of personal 
interviews or written solicitation, it should be used with caution. Currently the biggest 
concern in Internet surveying is coverage bias or bias due to sampled people not having 
or choosing not to access the Internet (Kay & Johnson, 1999; Crawford, Couper & 
Lamias, 2001). Despite exponential growth of the Internet there are still large numbers of 
people who do not have access and/or choose not to use the Internet. It is also clear that 
there are wide disparities in Internet access among ethnic and socioeconomic groups 
(Selwyn & Robson, 1998).  
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 There are specific populations where Internet access is extremely high and 
coverage bias is likely to be less of a concern. The United States Air Force (USAF) 
Surveys branch, an office of the Air Force Personnel Center at Randolph Air Force Base, 
San Antonio, Texas, surveys Air Force active-duty personnel and their family members, 
Air Force civilian employees, Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve personnel and 
their dependents, and Air Force retirees.  The USAF Surveys Branch previously 
conducted paper-based surveys via postal mail, but it has recently converted to 
conducting surveys entirely over the Internet.  The office is staffed with only four people 
who are responsible for drafting, fielding, and analyzing surveys of more than 350,000 
active-duty Air Force personnel located throughout the world. 
 The success of this electronic approach, used extensively by the U.S. Air 
Force (USAF), is attributable to three factors. First, the standardized email address 
system provides an easy means to contact a random sample from a closed population that 
can be completely enumerated.  Second, the USAF Surveys Branch has detailed 
information on its entire population of interest.  Third, most of the population has ready 
access to computers that are fairly standardized, so respondents can reasonably be 
expected to have access to a Web-access instrument and browser and, therefore, other 
software problems are minimized.40  The population of Navy URL officers falls into this 
same category so there was not a problem with officers not having access to the Internet 
to take the survey. 
 Web-based surveying is still in the early stages of development. The 
World-Wide Web (WWW) is a unique medium and it is not clear to what extent the 
knowledge gained over years of experience with more traditional surveying techniques 
fully applies to Internet surveying (Dilman, Tortora & Bowker, 2001). Studies are just 
beginning to be done to learn the optimal ways to structure and format Internet surveys to 
limit biases and increase response rates. It is also likely that the best way to design an 
Internet survey depends in part on the familiarity and comfort of the respondents in using 
Web browsers and email clients. It is also quite likely that the type of Internet connection 
                                                 
40  Schonalu, Fricker, and Elliot. Conducting Research Surveys via E-Mail and the Web. Arlington, 
VA., RAND, 2002. p 56-57. 
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as well as the hardware and software used in accessing the Internet will impact on 
response rates and possibly how a person responds to an Internet-based survey. However, 
the Navy has mandated that all of its officers have access to computer-based 
communications (through its Information Technology 21 [IT21] program), so URL 
officers are connected or have access to the World Wide Web. 41  Even still, access does 
not address the problem of bandwidth.  Sailors and Marines may have access at-shore as 
well as at-sea, but limitations in bandwidth (14.4 kbps is still not unheard of) especially 
for sea-going commands may make taking the survey a tedious task. 
 The use of HTML forms for surveying poses a unique set of issues and 
challenges that need to be addressed to ensure valid data. The Web is a very public place 
and unless steps are taken to limit access to a survey, it may be found and responded to 
by people who are not among those sampled by the researcher. This can either happen by 
accident or maliciously. Since one only has to "click" their mouse pointer on the "submit" 
button to respond to a Web-based survey instrument once it is filled out, it is also quite 
possible for respondents to either mistakenly or purposefully submit multiple copies of 
their responses.  
While Internet-based surveying techniques need to be used with caution, their 
benefits warrant continued exploration with cautious use. It is also clear that coverage 
bias and familiarity with Internet tools will be less of an issue over time. Additionally our 
knowledge about how best to conduct Internet surveys will continue to improve with 
research and experience.  
  b.  Research on Internet-based Surveying 
 Although the research on Internet-based surveying is limited, findings are 
beginning to appear in the literature. Several studies have found that response rates for 
Internet surveys are lower than equivalent mail surveys (Medin, Roy & Ann, 1999; 
Cooper, Blair & Triplett, 1999). As noted by Crawford and colleagues (2001), this may 
be due to a lack of knowledge on how to achieve high response rates using the Internet 
surveys. The lower response rates for Internet surveys may also reflect coverage bias, the 
                                                 
41 NMCI stands for Navy. Marine Corps Internet and is a program designed to bring every sailor and 
marine access to a network of knowledge and IT capability to function in the 21st century. 
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lack of familiarity with the media and/or lack of convenient access to the Internet. In the 
author’s experience, Web congestion can also be a factor in lowering response rates for 
Web surveys particularly with people who have relatively little experience with the 
Internet. Cook and colleagues (2000) conducted a meta-analysis of factors influencing 
response rates in Internet-based surveys. They found that follow-up contacts with non-
respondents, personalized contacts, and contacting sampled people prior to sending out 
the survey were the three dominant factors in higher response rates. Kittleson (1997) in a 
study of email-based surveying found it was possible to double the response rate with 
follow-up memos, though in general this may be somewhat optimistic. As with mailed 
surveys, repeated follow-ups have diminishing returns and at some point risk irritating 
potential respondents without noticeably increasing response rates. Additionally, 
Dillman, Tortora, Conrad & Bowker (2001) found that relatively plain Web surveys that 
load quickly resulted in higher response rates than "fancier" surveys that take longer to 
load. Jeavons (1998) analyzed detailed server logs from three separate large-scale 
surveys. He found a relatively high percentage of potential respondents stopped 
completing the surveys 1) when encountering the first question, 2) when encountering a 
complex question grid, and 3) when asked to supply their email address. This suggests 
that some potential respondents have difficulty with the media and give up early in the 
process of completing the survey or when encountering complex questions. Others may 
be reluctant to give out personal information such as an email address. The logs were also 
merged with demographic data collected via the surveys. Somewhat surprisingly no 
patterns in failure to complete rates were found by gender, age or education level. In two 
of the surveys, people with lower income were found to have a higher rate of repeating 
screens of questions mainly due to improperly filling out questions.  
 c.  Developing Web Surveys  
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 As noted, most Internet surveying is now being done using HTML forms 
with potential respondents often contacted via email cover letters. While some developers 
still directly code these forms in HTML, there are dozens of HTML editors available, and 
they are becoming increasingly sophisticated and easy to use. There are two general 
methods of capturing the data entered into an HTML form. The form can be programmed 
to email the data back to a specified email address or captured by a program on the server 
called a common gateway interface (CGI) script. Using CGI scripts is more robust, offers 
more flexibility and is the far more commonly used method of capturing data. There are 
several HTML development packages that both provide HTML editing capabilities and 
automate the process of developing the CGI scripts necessary to capture data from 
HTML forms developed with the package. Two widely used examples of these packages 
are Microsoft's FrontPage and Macromedia's Dreamweaver. While these packages are 
general-purpose Web development tools, there are also a growing number of software 
development systems designed specifically for Web-based surveying. Examples include 
Perseus's Survey Solutions for the Web, Creative Research System's The Survey System, 
and Survey Said™ Survey Software. These packages tend to offer additional features 
specific to survey research. Examples include as managing the distribution of email cover 
letters, built-in statistical analysis and reporting capabilities, and automatic tracking of 
people who have responded coupled with the ability of sending out follow-up email 
reminders to those who have yet to respond. Their HTML editors are also geared for 
survey form development, allowing them to simplify and streamline the process of 
developing and formatting the question response fields.  
 d.  Summary 
 Internet surveys are clearly going to grow in popularity as the problems of 
coverage bias and unfamiliarity with the Internet subside. For the foreseeable future there 
will be people who will lack Internet access either by choice or circumstance though this 
will be less of an issue. Additionally the tools for conducting Web-based surveys will 
grow in sophistication and ease of use as will knowledge on how best to employ this 
survey methodology. At present researchers should use this technique with caution in 
carefully chosen populations and with an eye to learning about how to do it better. 
2. Bias and Error 
It is important to differentiate between survey bias (described below) and human 
bias. Human prejudice or bias is a hostile attitude toward a person who belongs to a 
group, simply because he belongs to that group, and is therefore presumed to have the 
objectionable qualities ascribed to the group.42  Bias in a human a process interrupts the 
                                                 
42 Allport, Gordon W.  The Nature of Prejudice. Cambridge, MA., Addison-Wesley Publishing 
Company, Inc., 1954. P 7. 
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flow of information just as noise does for a signal in a communication circuit. This flow 
interruption is in the form of mistrust and in times of crisis the military and the media 
need to have a relationship of trust.  It has to be developed; bias impedes this 
development. 
The general term used to describe the problems that exists when the sample 
within survey are not representative of the population is also bias.  Most statistical texts 
use the terms representative sample (good) and biased sample (bad).   A biased sample 
has properties of its own that may not match of the larger population.  Naturally, one 
wants the bias (a source of error) to be as small as possible. 
There are two sources of bias in survey research.  The first is selection bias, 
where there is a systematic difference between the population and the sample, as 
described in the following examples: 
EXAMPLES OF BAD SAMPLES  
Bad Sample A:  The basketball team as a sample used to study heights of high school 
students. 
Bad Sample B:  Your 10 best friends as a sample used to predict the winner of the coming 
election. 
Bad Sample C:  The 25 most successful new electronics companies as a sample used to 
study the financial problems of typical new electronics companies. 
Bad Sample D:  The opinions of some of the readers of a particular magazine as a sample 
used to study the opinions of Americans in general. 
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CONSEQUENCES OF USING BAD SAMPLES 
Consequence of using Bad Sample A:    
The study may conclude that the general population of students is taller than they really 
are because basketball players are generally selected from only the tallest members of the 
available population. 
Consequence of using Bad Sample B:   
Because people tend to associate with people who agree with their views, this sample will 
tend to reinforce ones own preference rather than provide an accurate indication of the 
outcome of the election. 
Consequence of using Bad Sample C:   
Because only those companies that succeeded were chosen for study, the results can 
hardly be considered indicative of the problems of “typical” new companies, many of 
which do not succeed.  However, this sample might be very useful for studying the 
population of new electronics companies that are likely to be successful. 
Consequence of using Bad Sample D:   
Different sorts of people read different magazines (compare the readership of Popular 
Mechanics to that of Working Woman) and therefore, the opinions of the readership will 
not be representative of the population at large. 
The second source of trouble in conducting a survey is response bias, because not 
everyone being studied will return the survey questionnaire. Response rates of over 50% 
(in which only half of the people contacted returned their forms; see Table 2.) are not 
uncommon.  For the sample to be representative of the population, the hope or the 
assumption is that those who did not return the questionnaires are not very different from 
those who did.  Although this hope is sometimes justified, usually there is little 
researchers can do about this problem except to accept it and wish for a small amount of 
response bias. 
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Table 2.   Studies Comparing Response Rates for E-Mail and Mail Response Modes (From: 
Schonlau, M., Fricker, R.D., Elliot, M.N., RAND) 
Response Rate 
Study Total Sample Size Email Study Arm Mail Study Arm Population 
Tse et al. (1995) 
Tse (1998) 
Schuldt and Totten 
(1994) 
Kittleson (1995) 
Jones and Pitt 
(1999) 
Mehta and Sivadas 
(1995) 















































AT&T employees  
To see why response bias might be a problem, consider the fact that those who do 
not answer a questionnaire might well represent the more active and vocal members of 
the population.  Those with strong opinions and interests will tend to be overrepresented, 
whereas those who are quiet and content with the status quo (or who are too busy with 
other things at the moment) will tend to be underrepresented.43 
Survey error is commonly characterized in terms of the precision of the statistical 
estimates.  However, characterizing survey error only in terms of standard errors and 
response rates ignores other ways in which errors can enter the survey process. 
Table 3 lists the four general categories of sources of survey error, as defined by 
Groves as part of his “Total Survey Error” approach.44  However, one point of interest is 
with respect to data quality.  The quality of data transcription is an issue with 
conventional surveys because all conventional surveys require some form of conversion 
nalysis. With Internet surveys, however, the answers that into an electronic format for a                                                 
 43   Siegel, Andrew F. and Morgan, Charles J.  Statistics and Data Analysis – An Introduction. 
Copyright 1996, 1988 by John Wiley and Sons, Inc., p. 295. 
 44   Groves, R. Survey Errors and Survey Costs, New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1989. 
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the respondents enter into an online form oftentimes can be directly downloaded into a 
database, thereby avoiding transcription errors.45 
Table 3.   Types of Survey Errors and Their Source (From: Groves 1998) 
 
Error Source How this study addressed 
the issues 
Coverage 
Failure to give any chance 
of sample selection to some 
individuals in the population 
Fleet PAOs were the first 
points of contacts to get the 
survey to the fleet URL 
officers as well as student 
and staff URL officers. 
Sampling 
Heterogeneity in the survey 
measure among persons in 
the population 
Every attempt was made to 
reach all designators within 
the URL communities 
(including, race, gender, 
socioeconomic, rank, etc.) 
Nonresponse 
Failure to collect data on all 
persons in the sample 
A review of survey 
responses was taken in mid-
August 2003 and efforts 
were redoubled to broadcast 
the survey link.  A form 
letter was also sent out to 
the email list the author 
developed to solicit reasons 
why the survey was not 
taken.  Several notes were 
taken: wrong email, address, 
some officers had retired, 
students transferred from 
their commands, and no 
time to take the survey were 
among the feedback the 
author received. 
 
                                                 
 45   Conventional surveys mean face-to-face and telephone interviews.  Schonlau, Matthias, Fricker, 





Measurement Inaccuracies in responses 
recorded on the survey 
instruments that arise from: 
The efficient interviewers 
have on respondents’ 
answers to survey questions 
Respondent error (from the 
respondent’s inability to 
answer questions, lack of 
requisite effort to obtain the 
correct answer, or other 
psychological factors) 
Error due to the weakness in 
the wording of survey 
questionnaires 
Error due to effects of the 
mode of data collection 
(such as face-to-face or 
telephone communication). 
Appendix C contains the 
statistical results of survey.  
Some respondents failed to 
answer one or two of the 
questions.  Moreover, after 
review of certain questions, 
wording may have caused 
unintended responses.  
Finally,  several questions 
were formatted in such a 
way that it made both 
answering the question and 
analyzing the responses 
more tedious than 
necessary. 
 
D.   SURVEY RESULTS AND ANALYSIS 
The survey consists of thirty-nine questions of which several groupings of 
questions sought answers to the following categories: 
1.  Identify what the demographic factors are so that a reasonable conclusion 
can be drawn to root causes regarding bias.  Even still, when does this bias take root 
in an officer’s career? 
For this survey, the demographic summary of the results follows.  
• Median age of respondents is 31. 
• No ranks above Rear Admiral (Lower/0-7) were part of the respondents.  
Fifty-five (55) of ninety-three (93) respondents were Lieutenants (O-3). 
• Submariners and Surface Warfare Officers responded while no Naval 
Aviators participated.  
• The median commissioning year was 1996, so the average years of Naval 
Service equal about 7.  A majority of the Navy officers sampled received their 
commissioning from either the U.S. Naval Academy or through a Naval 
ROTC (Reserve Officer Training Corps) program. 
• Eighty-seven (87) males, five (5) females, and one (1) unidentified sex were 
among those who responded.46 
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46 Relative to active duty naval forces this skew in gender appears to be in line when compared to 
• 77% of the ninety-three (93) respondents had some post-graduate work 
completed or a post-graduate degree. 
• Over half the respondents stated having conservative political views and many 
were Republicans (55.91%). One of the questions this study sought to answer 
was what factors influenced the political views of respondents.  Questions 8 
and 9 asked the Navy officers to describe whether they were far left or all the 
way to the right; followed by categorizing their choices into Republican, 
Democrat, Independent, or no preference. This study found that warfare 
designation or the type of job the officers were assigned to in the Navy, the 
year they were born, and mother’s education were the key primers in 
determining their political views.  See Figure 4. Political views of Navy 
officers (See Appendix C – Survey Said ™ 
• Diverse group of nationalities participated amongst the respondents; 
Caucasions being the majority. 
• Most respondents were raised by parents with higher levels of education.  
Their fathers had a college degree or higher while their mothers had a high 
school or higher level of education. 
• Finally, the officers sampled come from all over the United States and spent 
their childhood years in just about every region of the country. 
Throughout the study, a comparison among the questions considered the median 
responses by URL Navy officers.   The median and mean are the most common measures 
of the center of a distribution.  The mean and median of a symmetric distribution are 
close together.  If the distribution is exactly symmetric, the mean and the median are 
exactly the same. In a skewed distribution, the mean is farther out in the long tail that is 
the median.  For instance, in this survey the average age of those who responded was 
[1970.2717, year of birth] about 33 years of age, while the median age was [1972, year of 
birth] about 31 years of age.  Strongly skewed distributions usually give the median 
(“middle value”) rather than the mean (“arithmetic average value”).47  Once again, for 




                                                 
survey respondents – (http://www.bupers.navy.mil/mentor/totalforce.html).  Total Force Male – 333,807, 
85.40%; Total Force Female – 57,045, 14.6%. Demographics are from a navy website dated March 2002. 
47 McCabe, G.P., Moore, D.S. Introduction to the Practice of Statistics. W.H. Freeman Company, NY. 
3rd Ed., 1999, p. 43. 
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Figure 4.  Political views of Navy officers (see Appendix C- Survey Said™ Statistics and Graphs) 
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Figure 5.  Navy officers’ mother’s education (see Appendix C- Survey Said™ Statistics and Graphs) 
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The statistical test to determine if there is a correlation between the variables of 
political views against demographic variables of designator, year commissioned, and 
mother’s education, shows there is some correlation occurring (refer to Appendix F for 
significance of p-value in a statistical test).     
 RESULTS (Navy officer’s mother’s education): 
Q(8/9, 2), K-Wallis, Correlation: p-value = 0.021 
Q(8/9, 3), Spearman, Correlation: p-value = 0.014 
Q(8/9, 11), Spearman, Correlation: p-value = 0.0206 (compared with father’s 
education, p-value = 0.3207) 
These data of the officer’s mother’s education display a stronger correlation with 
regards to the officer’s political views than that of the father’s education.  Based on this 
p-value significance, this study infers that the mother may be more of an influencing 
factor than the father on the officer’s political perception.  Hence, this contribution can 
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shape the officer’s bias perception of politics and military affairs and operations. More 
importantly, how the media affects their view.  
Although the median ages of respondents were about 31 years of age, Figure 4 
indicates that a good majority of the respondents were conservative/moderate thinkers.  
One would assume that officers around the ages of 25-35 process of thinking would be 
more characteristic of risk-takers.  So why the 180º train of thought? From the data, one 
can infer the conservative/moderate thinking stemming from lack of experience as a 
Navy officer being commissioned within the past ten years versus their superiors.  The 
“inexperienced” Navy officer obiviously would be more conservative in certain situations 
simply because they’ve never had any prior exposure – a “better safe than sorry” motto. 
The fact that the median age of the Navy officers surveyed was 31 years of age indicates 
that the respondents were still junior in their time of service.  Most officers did not have 
any specific experience in dealing with the media, and if they did it was minimal.   
In addition, based on the p-value correlation of the mother’s education, one can 
also infer the conservative/moderate point of view derives from the maternal values being 
passed on to her offsprings.  Mothers are the care-givers, the foundation of the the home, 
the one who conserves so as to provide for the family, the mediator, etc.  Therefore, the 
Navy officer’s conservative approach is maternal – being a provider as team leader of 
his/her section, sets an example for his/her team members, and supports his/her peers. 
Certainly, attitude and education are interrelated; each has a strong effect on each 
other.  But, of the two, attitude is the more important because, without the proper attitude, 
knowledge will not be applied effectively.  The news media fared far less in people’s 
confidence when compared to the military.  A large majority of officers would welcome 
media personnel but there are those who still carry veins of suspicion and distrust that 








Figure 6.  Military keeping the public and media informed (see Appendix C- Survey Said™ Statistics and 
Graphs) 
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Running a correlation test once again, the p-value infers that there is correlation 
between the demographic variable of officer commissioning source and what determines 
their views on how the military tells its story to the media and the people.  It may be that 
because NROTC officers are exposed to a more diversified student population with more 
varied and liberal educations, particular at the elite college institutions, these Navy 
officers are exposed to these same liberal views as opposed to their Naval Academy 
counterparts who are from a more homogenous population. 
 RESULTS: 
Q(5, 17), K-Wallis, Correlation:  p-value = 0.0366 
Overall, majority of the Navy officers sampled felt that the military does an adequate job 
of keeping the media and ultimately the public informed of military and national security 
issues as shown by Figure 6.   But when asked how willing was each Navy officer to 
share information with the media, the response was just the opposite.  There is a 
significant correlation of the type of job the Navy officers does and their willingness to 
share information.   The data indicate Surface Warfare Officers and Submariners are less 
willing to share information directly or openly with the media (Navy Aviators did not 
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respond to the survey). This may be due to the sensitive information that accompanies 
any tactical/procedural operations either SWO or Submariners are involved in.  Because 
of this and the fact that the Navy officers sampled are still “novices” in their military 
service and their knowledge, training, and experience in dealing with the media, most 
would defer in this role of information sharing to the Public Affairs Officer (PAO). 
 RESULTS: 
 Q(2, 23), Wilcoxon, Correlation:  (Designator versus value or benefit of 
sharing information with the media) p-value = 0.0312 
  
Figure 7.  The graph shows that Navy officers disagree with the notion that the PAO encourages officers to 
speak with the media openly. (see Appendix C- Survey Said™ Statistics and Graphs) 
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 In addition, Navy officers sampled felt an inherent risk when speaking to the 
media.  This is consistent with the conservative/moderate thinking process previously 
discussed.  Listed are the following issues majority of the Navy officers were concern 
about; each one rated a “4 – very serious risk,” 
• Battle plans or operations 
• Intelligence issues 
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These issues rated a “3 – a fairly serious risk,” 
• Criticism of current defense or security policies 
• Issues which could potentially embarrass a senior officer 
• Facts contradicting official statement or policies 
• Sensitive issues which are the responsibilities of superiors 
• Scandal in the officer’s office or base 
 
It appears that risks and consequences are a big determination of Navy officer’s, 
attitude towards the news media.  The following results demonstrate that the Navy officer 
is primarily concerned about what is called “operational security.” This is defined as a 
process of identifying critical information and subsequently analyzing friendly actions 
attendant to military military operations and other activities to select and execute 
measures that eliminate or reduce to an acceptable level the vulnerabilities of friendly 
actions to adversary exploitation.48 
The Navy officers sampled felt the consequences of speaking to the media in the 
following issues rated a “4 – very serious concern,” 
• Harming national security 
These issues rated a “3 – a fairly serious concern,” 
• Embarrassing your service 
They are afraid that secrets will be leaked and damage forthcoming activities.  
They see the media as interested in revealing secrets.  This superficial explanation belies 
the fundamental differences between both the military and the media.  This is what 
shapes the Navy officer’s attitudes towards the media.  This misunderstanding of cultures 
(both the military and the media) influences attitudes and attitudes create some of the 
tension.   
                                                 
48   Joint Pub 3-13: Joint Doctrine for Informatoin Operations, 1998, p. Gl-9. 
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The Navy officer is a team player.  The military depends upon team players for 
operational success.  The media are not seen as team players but more of independent 
entities.  The officer respects authority. The journalist is totally undisciplined.  The 
officer is normally a conservative.  Most journalists are liberal.  The Navy officer is 
restrained; the journalist is unbridled.  The Navy officer, generally speaking, is mute; the 
scribe is articulate.  The Navy officer is practical, and the journalist, particularly today, as 
opposed to the days of the front-line news of the 1920s and 1930s, is an elitist.  He goes 
to the best colleges; he has advanced degrees; he is no longer the rough- and tumble 
whiskey-drinking journalist of years past.49 
These differences lead and influence the young Navy officer to distrust the 
journalist.  However, the military leadership is slowly realizing the importance of 
manipulating the media to serve the purposes of military operations, such as the use of 
embedded reporters in Operation Iraqi Freedom (see Appendix G for SECDEF-CJCS 
Media guidance). 
When questioned why the military thinks the media does not do a good job of 
reporting and therefore tend to distrust the media, here are their answers. The Navy 
officers sampled scaled their responses from 1 to 10, with 10 representing the highest 
importance rating. 
• The current news premium is on sound bites- sensationalism vs. depth – “9” 
Figure 8.  The following describe the considerations media editors and gatekeepers have in selling news. 
(see Appendix C- Survey Said™ Statistics and Graphs) 
Informing the public: 
 
   37-1    11  12.64% Very important 
   37-2    48  55.17% Important 
   37-3    25  28.74% Not very important 
   37-4     3   3.45% Not important at all 
 
Selling more copies or getting better ratings: 
 
   37-5    70  80.46% Very important 
   37-6    14  16.09% Important 
                                                 
49 Trainor, Bernard E.  Military Perspectives on Humanitarian Intervention and Military-Media 
Relations. Chester W. Nimitz Memoral  Lectures in National Security Affairs, Departments of Military 
Education, International and Area Studies, UC Berkeley, 1995.  p. 29-30. 
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   37-7     1   1.15% Not very important 
   37-8     2   2.30% Not important at all 
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• Lack of personal military experience by reporters or writers - “8”  
• Complexity of military information doesn’t fit the new journalism 
template/format (a 30 sec. format cannot cover all of the complex nuances of 
military operations) – “7” 
• To a lesser extent the following factors rated a “6” – 
 Low level of public interest/apathy 
 The ability to raise the priority of military stories with editors 
 Concern that the military is trying to spin or control the story 
(therefore, no news might be preferable) 
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A number of factors have influenced the decline of military experience by 
reporters or writers.  For a decade after the 1991 Persian Gulf War, coverage of the armed 
forces, defense and intelligence issues and even foreign affairs had steadily dwindled as a 
result of economic trends and business decisions that forced print and broadcast 
operations to slash manpower and costs.  Of equal significance, the nation itself had 
turned away from an interest in foreign and military news after victory in the desert, and 
the political slogan, “It’s the economy, stupid,” aptly defining journalism priorities in the 
1990’s. 
Ed Offley criticizes his own kind by saying even journalists have ”the habit of 
thinking that international events have no significance at home has been exposed as just 
as dangerous as pre-World War II isolationism.”  Then September 11 occurred and now 
reporters and editors and producers are clamoring to cover military events with the 
intensity and purpose to match that of their predecessors at Normandy in 1944, Inchon in 
1950, the Ia Drang Valley, in 1965, and 73 Easting in the Iraqi desert in 1991.   For 
Offley, many journalists today will be rushed into the military beat totally unprepared for 
wartime coverage.  The lack of knowledge and experience of military operations as well 
as military personnel is a recipe for frustration, bewilderment and error.50  This 
interaction and understanding of military culture is one critical factor to the military 
trusting the media. At this point in the analysis, there seems to be a correlation between 
the age of the respondents, their family background, and where/when Navy officers were 
commissioned to their views on public life, politics, and the media. Majority of Navy 
officers, like many everyday people, were raised with their parents’ biases whether it is 
regards to morals, raising a family, education, religious views, or political views.  With 
time (or age and years of military service), Navy officers will gain more experience and 
will become more knowledgeable in their specialized “jobs”.  All these factors combined, 
each being equally important factors, correlate that each Navy officer have been “shaped” 
into thinking a particular bias regarding all subjects including the negative bias they have 
towards the media.  Moreover, some of the questions show the median responses of Navy 
officers towards what they think are the primary agendas of editors and media 
gatekeepers.  
                                                 
50 Offley, Ed. Pen & Sword, A Journalist’s Guide to Covering the Military. Oak Park, Il., Marion 
Street Press, Inc., 2001, p. 14. 
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2.  After deciphering that not one but all these factors affected a Navy 
officer’s bias towards media we asked, “What are the appropriate roles of the U.S. 
military in the 21st century?” 
 Survey respondents felt that the following were somewhat appropriate: 
• Informing the public about military and national security issues 
• Education, training, career opportunities for youth 
• Domestic disaster relief 
But also respondents felt that these roles for the U.S. in a post-Cold war world 
were very appropriate: 
• Protecting the U.S. from foreign aggressors 
• Provide military advice to U.S. political leaders 
• Assist in the defense of allies 
• Protecting U.S. economic interests abroad 
 
A semantic differential, basically a play on words in the same question to evoke a 
different response from the officers sampled, was asked of respondents in Q18-20, 
specifically if they want, need, and have a right to know about the following issues.  The 
following are the top 5: 
1. Military readiness 
2. Terrorist threats 
3. Counter-Terrorist activities 
4. Effect on reaching policy goals 
5. Quality of life/Human casualties 
In order to understand if the military is sensitive to the public’s access to timely 
and accurate information on military matters and national security issues, over half the 
officers felt that it was very important that the public get timely and accurate information 
(51.61% surveyed).  However, when asked what issues affect the public’s awareness of 
the military, most felt the American public had more important personal issues to worry 
about and that Americans lack of military service contributed to this lack of awareness.  
 51
This is significant because it tells that media is doing a good job o freporting their news 
stories but the public is not listening. 
3.  Identify evidence of bias towards the media - 
The Navy officers felt the following towards the media: 
• Few officers sensed that the media kept the public informed about the military 
and national security issues (about 7.61%).   About 55% felt that the media 
performed this service not very well or not well at all. 
• When asked how the military performs the task of informing the public about 
military and national security issues, Navy officers felt that the military did 
somewhat well (about 47.31%) 
• The officers sampled felt that several issues impacted their willingness to 
share information with the media: 
 Concern about impact on current military operations and fear that 
comments will be taken out of context or misinterpreted 
Despite these responses that show a military officer corps showing some bias 
towards the communications media, most officers in the survey felt that the Navy’s 
relationship with the media was good.  In fact officers felt that media personnel should 
have maximum access to the military in peacetime.  It is when military actions are being 
planned, that the Navy officerNavy officers surveyed felt that the media should have 
limited or no access. However, if an open and honest relationship between the military 
and the media were to exist, then the notion of access would not be an issue. General 
Bernard Trainor mentions that total access was provided to journalists in the Gulf War 
and that they were very responsible.  
The enormous left hook that Schwartzkopf called the Hail Mary involved 
hundreds of thousands of troops moving into the western desert to surprise 
Saddam Hussein. Journalists in the theater and every editor and publisher 
in the United States (whether it was print or television) knew about it.  But 
none of this came out in the press.  There was speculation by analysts, but 
there was no leak that the forces were actually moving to the west.  The 
press showed itself to be quite responsible.51 
                                                 
51 Trainor, Bernard E.  Military Perspectives on Humanitarian Intervention and Military-Media 
Relations. Chester W. Nimitz Memoral  Lectures in National Security Affairs, Departments of Military 
Education, International and Area Studies, UC Berkeley, 1995.  p. 41. 
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Finally, the officers in this study felt that the “medium” of how news or 
information is reported has modestly improved the quality of news reporting of military 
and security issues.  This phenomena can be attributed to the fact that people have access 
to different forms of media, 24-hour news television, the Internet, etc. to corroborate the 
evidence presented.  In fact, some of the officers (about 46%) feel that new technology 
such as the Internet improves the quality of reporting. 
From this survey analysis, utilizing several methods to help determine if bias 
exists among URL Navy officers, there is evidence of bias towards the news media.  A 
review of the literature and discussions on military-media relationships also confirm that 
the same issues that surface: work environment, home environment, a misunderstanding 
of PAO roles, a dichotomy of organizational agendas as the cause of conflict, to name a 
few, are also contributing root causes towards this bias.  To address this bias, the 
researcher maintains that the vast resources of the Department of the Navy’s training and 
education can be optimized to help shift the attitudes of Navy officers against the media 
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IV. CONCLUSION 
We did our job, and I think we did it well.  I think that remains, for me, the 
model that should be the goal in military and media relations: honest, open 
coverage. 
--Joe Galloway [war correspondent who covered wars from Vietnam to 
the Persian Gulf] 
A survey was developed for a targeted sample of the URL Navy officers.  The 
data returned were analyzed and evidence compiled showing that there is, in fact, bias 
among URL officers against the media.  Factors such as home environment prime the 
respondents with a propensity to develop this negative bias.  Couple this instilled bias 
with the inherent bias senior officers may tend to have against journalists, and it is no 
wonder that subordinates feel the way they do, according to this study. Further, the study 
reviewed the media training course the Navy offers its senior officers (or any senior 
military officer that requests the training) as a model from which to adapt similar media 
training for young Navy officers.  And finally, the study presented the training 
background for career Navy officers from their commissioning throughout their mid-
grade service up until they reach the lowest flag rank (0-7). 
So why is a study on military-media relationships, especially one that focuses on 
more junior officers within a closed population, important?  First, the career track of the 
URL officers- from commissioning on is well established.  Second, the dynamic 
environment the military faces calls for a continual re-evaluation of education and 
training topics and standards.  In the grand scheme of things, the news media, whether 
U.S. naval leaders like it or not, are an integral part of military operations and planning.  
The media’s purpose of informing the American public of the United States policies in 
world affairs is crucial.  More specifically, the media serve a greater purpose in 
communicating to the American public the U.S. Navy’s role in defense of U.S. policies at 
home as well as abroad. This happens generally within the operational confines of 
operational planning and warfare such as Command and Control Warfare, Information 
Operations (C2W, IO).  Finally, senior military officers get this valuable training, so why 
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not grow that skill early within the junior officer specialty training tracks and 
professional military education opportunities? Instead of a media boot camp late in a 
Navy officer’s career, tailored subsequent courses teaching Navy officers how to develop 
relationships and deal with the media over the course of their career would have the most 
benefits.  Officers would have the experience coupled with the education to face a 
dynamic military-media environment.    
 
A.  RECOMMENDATIONS FROM SURVEY 
With evidence citing probable bias amongst active duty Navy officers, the 
following is a proposed modification to URL educational career path to mitigate media 
bias.  It is believed that such educational recommendations will improve officer skills in 
military-media relationships, even better, to elevate the awareness of the value of a 
positive military-media relationship for military operations.   The following from Colin 
Powell when he was then Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) exemplifies the 
importance of such a skill for officer leadership. 
In a very real sense this is the same for media-military relationships.  
There is a political edge to just about every decision made and reported.  It 
is how it is reported and the integrity of the reporting.  Every career 
military officer, especially Navy officers should have this skill injected 
over the life of their service to prepare them to react to any crisis within 
their commands.  A steady strain of give and take within media-military 
systems will predictably ensure we win the battle and the war should it 
come to that.52 
The pursuit of a more well-rounded and professional naval corps of officers has 
seen progress made over the years.  But until the resistance of senior Navy officers 
subsides and the championing of a more balanced incentive and reward system for Navy 
officers occurs, most will continue to strive for that frocking at sea to next level of 
command rather than seek a spot on the superintendent’s academic achievement board. 
The Navy is attempting to mitigate this with the Five-vector model.  The tool is 
                                                 
 52  Extracts from THE COMMANDERS by Bob Woodward. Reprinted by permission from The 
Commanders, by Bob Woodward, pp. 82-196 © 1991 by Bob Woodward. Published by Simon & Schuster. 




essentially a front-end program that taps into a personnel’s training and education 
database to effectively manage and customize a roadmap for successful dvelopment of a 
sailor’s career along five vectors: professional development, certification and 
qualification, personal development, leadership, and performance.  The Navy hopes to 
use the five-vector model as a basis for changing the ways sailors advance and in the 
future how they are paid.  By doing this it is hoped that the navy can overhaul its human 
resource management problems of the past.53 
If this is the case, that education over a Navy officer’s career is important, then 
what are the factors that hinder an important and practical change to officer career paths? 
One hindrance is the performance rating system currently in place.  Simply put graduate 
education does not receive high marks on a Navy officer’s fitness report.  Sustained 
performance at sea is the gold standard if an URL officer expects to advance in their 
career.  Centers of excellence such as the Naval Postgraduate School and the Naval War 
College are not sought after career milestones.  This has to change if there is to be an 
alignment of educational goals and skills required of future Navy officers with how they 
rated on the basis of their academic achievements; currently this is not the case.   
Education as a catalyst for change has been the tool through which societies have 
sought to fight traditional bias – such as racial, ethnic, and social prejudice.  The 
advocates of education have always believed that there are many lifelong benefits, such 
as increased tolerance, understanding, and patience, many of which help overcome 
cultural stereotyping, bias, and insensitivity.54  Education has been shown to improve 
self-esteem and hone creativity not to mention the boost in critical thinking skills of its 
subjects.  At- risk children who have participated in music education, for example have 
shown productivity increases in academic performance.  Moreover there seems to be a 
greater tolerance for diversity among those who have been exposed to this unique form of 
education versus those that were not.  Therefore, this is evidence that education, even in 
innovative programs, is a very successful tool in mitigating bias of varying types.  Navy 
                                                 
53 Faram, Mark. “Five-Vector plan is your road map to advancement,” Navytimes.com, 29 May 2003. 
 54   Glenn, Karl. "The Many Benefits Of Music Education -- Now and in the Future." NASSP Bulletin 
v.76, n.544 (May 1992): p. 1-4. 
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officers exposed to any structured media education course at any point in their career, but 
most especially during their formative junior officer tours, will no doubt develop and 
hone the skills and experience that will only benefit military-media relationships. 
One proposal was to send officers to War College before rather than after mid-
level command. Capstone and other general/flag programs help officers gain a global 
perspective, but they come late in a career and there are no mandatory subsequent courses 
for strategic leaders.55 Perhaps an institutional education process between assignments is 
unnecessary on the strategic level. 
Leader conferences and other interactions already provide those benefits to senior 
officers. The question is whether there is sufficient time or opportunity on the job for 
strategic leader discussion, reflection, integration, and synthesis of concepts. One source 
of help is experienced senior officers. Many retired strategic leaders are involved in 
professional military education. One possibility is an institutional setting where retirees 
can periodically exchange information with active duty general/flag officers in a 
nonoperational environment.  This same type of mentoring can also be applied 
throughout a junior officer’s career, especially when issues arise that concern military-
media relationships. 
The services, specifically the Navy, should explore how information technology 
can enable and enhance these mentor relationships. Other respondent suggestions 
included taking advantage of graduate education at civilian institutions in international 
affairs, exposing leaders to the dynamics of civil-military relations and congressional 
affairs, establishing partnerships with industry, and spending more time with senior 
leaders in other services. Such initiatives could be accomplished within the context of a 
more robust institutional development program. Whether that future is taking the reigns 
of a new job as a newly promoted Rear Admiral, or if that future calls for an alliance of 
                                                 
 55  The Capstone Course is hosted by the National Defense University for newly selected flag/general 
officers. The curriculum examines major issues affecting national security decision-making, military 
strategy, joint/combined doctrine, interoperability, and key allied nation issues.  Capstone is an intensive 
six-week course consisting of seminars, case studies, informal discussions, visits to key US military 
commands within the continental United States, and overseas trips to Europe, the Pacific, and the Western 
Hemisphere. 
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two great organizations working together to get the message to the world that the United 
States will not be intimidated by terrorists. Planning for future readiness is key. 
In addition to a media course curricula modeled after the senior officer media 
training outlined in Appendix E, there are other opportunities to raise the level of 
awareness for Navy officers.  For instance during the course of this research, the author 
came across a proposed model from which military officers can use to determine when an 
imbalance in the military-media process will occur, a sort of military-media relationship 
modeling concept.  The model is theoretical in nature but it serves the purpose of 
allowing military officers to examine past, present, and future conflicts with the military-
media and the American public in mind.  For the sake of clarity, the following description 
of the model as well as an example of its application is directly quoted from Thomas J. 
Burton’s research. 
A more plausible model, that takes into full account the influence of media 
and the complexity of today’s environment, is one of three-dimensions.  
First, there is a long and narrow flat surface.  This surface acts as an 
arbitrary plane designed to support the model as it moves with the passage 
of time.  Second, a hollow, three-sided pyramid with flexible walls sits on 
the plane.  The pyramid is symbolic of the Trinity.  One side represents the 
people, the second side the military, and the third, the government.  
Superimposed over the pyramid is a pliant, water-filled cube.  Each top 
corner of the tube represents a form of media (print, film, radio, and 
television) with the five exposed sides (one being the top) representative 
of their individual or collective influence.  If only one form of media is 
exerting pressure, only one side of the cube will flex toward the pyramid.  
If two forms of media exert pressure, two sides of the cube will flex 
toward the pyramid.  The same pattern holds true for three media.  If, 
however, all media exert pressure, all five sides of the cube will flex 
toward the pyramid and the pyramid will be subject to total collapse.  The 
plane of time provides a solid foundation, or base, for both the air-filled 
pyramid and water-filled cube. 
Burton further amplifies his theoretical model by providing the following example. 
Applying the model to Operations Other Than War (OOTW) gives us the 
opportunity to see the model in action.  The most commonly recognized 
forms of OOTW are U.S. military support to United Nations peacekeeping 
and peace enforcement efforts.  However, OOTW activities also include 
strikes and raids, support to insurgency, antiterrorist operations, 
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counterdrug operations, humanitarian relief, and the evacuation of U.S. 
citizens from hostile environments. 
OOTW represents a gray area.  The people, the government, the military, 
and the media are often uncertain about why the United States should be 
involved.  Frequently, these activities do not represent a direct or 
immediate threat to the well-being of America.   Amidst this uncertainty 
model is subject to a bombardment of vacillitating changes among the 
three elements of the pyramid and the gatekeeping operations of the 
media.56 
However, education, training, and experience does not stop with military officers, 
it also must be embraced by the news media as well.  For the military and the media, both 
worlds are changing, so adapting and learning are two traits that will serve each entity 
well.  The challenges go beyond the immediate deployment of combat forces against our 
enemies.  The following are additional variables the military and news media face with 
regards to their own organizational conflicts: 
• A possible “defense train wreck” stemming from serious under-funding of 
defense assets in the late 1980s through 2000; 
• The emergence of hackers and cyber terrorists attempting to damage or 
destroy military and civilian computer networks; 
• Protracted ethnic conflicts in the Balkans, former Soviet Union, Middle East, 
Africa and Asia that have the potential to escalate into regional wars; 
• The collapse of nonproliferation regimes worldwide and increased threat of 
nuclear war in South Asia (even more dangerous than before September 11); 
• The increasing number of “rogue” states that are arming themselves with 
ballistic missiles. 
The point here is that organizational agendas for the military and the media are 
different.  If the military see one way of how the military message should be reported 
versus how it is being reported by the news media, a problem will arise.  
The study sought to determine if there was a correlation of when Navy officers 
were commissioned (i.e., their time in service) and their opinion on what they needed to 
know about military issues and operations.  The test found that terrorist threats were the 
most important issue compared with military readiness which had a weaker correlation.   
                                                 
56 Burton, Thomas J., Mr. Mass Media and Clausewitz: A Different Look at the Trinity. U.S. Army 
War College. Individual Study Project, 1994. p. 23. 
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According to Table 4, respondents saw that these issues to some extent influenced 
their mission determinations and objectives.  This significance of this correlation is 
important because these very issues are what the media are still lacking in accurately 
reporting to the public, which result in mistrust by the military during certain 
circumstances.  Hence, it would benefit the military if this message were effectively 
understood and communicated to the American public. 
 RESULTS: 
Q(4, 19) –Column 46(YR Commission vs. Military Readiness, p-value = 0.067) 
Weak Correlation; Column 52(YR Commission vs. Terrorist Threats, p-value 
= 0.0384) Correlation 
Table 4.   Respondents answers on their need to know about specific military issues and operations 
(see Appendix C- Survey Said™ Statistics and Graphs) 
 
92 Respondents Answered Question # 19 
Issues 
   19-1    77  83.70% Terrorist threats 
   19-2    51  55.43% Counter-terrorist activities 
   19-3    78  84.78% Military readiness 
   19-4    58  63.04% Effect on reaching policy goals 
   19-5    42  45.65% Physical damage 
   19-6    43  46.74% Human casualties 
   19-7    47  51.09% Quality of life 
   19-8    15  16.30% Sexual misconduct 
             1   1.08% Missing Cases 
Not only will the military engage future enemies under these circumstances, they 
must also engage the media in order to best present the message of their mission in 
planning for these variables when considering future operations.  For the news media, the 
challenge is to report accurately the facts as they present themselves but how to do this 
with shrinking budgets and reporters who lack general military experience. 
For print and broadcast journalism, the defense beat remains a vital segment of 
government and society that demands professional, comprehensive coverage.57  Just like 
the Joint Professional Military Education (JPME) program hosted at the Naval War 
                                                 
57 Offley, Ed. Pen & Sword, A Journalist’s Guide to Covering the Military. Oak Park, Il., Marion 
Street Press, Inc., 2001. p. 264-265. 
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College, is a result of crisis, new challenges requires adaptation in Navy officer and news 
media education and training. 
 Case studies are a wonderful application to not only use Burton’s model described 
above, but also as an instructive opportunity to combine theory and experience.  For the 
military-media relationship, it should be standard practice following each crisis/conflict 
operation, that leaders from the Pentagon and from news organizations arrange a 
thorough, objective “lessons learned” analysis of the news media coverage and the way it 
was accomplished. Another recommendation would be to insure the Professional Military 
Education System (PME) adequately prepares military officers to assist the news media 
in their vital role of informing the American public on the activities of the U.S. armed 
forces, with specific emphasis on the crisis/conflict situation.58 
 A Commanding Officer at Sea seeks to win every battle at sea.  It is through 
education that innovativeness is inspired.  How beneficial would it be that in addition to 
the specific agendas each member of the trilateral relationship (military, 
people/government, and media) pursues, that a blend of core values is fostered.    In lieu 
of the self-interests, vanity and personal ambition that scars meaningful military-media 
relationships, institutional trust and understanding can flourish. Ultimately this 
understanding will lead to the realization that both the media and the military are 
upholding the freedoms that make democracy work in the United States. 
 
B. AREAS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
Despite these differences, the media and the military co-exist and have had a 
long-standing relationship.  The media have been instrumental in educating the public 
about the military and keeping them abreast of the role of the military in the realm of 
world politics and the furthering of American interests abroad.  However, the media are 
not being utilized to the fullest benefit by the military.   
One of the questions this study sought to examine involved the root cause of bias 
U.S. Navy officers had against the news media.    One area the research presupposed that                                                  
58 Aukofer, Frank and William P. Lawrence.  America’s Team; The Odd Couple—A Report on the 
Relationship Between the Media and the Military.  The Freedom Forum First Amendment Center: 
Nashville, TN, 1995, p. 53. 
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to focus on for further study are those that showed the most relevance to this initial 
question – what are the factors that produce bias amongst Navy officers? The data in the 
study indicate a possible correlation between commissioning source and level of media 
bias; this should be a focus of future research.   There seems to be a perception found in 
this study that the military does a good job of conveying its message to the public.  The 
public however, may be indifferent to the message as it is being presented.  A further 
study could be issued to investigate why, and what tools or skills could be learned to 
better involve the public towards receiving the message more positively. It is 
recommended that subsequent research narrow in on the factors of bias uncovered by this 
small study. 
In summary, junior Navy officers’ education, whether it is derived from their 
parents, from informal training (hands on experience), primary schooling, or during their 
military career, influenced some bias throughout their entire lives.  It is from this early 
“education” that intelligent Navy officers shape their way of critical thinking which 
involves their perception of the media –good or bad.  Looking towards the Navy’s future, 
the military must support a continuing military-media education program to guarantee 
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APPENDIX A - INSTITUTIONAL REVIEW BOARD PACKAGE 
NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL 
INSTITUTIONAL REVIEW BOARD ROUTE SHEET 
 
Ref:   
Date:  
 
IRB Committee Member, 
 
You have been selected as an expedited reviewer for the enclosed protocol.  If the 
protocol meets IRB requirements and is not greater than minimal risk, please sign the 
enclosed approval memorandum for the experimental protocol you have reviewed and 
return to the Chair when completed.  Please review this as soon as possible.  We’d like to 
have protocols reviewed within one week of processing.  If this protocol exceeds minimal 















 NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL 
MONTEREY, CALIFORNIA 
 
TO: Steven J. Iatrou 
 
FROM: Jeff Crowson, Chair, NPS Institutional Review Board for the Protection of Human 
Subjects 
DATE: December 10, 2003 
SUBJ: APPROVAL OF EXPERIMENTAL PROTOCOL 
 
1.  Your protocol entitled “Military-Media Bias Online Survey” has been approved by the 
NPS Institutional Review Board. 
 
2.  You may begin your experiment under the guidelines outlined in your protocol. 
 
3.  This approval will remain active for one year from the above date. However, if there 
are any changes made to your approved protocol over the duration of your data 
collection, it will be necessary to reapply to the NPS IRB for approval. 
 
4.  At the conclusion of data collection, you agree to present a project summary to the 
NPS IRB which will remain on permanent record. 





  Reviewer’s Name and Title 





  Jeff Crowson 
IRB Chair 
 





  NPS Approving Official 
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 INFORMATION SCIENCES ACADEMIC GROUP 
Root Hall 
Naval Postgraduate School 






To: Protection of Human Subjects Committee 
 
Subject: Application for Human Subjects Review for Media-Military Relationship 
Online Survey 
 
1. Attached is a list of questions to be administered in an online survey during the 
months of August through September 2003. 
 
2. We are requesting approval of the described experimental protocol.  
 
3. We include the consent forms and privacy act statements that will be part of the 
navigation process to the URL at which the survey is being hosted. 
  
4. Once a participant completes the survey, no debrief will be given.  Final results 
will be tabulated and analyzed and incorporated into a thesis project exploring the 











APPLICATION FOR  
HUMAN SUBJECTS REVIEW (HSR) 
HSR NUMBER (to be assigned) 
PRINCIPAL INVESTIGATOR(S)  (Full Name, Code, Telephone) 
Steven J. Iatrou, Code 37/39, 1-831-656-3770 
 
APPROVAL REQUESTED           [X] New          [  ] Renewal 
 
 
LEVEL OF RISK     [  ] Exempt      [  ] Minimal      [X] More than Minimal 
Justification: 
Study only involves completion of online-survey. 
 
WORK WILL BE DONE IN (Site/Bldg/Rm) 
NPS, Root Hall, 201I 
 




MAXIMUM NUMBER OF SUBJECTS 
27,000 
 




SPECIAL POPULATIONS THAT WILL BE USED AS SUBJECTS 
[  ] Subordinates    [  ] Minors    [  ] NPS Students    [  ] Special Needs (e.g. Pregnant women) 
[X] Unrestricted Line Officers 
Specify safeguards to avoid undue influence and protect subject’s rights: 
 
Survey Said™ software is anonymous.  Only demographic data will be used to annotate data. 
 
OUTSIDE COOPERATING INVESTIGATORS AND AGENCIES 
N/A 
 
[  ] A copy of the cooperating institution’s HSR decision is attached. 
 
TITLE OF EXPERIMENT AND DESCRIPTION OF RESEARCH (attach additional sheet if 
needed).  Military-Media Relationship Online Survey.  Survey will attempt to identify a bias 
towards media by military officers and discern if there is a specific time in an officer’s career 
when he/she becomes biased against the media. 
 
I have read and understand NPS Notice on the Protection of Human Subjects. If there are any 
changes in any of the above information or any changes to the attached Protocol, Consent 
Form, or Debriefing Statement, I will suspend the experiment until I obtain new Committee 
approval. 
 
SIGNATURE_________________________________________   DATE_________________
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PARTICIPANT CONSENT FORM 
 
You are invited to participate in an online survey studying the military and the media.  We 
ask you to read the following paragraphs and press the “Participate in Survey” button 
below indicating that you agree to be in the study.  Please direct any questions you may 
have to Steven J. Iatrou, sjiatrou@nps.navy.mil. 
 
If you agree to participate in this study, you will be asked to answer a series of questions 
that are aimed at assessing the relationship between the military and the media amongst the 
Navy’s unrestricted line Officer Corps.  The first 13 questions are for collecting 
demographic information and will aid in the identification of statistical trends, while the 
remaining questions address the military-media relationship. 
 
Privacy Act Statement.  Data collected from this survey will be used for statistical 
analysis by the Principal Investigator, Departments of the Navy and Defense, and other 
U.S. Government agencies, provided this use is compatible with the purpose for which 
the information was collected.  Use of the information may be granted to legitimate non-
government agencies or individuals by the Naval Postgraduate School in accordance with 
the provisions of the Freedom of Information Act. 
 
 
1. Risks.  This research involves virtually no risk at all.   
 
2. Compensation.  No tangible reward will be given.  Results will be available in a 
completed thesis project titled, “Military-Media Relationships: U.S. Navy officers’ 
Attitudes Towards the Media.” 
 
3. Confidentiality.  No information will be gathered which could identify you as a 
participant. 
 
4. Voluntary Nature of the Study.  If you agree to participate, you are free to withdraw 
from the study at any time without prejudice.   
 
5. Minimal Risk Consent Statement.  I understand that this project does not involve 
more than minimal risk.   
 
6. Voluntary Participation.  I understand that my participation in this project is 
voluntary and refusal to participate will involve no penalty or loss of benefits to which I 
am otherwise entitled.  I also understand that I may discontinue participation at any 
time without penalty or loss of benefits to which I am otherwise entitled. 
 
7. Statement of Consent.  I have read the above information.  I agree to participate in this 
study. I understand that this project does not involve more than minimal risk.  I have 
been informed of any reasonably foreseeable risks or discomforts to me. 
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APPENDIX B - MILITARY MEDIA RELATIONSHIP SURVEY 
QUESTIONS 
Questions 1-13 are designed to provide demographic identifiers to the survey data and 
enable collected data to be correlated to specific age, rank, commissioning source, 
career field, or gender. 
 












2.  What is your primary specialty? 
o Aviator 
o Submariner 
o Surface Warfare Officer 
 
3.  In what year were you born (YYYY format)? 
 
4.  In what year were you commissioned (YYYY format)? 
 




o Enlisted Commissioning Program 
o Seaman to Admiral 
o Other 
 




7.  What is the highest level of education that you have received? 
o high school 
o some college 
o college graduate 
o some graduate work 
o graduate degree 
 
8.  How would you describe your views on political matters? 
o far left 
o very liberal 
o somewhat liberal 
o moderate 
o somewhat conservative 
o very conservative 
o far right 
o other 
o no opinion 
 
9.  Generally speaking, do you think of yourself as a Republican, a Democrat, and 




o no preference 
o other 
 
10.  What is the highest level of education that your father obtained? 
o less than high school 
o high school 
o some college 
o college graduate 
o some graduate work 
o graduate degree 
 
11.  What is the highest level of education that your mother obtained? 
o less than high school 
o high school 
o some college 
o college graduate 
o some graduate work 
o graduate degree 
 
12.  Where did you live most of the time when you were growing up? 
o New England 
o South 
o Mountain States 




o moved around 
72 
o other (please specify) 
 
13.  What is your racial/ethnic identity? 
o White or Caucasian, not Hispanic 
o Hispanic 
o Asian-American 
o Black or African-American, not Hispanic 
o American Indian, Eskimo, or Aleut 
o other (please specify) 
 
Questions 14-39 are designed to identify an officer’s feelings towards the role of the 
military in the post—Cold War world and to identify bias towards the media. 
14.  Which of the following do you feel are appropriate roles for the United States 
military to play in contemporary American society.  Choose among 4, “very 
appropriate,” 3, “somewhat appropriate,” 2, “somewhat inappropriate,” and 1, 
“very inappropriate.” 
o Informing the public about military/national security issues 
o Education, training, career opportunities for youth 
o Domestic disaster relief 
o Model for resolution of social problems 
o Enforcement of immigration policies 
o Domestic law enforcement 
 
15.  Which of the following do you feel are appropriate roles for the United States 
military to play in the post-Cold War world.  Choose among 4, “very appropriate,” 
3, “somewhat appropriate,” 2, “somewhat inappropriate,” and 1, “very 
inappropriate.” 
o Protect the U.S. from foreign aggressors 
o Provide military advice to U.S. political leaders 
o Assist in the defense of allies 
o Assist emerging democracies with professionalization and de-politicization of their 
militaries 
o Protect U.S. economic interests abroad 
o Participate in multinational peacekeeping efforts 
o Support humanitarian relief efforts 
o Intervene in civil wars when it is deemed in the U.S. national interest 
o Support and participate in foreign counter-narcotics activities 
 
16.  How well do you think the media keep the public informed about military and 
national security issues? 
o Very well 
o Somewhat well 
o Not very well 
o Not well at all 
o Don’t know 
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17.  How well do you think the military fulfills its responsibility to keep the public 
informed about military and national security issues? 
o Very well 
o Somewhat well 
o Not very well 
o Not well at all 
o Don’t know 
 
18.  Do you want to know about the following issues? 
o Terrorist threats 
o Counter-terrorist activities 
o Military readiness 
o Effect on reaching policy goals 
o Physical damage 
o Human casualties 
o Quality of life 
o Sexual misconduct 
 
19.  Do you feel that you need to know about the following issues? 
o Terrorist threats 
o Counter-terrorist activities 
o Military readiness 
o Effect on reaching policy goals 
o Physical damage 
o Human casualties 
o Quality of life 
o Sexual misconduct 
 
20.  Do you feel that you have a right to know about the following issues? 
o Terrorist threats 
o Counter-terrorist activities 
o Military readiness 
o Effect on reaching policy goals 
o Physical damage 
o Human casualties 
o Quality of life 
o Sexual misconduct 
 
21.  How important do you feel it is for members of the public to receive accurate 
and timely information on military and national security issues and events? 
o Very important 
o Somewhat important 
o Not very important 
o Not important at all 
o Don’t know 
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22.  On a scale of 1 to 10, with 10 being representing the highest importance rating, 
rate the importance of the following issues affecting the public’s awareness of the 
military. 
o No current military threats to the United States 
o Regional conflicts are far away and too difficult to understand 
o There are more important personal issues to worry about (economy, education, school 
violence) 
o Declining share of Americans have served in the military (lack of personal 
experience) 
o Elimination of the draft 
o Technowar: Battles are being fought with technology, with very few if any U.S. 
casualties 
o Too much on the American plate (lack of time to give the military serious 
consideration) 
o Our current set of role models and heroes are not from the military (all sports and 
entertainment) 
o Because it’s about where they want to be (medium level of interest, therefore medium 
level of awareness) 
o Perceived change in mission of the military from U.S. defense to global peacekeeper 
o U.S. is entertainment oriented society; military events are not entertainment 
o The post-Cold-War message (we won!) 
o Changes in the media (cutbacks in funding, number of reporters, etc.) 
o Lack of serious intellectual debate or challenge coming from the media (not as much 
investigative reporting, detail) 
o Sense that the public feels powerless/disconnected in general (high level of apathy) 
o Impact of negative news stories about the military (sexual misconduct and scandals) 
 
23.  On a scale of 1 to 10, with 10 being representing the highest importance rating, 
rate the importance of the following issues that (would) affect your willingness to 
share information with the media. 
o Concern about impact on current military operations 
o Lack of general trust in the media by members of the military 
o Fear that comments will be taken out of context and misinterpreted 
o Impact on personal careers (advancement or otherwise) 
o The “good news” offered won’t be published 
o A sense that the story has already been written—media are just looking for a footnote 
or a source 
o A sense that the media don’t truly respect or understand the military’s complexity and 
culture 
o Lead by example (senior officers not going forward on key issues; therefore, junior 
officers continue with this style) 
o Informal mentoring: People who have been burned in the past pass this lesson on to 
new members of the military 
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o Personal experience of being burned (I’ve been burned once, I won’t get burned 
again) 
o Civilian leadership not being visible or encouraging to media access 
o Potential for negative impact on congressional funding efforts 
o Not comfortable with the skill levels to deliver the information and respond to the 
kinds of questions asked 
o Impact on future programs if information in the media precedes procurement 
o No personal benefit or value 
o A level of arrogance that the military “owns” the data 
 
24.  In general, how would you assess the Navy’s relationship with the media?  
Choose among 4, “excellent,” 3, “good,” 2, “fair,” and 1, “poor.” 
 
25.  Should the media have maximum access to the military: 
o In peacetime? 
o During military conflict? 
o When military action is being planned? 
 
26.  Public affairs encourages military officers to speak with reporters: 
o Strongly agree 
o Agree 
o Disagree 
o Strongly disagree 
 
27.  Public affairs tends to restrict media access to information: 
o Strongly agree 
o Agree 
o Disagree 
o Strongly disagree 
 
28.  Public affairs tends to follow the orders and desires of senior civilian and 
military leadership in deciding how to approach setting levels of access: 
o Strongly agree 
o Agree 
o Disagree 
o Strongly disagree 
 
29.  How would you rate the relative risk of speaking with the media in regards to 
the following issues.  Choose among 4, “a very serious risk,” 3, “a fairly serious 
risk,” 2, “not a very serious risk,” and 1, “not a risk at all.” 
o Battle plans or operations 
o Intelligence issues 
o Criticism of current defense or security policies 
o Issues which could embarrass a senior officer 
o Facts contradicting official statement or policies 
o Issues which are the responsibility of superiors 
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o Scandal in the officer’s office or base 
o Sensitive social issues 
o Public policy relating to the military 
o Capabilities of declassified weapons and technology 
o Personnel issues 
o Quality of life issues 
o Basic and advanced training techniques 
 
30.  In speaking with the media, how constrained do you/officers feel due to the 
influence of: (Choose among 4, “a great deal,” 3, “a fair amount,” 2, “not very 
much,” and 1, “not at all.”) 
o Civilian leaders 
o Superior officers 
o Public affairs officers 
o Peers 
 
31.  Rate the following consequences that concern you most when speaking with 
reporters: (Choose among 4, “a very serious concern,” 3, “a fairly serious concern,” 
2, “not a very serious concern,” and 1, “not a concern at all.”) 
o Harming national security 
o Embarrassing your service 
o Putting your career at risk 
o Hurting your chances for promotion 
o Hurting your standing with colleagues 
 
32.  On a scale of 1 to 10, with 10 being representing the highest importance rating, 
rate the importance of the following factors that you view are affecting the media’s 
ability to inform the public. 
o The current news premium is on sound bites—sensationalism vs. depth 
o The ability to raise the priority of military stories with editors 
o Complexity of military information doesn’t fit the new journalism template/format 
o The level of budget and resource cuts experienced by the media in coverage resources 
for military news and events 
o Lack of general access to military personnel 
o Lack of patience by media to give military time to prepare and analyze 
o Low level of public interest/apathy 
o Too much focus on issues and officers in the Beltway; not enough human-interest 
stories of personal relevance 
o Challenging for the media to assess public interest in a specific regional conflict 
o Concern that the military is trying to spin or control the story (therefore, no news 
might be preferable) 
o Lack of personal military experience by reporters or writers 
o Lack of consistent skills by the military to deliver the information 
o Public’s concern about media accountability in general 
o Military news doesn’t sell newspapers 
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33.  Prior to September 11th, 2001, how do you think the end of the Cold War has 
influenced: 
The assignment of reporters to cover military and security issues? 
o More reporters assigned 
o Same number assigned 
o Fewer assigned 
The level of experience reporters have when covering military and security issues? 
o More experienced 
o About the same 
o Less experienced 
 
34.  Since September 11th, how do you think the United States’ War on Terror has 
influenced: 
The assignment of reporters to cover military and security issues? 
o More reporters assigned 
o Same number assigned 
o Fewer assigned 
The level of experience reporters have when covering military and security issues? 
o More experienced 
o About the same 
o Less experienced 
 
35.  When a reporter wants to do a story on the military or a national security issue, 
it must be approved by an editor or other gatekeeper.  What effect do you think 
editors and gatekeepers have on how fairly and accurately stories get reported? 
o More fair/accurate 
o Just as fair/accurate 
o Less fair/accurate 
 
36.  Do editors and gatekeepers or individual reporters have a greater role in 
determining which military and national security issues get reported in the media? 
o Editors and gatekeepers 
o Reporters 
 
37.  How important are the following considerations to editors and gatekeepers? 
Informing the public: 
o Very important 
o Important 
o Not very important 
o Not important at all 
Selling more copies or getting better ratings: 
o Very important 
o Important 
o Not very important 
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o Not important at all 
 
38.  How has the rise of the 24-hour news television channels and increased 
competition influenced the quality of news reporting of military and security issues? 
o Greatly improved 
o Modestly improved 
o Modestly worsened 
o Greatly worsened 
 
39.  How does the Internet affect the quality of reporting on military and national 
security issues? 
o Improves 
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APPENDIX C -  SURVEY SAID™ STATISTICS AND GRAPHS 
(Questions 1-13 are designed to provide demographic identifiers to the survey 
data and enable collected data to be correlated to specific age, rank, commissioning 
source, career field, or gender.) 
 
1. What is your rank? 
 















93 Eligible Respondents 
92 Respondents Answered Question # 1 
Rank 
    1-1     4   4.35% ENS 
    1-2     4   4.35% LTJG 
    1-3    55  59.78% LT 
    1-4    16  17.39% LCDR 
    1-5     9   9.78% CDR 
    1-6     4   4.35% CAPT 
    1-7     0   0.00% RDML 
    1-8     0   0.00% RADM 
    1-9     0   0.00% VADM 
   1-10     0   0.00% ADM 
            1   1.08% Missing Cases 
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2. What is your primary specialty? 
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93 Respondents Answered Question # 2 
Specialty 
    2-1     0   0.00% Aviator59 
    2-2    16  17.20% Submariner 
    2-3    77  82.80% Surface Warfare Officer 
            0   0.00% Missing Cases 
 
3. In what year were you born (YYYY format)? 
92 Respondents  Answered Question #3 
 Average Age was: 1970.2717, about 33 years old 
 Median Age was:   1972, about 31 years old 
 
4.  In what year were you commissioned (YYYY format)? 
93 Respondents  Answered Question #3 
 Average commissioning year was: 1993. 054, about 10 years of Naval service. 
 Median commissioning year was:   1996, about 7 years of Naval service 
                                                 
59  Every attempt was made to contact Naval Aviators to take the survey (those studying at the NPS 
Naval Safety Aviation Course were sought in addition to contacting the PAO’s of both Pacific and Atlantic 
Naval Air Squadrons for help in distribution; no response garnered).   
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5.   What is your commissioning source? 
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93 Respondents Answered Question # 5 
Commission Source 
    5-1    15  16.13% OCS 
    5-2    38  40.86% ROTC 
    5-3    27  29.03% USNA 
    5-4     8   8.60% Enlisted Commissioning Program 
    5-5     0   0.00% Seaman to Admiral 
    5-6     5   5.38% Other60 
            0   0.00% Missing Cases 
 
 
                                                 
60  “Seaman To Admiral” is no longer an active commissioning program. Other responses were -  
Merchant Marine direct Commission, U.S. Merchant Marine Academy, and LDO/CWO. 
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6.   What is your sex? 
 
 
Survey Said for Windows and the WEB - Sex
Female
Male




92 Respondents Answered Question # 6 
Sex 
    6-1    87  94.57% Male 
    6-2     5   5.43% Female61 
            1   1.08% Missing Cases  
           
 
                                                 
 61 Relative to our active duty naval forces this skew in gender  seems to be in line when compared to 
survey respondents – (http://www.bupers.navy.mil/mentor/totalforce.html).  Total Force Male – 333,807, 
85.40%; Total Force Female – 57,045, 14.6%. Demographics are from a navy website dated March 2002.  
The one missing case, a respondent failed to indicate sex. 
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7.   What is the highest level of education that you have received? 
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93 Respondents Answered Question # 7 
Education 
    7-1     1   1.08% high school 
    7-2     1   1.08% some college 
    7-3    18  19.35% college graduate 
    7-4    40  43.01% some graduate work 
    7-5    32  34.41% graduate degree 
    7-6     1   1.08% doctorate degree 
            0   0.00% Missing Cases 
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8.   How would you describe your views on political matters? 
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93 Respondents Answered Question # 8 
Political 
    8-1     0   0.00% far left 
    8-2     2   2.15% very liberal 
    8-3     5   5.38% somewhat liberal 
    8-4    27  29.03% moderate 
    8-5    39  41.94% somewhat conservative 
    8-6    15  16.13% very conservative 
    8-7     0   0.00% far right 
    8-8     2   2.15% no opinion 
    8-9     3   3.23% other62 














                                                 




9.   Generally speaking, do you think of yourself as a Republican, a 
Democrat, and Independent, or what? 
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93 Respondents Answered Question # 9 
Political type 
    9-1    52  55.91% Republican 
    9-2    14  15.05% Democrat 
    9-3    20  21.51% Independent 
    9-4     4   4.30% no preference 
    9-5     3   3.23% other63 











                                                 
63 Other:  Registered Republican, practices non-partisanship; Libertarian. 
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10.   What is the highest level of education that your father obtained? 
 








less than high school
0 5 10 15 20 25 30
 
93 Respondents Answered Question # 10 
Father education 
   10-1     4   4.30% less than high school 
   10-2    14  15.05% high school 
   10-3    14  15.05% some college 
   10-4    28  30.11% college graduate 
   10-5     5   5.38% some graduate work 
   10-6    17  18.28% graduate degree 
   10-7    11  11.83% doctorate degree 




11.   What is the highest level of education that your mother obtained? 
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93 Respondents Answered Question # 11 
Mother Education 
   11-1     1   1.08% less than high school 
   11-2    20  21.51% high school 
   11-3    28  30.11% some college 
   11-4    26  27.96% college graduate 
   11-5     7   7.53% some graduate work 
   11-6     9   9.68% graduate degree 
   11-7     2   2.15% doctorate degree 
            0   0.00% Missing Cases 
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12.   Where did you live most of the time when you were growing up? 
 















93 Respondents Answered Question # 12 
Home of record 
   12-1     8   8.60% New England 
   12-2    17  18.28% South 
   12-3     3   3.23% Mountain States 
   12-4    10  10.75% Pacific Coast 
   12-5    18  19.35% Mid-Atlantic 
   12-6    21  22.58% Midwest 
   12-7     2   2.15% Southwest 
   12-8     8   8.60% moved around 
   12-9     6   6.45% other (please specify)64 
   0   0.00%   Missing Cases 
                                                 
64 Other: Puerto Rico, South Pacific, Texas and New York were the other comments. 
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13.  What is your racial/ethnic identity? 
 
Survey Said for Windows and the WEB - Race
other (please specify)
American Indian, Eskimo, or Aleut
Black or African-American, not Hispanic
Asian-American
Hispanic
White or caucasian, not Hispanic
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93 Respondents Answered Question # 13 
Race 
   13-1    78  83.87% White or Caucasian, not Hispanic 
   13-2     2   2.15% Hispanic 
   13-3     4   4.30% Asian-American 
   13-4     4   4.30% Black or African-American, not Hispanic 
   13-5     1   1.08% American Indian, Eskimo, or Aleut 
   13-6     4   4.30% other (please specify)65 
            0   0.00% Missing Cases 
 
                                                 
65  Other: Comments included a list of combination of races categorized above. 
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(Questions 14-39 are designed to identify an officer’s feelings towards the role of the 
military in the post—Cold War world and to identify bias towards the media.) 
 
14.  Which of the following do you feel are appropriate roles for the United States 
military to play in contemporary American society.  Choose among 4, “very 
appropriate,” 3, “somewhat appropriate,” 2, “somewhat inappropriate,” and 1, 
“very inappropriate.” 
 Median response # of respondents
Informing the public about military/national security issues 3 93 
Education, training, career opportunities for youth 3 93 
Domestic disaster relief 3 93 
Model for resolution of social problems 2 93 
Enforcement of immigration policies 2 93 
Domestic law enforcement 1 93 
 
15.  Which of the following do you feel are appropriate roles for the United States 
military to play in the post-Cold War world.  Choose among 4, “very appropriate,” 






Protect the U.S. from foreign aggressors 4 93 
Provide military advice to U.S. political leaders 4 93 
Assist in the defense of allies 4 93 
Assist emerging democracies with professionalization and de-
politicization of their militaries 
3 93 
Protect U.S. economic interests abroad 4 93 
Participate in multinational peacekeeping efforts 3 93 
Support humanitarian relief efforts 3 93 
Intervene in civil wars when it is deemed in the U.S. national 
interest 
3 93 





16.  How well do you think the media keep the public informed about 
military and national security issues? 
 
Survey Said for Windows and the WEB - National
Security
Do not know
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92 Respondents Answered Question # 16 
National Security 
   16-1     7   7.61% Very well 
   16-2    34  36.96% Somewhat well 
   16-3    28  30.43% Not very well 
   16-4    23  25.00% Not well at all 
   16-5     0   0.00% Do not know 
            1   1.08% Missing Cases 
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17.   How well do you think the military fulfills its responsibility to keep 
the public informed about military and national security issues? 
 
Survey Said for Windows and the WEB - Military to
public
Do not know
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93 Respondents Answered Question # 17 
Military to public 
   17-1    10  10.75% Very well 
   17-2    44  47.31% Somewhat well 
   17-3    29  31.18% Not very well 
   17-4    10  10.75% Not well at all 
   17-5     0   0.00% Do not know 





18.   Do you want to know about the following issues? 
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91 Respondents Answered Question # 18 
Information 
   18-1    80  87.91% Terrorist threats 
   18-2    64  70.33% Counter-terrorist activities 
   18-3    83  91.21% Military readiness 
   18-4    64  70.33% Effect on reaching policy goals 
   18-5    56  61.54% Physical damage 
   18-6    53  58.24% Human casualties 
   18-7    56  61.54% Quality of life 
   18-8    18  19.78% Sexual misconduct 




19.   Do you feel that you need to know about the following issues? 
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92 Respondents Answered Question # 19 
Issues 
   19-1    77  83.70% Terrorist threats 
   19-2    51  55.43% Counter-terrorist activities 
   19-3    78  84.78% Military readiness 
   19-4    58  63.04% Effect on reaching policy goals 
   19-5    42  45.65% Physical damage 
   19-6    43  46.74% Human casualties 
   19-7    47  51.09% Quality of life 
   19-8    15  16.30% Sexual misconduct 
            1   1.08% Missing Cases 
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20.   Do you feel that you have a right to know about the following issues? 
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88 Respondents Answered Question # 20 
Issues3 
   20-1    71  80.68% Terrorist threats 
   20-2    34  38.64% Counter-terrorist activities 
   20-3    73  82.95% Military readiness 
   20-4    53  60.23% Effect on reaching policy goals 
   20-5    42  47.73% Physical damage 
   20-6    43  48.86% Human casualties 
   20-7    43  48.86% Quality of life 
   20-8    25  28.41% Sexual misconduct 
            5   5.38% Missing Cases 
97 
21.   How important do you feel it is for members of the public to receive 
accurate and timely information on military and national security issues and 
events? 
 
Survey Said for Windows and the WEB - Public and
national security
Do not know
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93 Respondents Answered Question # 21 
Public and national security 
   21-1    48  51.61% Very important 
   21-2    34  36.56% Somewhat important 
   21-3     8   8.60% Not very important 
   21-4     3   3.23% Not important at all 
   21-5     0   0.00% Do not know 
            0   0.00% Missing Cases 
 
22.  On a scale of 1 to 10, with 10 being representing the highest importance rating, 






No current military threats to the United States 5 84 
Regional conflicts are far away and too difficult to understand 7 86 
There are more important personal issues to worry about (economy, 
education, school violence) 
8 86 
Declining share of Americans have served in the military (lack of personal 
experience) 
8 86 
Elimination of the draft 4 85 
Technowar: Battles are being fought with technology, with very few if 
any U.S. casualties 
6 85 
Too much on the American plate (lack of time to give the military 
serious consideration) 
6 86 
Our current set of role models and heroes are not from the military (all 7 84 
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sports and entertainment) 
Because it’s about where they want to be (medium level of interest, 
therefore medium level of awareness) 
6 85 
Perceived change in mission of the military from U.S. defense to global 
peacekeeper 
6 85 
U.S. is entertainment oriented society; military events are not entertainment 5 84 
The post-Cold-War message (we won!) 5 86 
Changes in the media (cutbacks in funding, number of reporters, etc.) 3 85 
Lack of serious intellectual debate or challenge coming from the media 
(not as much investigative reporting, detail) 
6 86 
Sense that the public feels powerless/disconnected in general (high level 
of apathy) 
6 86 




23.  On a scale of 1 to 10, with 10 being representing the highest importance rating, 
rate the importance of the following issues that (would) affect your willingness to 





Concern about impact on current military operations 10 88 
Lack of general trust in the media by members of the military 7 88 
Fear that comments will be taken out of context and misinterpreted 9 87 
Impact on personal careers (advancement or otherwise) 6 87 
The “good news” offered won’t be published 7 86 
A sense that the story has already been written—media are just looking for a 
footnote or a source 
5 86 
A sense that the media don’t truly respect or understand the military’s 
complexity and culture 
7 86 
Lead by example (senior officers not going forward on key issues; therefore, 
junior officers continue with this style) 
5 85 
Informal mentoring: People who have been burned in the past pass this 
lesson on to new members of the military 
5 85 
Personal experience of being burned (I’ve been burned once, I won’t get 
burned again) 
2 85 
Civilian leadership not being visible or encouraging to media access 4 83 
Potential for negative impact on congressional funding efforts 3 83 
Not comfortable with the skill levels to deliver the information and 
respond to the kinds of questions asked 
6 84 
Impact on future programs if information in the media precedes procurement 4 83 
No personal benefit or value 3 85 
A level of arrogance that the military “owns” the data 1 82 
 
 
24.  In general, how would you access the Navy’s relation ship with the media.  
Choose among 4, “excellent,” 3, “good,” 2, “fair,” and 1, “poor.” 
90 Respondents answered Question#24 
 Median response:  3 
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25.  Should the media have maximum access to the military: 
 
Survey Said for Windows and the WEB - Media
access
Other
When military action is being planned?
During military conflict?
In peacetime?
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89 Respondents Answered Question # 25 
Media access 
   25-1    36  40.45% In peacetime? 
   25-2    17  19.10% During military conflict? 
   25-3     0   0.00% When military action is being planned? 
   25-4    36  40.45% Other66 
            4   4.30% Missing Cases 
                                                 
66  Other: Comments were varied.  After subsequent review of the question, the author feels the word 
maximum was an inappropriate word.  The question was intended to evoke responses to “the degree” of 
access to the military.  The officers sampled picked up on this and provided the following feedback: 
answers ranged from “never, limited access, situation dependent, when leadership deems fit, as long as 
OPSEC is observed, all the above, to total access.” 
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26.   Public affairs encourages military officers to speak with reporters: 
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89 Respondents Answered Question # 26 
PAO 
   26-1     5   5.62% Strongly agree 
   26-2    20  22.47% Agree 
   26-3    54  60.67% Disagree 
   26-4    10  11.24% Strongly disagree 






27.  Public affairs tends to restrict media access to information: 
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89 Respondents Answered Question # 27 
PAO2 
   27-1     9  10.11% Strongly agree 
   27-2    49  55.06% Agree 
   27-3    29  32.58% Disagree 
   27-4     2   2.25% Strongly disagree 
            4   4.30% Missing Cases 
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28.  Public affairs tends to follow the orders and desires of senior civilian and 
military leadership in deciding how to approach setting levels of access: 
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87 Respondents Answered Question # 28 
PAO3 
   28-1    38  43.68% Strongly agree 
   28-2    45  51.72% Agree 
   28-3     4   4.60% Disagree 
   28-4     0   0.00% Strongly disagree 
            6   6.45% Missing Cases 
 
29.  How would you rate the relative risk of speaking with the media in regards to 
the following issues.  Choose among 4, “a very serious risk,” 3, “a fairly serious 
risk,” 2, “not a very serious risk,” and 1, “not a risk at all.” 
 Median response # of respondents 
Battle plans or operations 4 89 
Intelligence issues 4 89 
Criticism of current defense or security policies 3 89 
Issues which could embarrass a senior officer 3 89 
Facts contradicting official statement or policies 3 89 
Issues which are the responsibility of superiors 3 89 
Scandal in the officer’s office or base 3 89 
Sensitive social issues 2 89 
Public policy relating to the military 2 89 
Capabilities of declassified weapons and technology 2 89 
Personnel issues 2 89 
Quality of life issues 2 89 




30.  In speaking with the media, how constrained do you/officers feel due to the 
influence of: (Choose among 4, “a great deal,” 3, “a fair amount,” 2, “not very 
much,” and 1, “not at all.”) 
 Median response # of respondents
Civilian leaders 2 88 
Superior officers 3 88 
Public affairs officers 2 88 
Peers 2 88 
 
 
31.  Rate the following consequences that concern you most when speaking with 
reporters: (Choose among 4, “a very serious concern,” 3, “a fairly serious concern,” 
2, “not a very serious concern,” and 1, “not a concern at all.”) 
 Median response # of respondents
Harming national security 4 88 
Embarrassing your service 3 88 
Putting your career at risk 2 88 
Hurting your chances for promotion 2 88 
Hurting your standing with colleagues 2 88 
 
 
32.  On a scale of 1 to 10, with 10 being representing the highest importance rating, 
rate the importance of the following factors that you view are affecting the media’s 





The current news premium is on sound bites—sensationalism vs. 
depth 
9 83 
The ability to raise the priority of military stories with editors 6 82 
Complexity of military information doesn’t fit the new journalism 
template/format 
7 82 
The level of budget and resource cuts experienced by the media in 
coverage resources for military news and events 
5 80 
Lack of general access to military personnel 4 82 
Lack of patience by media to give military time to prepare and 
analyze 
5 82 
Low level of public interest/apathy 6 82 
Too much focus on issues and officers in the Beltway; not enough 
human-interest stories of personal relevance 
5 82 
Challenging for the media to assess public interest in a specific 
regional conflict 
5 81 
Concern that the military is trying to spin or control the story 
(therefore, no news might be preferable) 
6 81 
Lack of personal military experience by reporters or writers 8 81 
Lack of consistent skills by the military to deliver the information 5 81 
Public’s concern about media accountability in general 5 81 
Military news doesn’t sell newspapers 4 79 
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33.   Prior to September 11th, 2001, how do you think the end of the Cold War has 
influenced: 
 




The assignment of reporters to cover military and security issues? 
 
   33-1     8   9.30% More reporters assigned 
   33-2    16  18.60% Same number assigned 
   33-3    62  72.09% Fewer assigned 
 
The level of experience reporters have when covering military and security 
issues? 
   33-4     4   4.65% More experienced 
   33-5    33  38.37% About the same 
   33-6    49  56.98% Less experienced 
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(85 out of 93 Respondents Answered Question # 34 with 8 or  8.6% Missing 
Cases) 
 
The assignment of reporters to cover military and security issues? 
 
 
   34-1    81  95.29% More reporters assigned 
   34-2     4   4.71% Same number assigned 
   34-3     0   0.00% Fewer assigned 
 
The level of experience reporters have when covering military and security 
issues? 
   34-4    37  43.53% More experienced 
   34-5    35  41.18% About the same 
   34-6    13  15.29% Less experienced 
 













35.   When a reporter wants to do a story on the military or a national security 
issue, it must be approved by an editor or other gatekeeper.  What effect do you 
think editors and gatekeepers have on how fairly and accurately stories get 
reported? 
 









86 Respondents Answered Question # 35 
Media gatekeepers 
   35-1     9  10.47% More fair/accurate 
   35-2    40  46.51% Just as fair/accurate 
   35-3    37  43.02% Less fair/accurate 
            7   7.53% Missing Cases 
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36.   Do editors and gatekeepers or individual reporters have a greater role in 
determining which military and national security issues get reported in the media? 
 
 
Survey Said for Windows and the WEB - Media editors
Reporters
Editors and gatekeepers
0 20 40 60 80
 
 
87 Respondents Answered Question # 36 
Media editors 
   36-1    74  85.06% Editors and gatekeepers 
   36-2    13  14.94% Reporters 
            6   6.45% Missing Cases 
 
 
37.   How important are the following considerations to editors and gatekeepers? 
 
(87 out of 93 Respondents Answered Question # 37 with 6 or  6.45% Missing 
Cases) 
 
Informing the public: 
 
   37-1    11  12.64% Very important 
   37-2    48  55.17% Important 
   37-3    25  28.74% Not very important 
   37-4     3   3.45% Not important at all 
 
Selling more copies or getting better ratings: 
 
   37-5    70  80.46% Very important 
   37-6    14  16.09% Important 
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   37-7     1   1.15% Not very important 
   37-8     2   2.30% Not important at all 
 
 
Survey Said for Windows and the WEB - Selling news












38.  How has the rise of the 24-hour news television channels and increased 
competition influenced the quality of news reporting of military and security issues? 
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89 Respondents Answered Question # 38 
24 hr news 
   38-1    10  11.24% Greatly improved 
   38-2    35  39.33% Modestly improved 
   38-3    30  33.71% Modestly worsened 
   38-4    14  15.73% Greatly worsened 
            4   4.30% Missing Cases 
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39.  How does the Internet affect the quality of reporting on military and national 
security issues? 
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89 Respondents Answered Question # 39 
Internet news 
   39-1    41  46.07% Improves 
   39-2    32  35.96% Stays the same 
   39-3    16  17.98% Worsens 
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APPENDIX D - NAVAL SCIENCE CURRICULUM FOR NROTC 
AND CORE CURRICULUM FOR NAVAL ACADEMY 
MIDSHIPMEN 
NROTC/MMR CURRICULUM 200367 
 
• INTRO TO NAVAL SCIENCE 
• SEA POWER 
• SHIPS SYSTEMS I (ENGINEERING)  
• LEADERSHIP & MANAGEMENT 
• NAVIGATION I 
• NAVIGATION II 
• SHIPS SYSTEMS II (WEAPONS) 
• LEADERSHIP & ETHICS  
• AMPHIBIOUS WARFARE  
• EVOLUTION OF WARFARE 
• NAVAL SCIENCE LABORATORY 
• NAVAL SCIENCE FOR THE MERCHANT MARINE, P1550/13  
• NAVAL SCIENCE FOR THE MERCHANT MARINE, P1550/14 
• NAVAL SCIENCE FOR THE MERCHANT MARINE, P1550/15 
 
NROTC/MMR COURSE DESIGNATIONS 2003 
 
              FRESHMAN 
 
INTRODUCTION TO NAVAL SCIENCE (101) -- 






SHIPS SYSTEMS I (ENGINEERING) (102) -- 
P1550/4 (4-96) Change 5-97, 8-01 
LEADERSHIP & MANAGEMENT (401) 




NAVIGATION I (301) -- 
P1550/3 (8-01) 
Change 2-02                                                  
 67 Outline of NROTC/MMR curriculum summarized from CNET website “NAVAL SCIENCE 
CURRICULUM.” https://www.cnet.navy.mil/cnet/pns2003/. 
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NAVIGATION II (302) 
P1550/2 (4-96) 




SHIP SYSTEMS II (WEAPONS) (201) -- 
P1550/1 (11-99) Change 8-00 
LEADERSHIP & ETHICS (402) 
P1550/8 (11-02) 
 
MARINE AMPHIBIOUS WARFARE (410) -- 
P1550/10 (11-93) Change 8-00 
 
EVOLUTION OF WARFARE (310) -- 
P1550/7 (3-94) Change 6-98 
 
LAB NAVAL SCIENCE LABORATORY -- 
P1550/12 (6-96) Change 8-97 
 
MMR NAVAL SCIENCE FOR THE MERCHANT MARINE OFFICER -- 
P1550/13 (12-00) P1550/14 (602) 
P1550/15 (8-97) w/Change 8-00, 2-01 
 
 
                                                
CORE AND PROFESSIONAL CURRICULUM FOR NAVAL ACADEMY 
MIDSHIPMEN 200468 
 
To prepare midshipmen as Navy officerNavy officers, the Naval Academy’s 
curriculum blends professional subjects with required and elective courses similar to 
those offered at leading civilian colleges.   The curriculum has three basic elements: 
• core requirements in engineering, natural sciences, the humanities and social 
sciences, to assure that graduates are able to think, solve problems and express 
conclusions clearly; 
• core academic courses and practical training to teach the professional and 
leadership skills required of Navy and Marine Corps officers; and 
• an academic major in a subject chosen by midshipmen to develop their 
individual interests and talents. 
 
 68   A summary of the elements of the USNA core curriculum and professional educations were taken 
from the following internet link http://www.usna.edu/Catalog/; specifically, Ch 1, p 4 and  Ch 4, 54-56. 
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 Core Curriculum 
In four years at the Naval Academy, students are required to take certain core 
courses to make sure they are well prepared for the major career-path options available to 
Navy and Marine Corps officers. Majors courses also prepare midshipmen for advanced 
professional training and postgraduate education, which are expected of nearly all Navy 
officerNavy officers. Through required courses in engineering, natural sciences, social 
sciences, the humanities, professional military subjects and physical education, the Naval 
Academy gives midshipmen a balanced education to open practically any door of 
opportunity in the future. 
During plebe or freshman year, nearly all courses are required. The required 
courses form the foundation for the more advanced courses chosen by upper class 
midshipmen. Some core requirements in the upper class years have alternative courses 
from which to choose, depending on your academic background, abilities and major. 
The typical academic schedule for plebes includes five courses in each of two 
semesters: 
Plebe year, first semester — 16 credit hours 
• Calculus I — Most begin here, some validate and are placed into later calculus 
courses and a few plebes not adequately prepared for calculus take a pre-calculus course 
that does not count as part of the minimum mathematics requirement. 
• Chemistry I — Including laboratories. 
• U.S. Government and Constitutional Development — The foundation of 
American democracy. 
• Leadership and Human Behavior – An examination of the fundamentals of 
leadership within the context of individual and group behavior. 
• Rhetoric and Introduction to Literature I — Some plebes take a practical writing 
course to prepare for this class. 
Plebe year, second semester — 18 credit hours 
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• In addition to these courses taken for credit, a few hundred plebes who have had 
little exposure to computers are provided with six weeks of training. 
• Calculus II — Continuation of the first-semester course. 
• Chemistry II — Continuation of the first-semester course. 
• American Naval Heritage — A history of this country’s Navy. 
• Fundamentals of Naval Science — The basic elements of shipboard operation, 
organization and propulsion. 
• Rhetoric and Introduction to Literature II. 
Professional Courses and Training 
Professional courses and training are an important part of the Naval Academy’s 
integrated program. Required courses in such areas as naval science, engineering, 
navigation and weapons systems give midshipmen a working knowledge of modern naval 
operations and technology. 
Courses in leadership, ethics and military law help prepare them for leadership 
responsibilities as an upper class midshipman and a commissioned officer. Physical 
education teaches midshipmen the value of physical fitness and staying fit for life. Eight 
weeks of annual summer training introduces them to operational units of the Navy and 
Marine Corps, life at sea and the responsibilities of a junior officer. 
Fourth Class (Plebe) Year 
Professional courses — two required introductory classes in naval science and 
leadership. Courses include classroom studies and lab sessions in operational trainers and 
afloat in yard patrol craft. 
Third class year 
Professional courses — three required in navigation, naval engineering, ethics and 
moral reasoning 
Second class year 
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Professional courses — five are required, including courses in strategy and 
tactics, naval engineering and weapons. Also required are naval electricity and 
electronics and a leadership course that focuses on the dynamic interactions of leader, 
followers, and situation. 
First class year 
Professional courses — the three required courses are a weapons course exploring 
warfare systems design, a law course covering military justice and the law of war, and a 
junior officer seminar. 
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APPENDIX E -  NAVY MEDIA TRAINING PROGRAM 








Subj:  NASA 26 JUNE MEDIA TRAINING 
 
We are conducting media training for NASA Shuttle Program Officials Mr. Bryan 
O’Connor and Mr. Bill Parsons at the Naval Media Center on 26 June from 0900 – 1130.  
NASA PAO’s attending are:  
  
1. Allard Beutel, lead for space flight, formerly a CNN news producer 
2. Al Feinberg, member of the space flight PAO team, formerly a network  
feature news reporter (ABC, Fox) 
• Melissa Motichek, member of the space flight PAO team, also from CNN, an  
international news producer 
 
Proposed Schedule: 
0900 Arrival, greeted by RADM Pietropaoli, CAPT Gradisher, CDR Fenick69 
0910 Media Training Briefing – RADM Pietropaoli, CDR Fenick 
0945 Stand-up Interview conducted by LT Smith 
1000 Stand-up Interview feedback – RADM Pietropaoli, CDR Fenick 
1020 Remote Interview conducted by CAPT Rich Marin 
1035 Media Ambush –LT Salata, LT Deloach, LT Schultz, LT Smith, ENS Luckett 
1045 Remote Interview/Media Ambush feedback – Press Conference Brief 
1110 Press Conference – CAPT Marin, LT Salata, LT Deloach, LT Schultz, LT Smith, 
ENS Luckett, Brook Carroll, LT Gyapong 
1125 Press Conference feedback – RADM Pietropaoli, CDR Fenick 
 
 Media Center support is provided by:   
Sen. Engineer, Gary Craddock 
TV Techs, Robbert Goddard,  John Zador  
TV Production Specialist, Wayne Miller, Paul Hernandez 
Videographer,  Jeff Cordia, Dwayne Jones   
Audio Engineer, Delet Peters  
Stage Lighting and Directing, Reed Downey 
Lighting Technician, Charles Mecca 
Editors, Richard Holland, Merle Livingston, Braddum Davis 
                                                 
69 Notes provided by Navy Commander William R. Fenick, News Desk Director, DoN Office of 
Information as an attachment via electronic mail 10 Sep 2003. 
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Director, John Morrissey, Andrew Miller  
Asst. Director, Maria Cassidy  
 
 (Media Center personnel are fully cross-trained and can substitute 
positions.  The exact personnel manning each position will be finalized the morning of 
media training due to emergent manpower requirements, etc.) 
 
Our goal for this training is to raise the awareness of challenges to effectively  
communicating the missions and messages of NASA in a variety of news gathering 
formats.   
 
Department of the Navy Office of Information Media Training 
 
(The following is an outline of the training program briefed to senior military 
officers) 
 
1. Why media training? 
• Old thinking:  “Just don’t do it” 
• Interaction with the media is inevitable 
• Master it! 
2. Why engage the media?  
• Get your message out to the most people 
• Including your own 
• You want to engage on your own terms 
3. Who’s the spokesperson 
• Not Necessarily the PAO…especially in a crisis 
• Responsibility, authority, credibility 
• Today’s media want more than simply a spokesperson 
• They want access to the decision maker 
4. The PAO 
• Corporate expert 
• “Keeper of your Message” 
• Facilitate and coordinate the “engagement” 
• Prepare the “talent” 
• Works for YOU 
5. Rules of Engagement 
• Set when interview arranged and restated at beginning of interview  
a. On the record 
• For attribution; name and title 
b. On Background 
• Attribution is negotiable; “official” or “source” 
• Can be for immediate use or “embargoed” 
• Off the record vs deep background 




• TV  
• 24 Hour 
• News Service (Wire) 
• Cable spin-offs 
• “New” Media 
7. The Four “Cs” 
a. Commercials  
• Choose two or three communication points --- “commercials” 
• Make sure you know what the reporter’s  topic is in advance 
• Anticipate likely questions, and work to fit  your commercials 
into your answers 
b. Control 
• Be positive and energetic 
• Answer questions to your advantage 
• Rephrase when possible 
• Avoid  
o Comparisons 
o Promises 
o Speculating about the hypothetical 
o Repeating negatives 
• Correct inaccuracies 
• Do your research 
• Who’s doing the interview? 
• What is the setting (studio, office, etc.)? 
• Who else will be on the show? 
c. Cosmetics 
• Wear the right clothing 
• Consider the camera’s view 
• Nametags 
• Glasses  
• Are your socks long enough? 
• Make-up (for everyone) 
• Posture 
o Watch nervous movements, tics 
• Voice 
o Vary your pitch and tone  
o No up speak  
o Don’t trail off at end of sentences 
o Watch for verbal tics (repetitive phrases) 
d. Commandment 
• THOU SHALT NOT LIE 
8. Media Venues 
a. Talk show 
• Friendly 
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• Personality-driven; focus on the host 
• Great opportunity to air your commercials 
• Live format and “lively” 
• Cosmetics key; image tells the story 
• Energy, energy, energy 
• Talk to the interviewer, not the camera 
• Know the format in advance 
• Find out what other guests will be on 
b. Stand-ups  
• Most common TV encounter 
• Choose a supportive backdrop  
• Taped, not live 
• Edited 
• Put question in answer 
• Talk to the interviewer, not the camera 
• ALWAYS “have something to add” 
• Cosmetics important…image is everything 
c. Remote 
• Live format --- via satellite 
• Stay focused on interviewer (camera);  hard when you can’t see 
them 
• Pay careful attention to directions from studio staff 
• Use commercials! 
d. Confrontational 
• Live or live to tape 
• Will probably get “help” in preparing---ask for it! 
• Don’t repeat negatives  
• Correct inaccuracies 
• Rephrase questions to include commercials 
• Don’t lose your cool! 
• You won’t “win” but staying even with host is victory itself 
9. Media availability 
• “Press conference” 
o Use this method to communicate same message to large group 
o Always limit scope of questions with statement 
o Specify the length  
o Defer answers if necessary 
• Print 
o Most Common  
o Daily, Weekly, News Service 
o Local, National, Trade 
o Depth of coverage 
o Preparation is still key! 
o Length of interview 
o Commercials 
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APPENDIX F -  SURVEY ANALYSIS USING S-PLUS 6.1.2 
The survey was developed and reviewed by the Naval Postgraduate School 
Institutional Review Board throughout the month of July 2003 and prepared for web 
publication using the “creator” function of the Survey Said™ software suite.  By August 
5, 2003 the survey was published online and responses solicited through September 10, 
2003, giving about a month to collect demographic data on Navy officer respondents.70 
Data was collected on the NPS Internet server and downloaded into both the survey 
software, Survey Said™, database file and a spreadsheet format, using Microsoft Excel.   
For this study, the data is presented after being analyzed two ways.  First, in order 
to conduct any type of inference, a statistical procedure called nonparametric methods 
was applied to a portion of the survey questions.  Secondly, the use of statistical and 
graphical measurements of the response rate of the survey subjects is included in detail in 
Appendix C.  Moreover, the assistance of a certified statistician is helpful when trying to 
analyze the data with the best statistical tool.  Dr. Robert Koyak from the Operations 
Research Department at NPS was instrumental in ensuring the integrity of the analysis. 
Nonparametric tests were the statistical method recommended by Dr. Koyak 
when doing any type of inference between variables of data.  The word nonparametric 
contrasts these methods with statistical methods that are based on models of a specific 
form and use data to estimate the parameters in these models.  Simply put, nonparametric 
tests do not require any specific form for the distribution of the population from which 
these survey samples come. 
Several tests of the data were used: the Wilcoxon rank sum test, Spearman test, 
Kruskal-Wallis Test, and the Chi-Square test.  But first the data had to be prepared prior 
to conducting the tests. 
 The Wilcoxon rank sum test was applied to the following questions: 1-13, 16-
21,25-28, and 33-39.  Rank tests are nonparametric tests based on the ranks of 
                                                 
 70   The URL numbers reflect statistical data for FY 2003 starting October 2002 through June 2003 
(Total 25,974) – 1110(Surface Warfare) 8,636; 1120(Subsurface Warfare) 3,773; 1310 and 1320 combined 
13,565; Total number of Navy officers attempted to reach with survey was compiled with help from 
DMDC (East Coast). http://www.dmdc.osd.mil/. 
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observations, their positions in a list ordered from smallest (rank 1) to largest.  Tied 
observations receive the average of their ranks.  The Wilcoxon rank sum test compares 
distributions to assess whether one has systematically larger values than the other.  The 
Wilcoxon test is based on the Wilcoxon rank sum statistic W, which is the sum of the 
ranks of one of the samples. 71  Using this test, between two variables, one is ranked and 
ordered the other is not. 
Spearman’s rho is a nonparametric alternative to the standard correlation 
coefficient.  Like many of the other nonparametric techniques, it is robust in the sense 
that it is not particularly sensitive to the shape of the distribution or the presence of 
outliers.  Further, it only requires that the data be measured at the level of ordered 
categories, whereas the regular correlation coefficient measured numerical data.72  Using 
this test, the data of two variables for consideration are ordered. 
The Kruskal-Wallis test compares several populations on the basis of independent 
random samples from each population.  This is the one-way analysis of variance setting.  
The null hypothesis for the Kruskal-Wallis test is that the distribution of the response 
variable is the same in all the populations.  The alternative hypothesis is that the 
responses are systematically larger in some populations than in others. 
The Kruskal-Wallis statistic H can be viewed in two ways.  It is essentially the 
result of applying one-way ANOVA to the ranks of the observations.  It is also a 
comparison of the sums of the ranks for the several samples.  When the sample sizes are 
not too small and the null hypothesis is true.  H for comparing I populations has 
approximately the chi-square distribution with I-1 degrees of freedom.  Use this 
approximate distribution to obtain P-values.73 
To test the HO that there is no association between the row and the column 
classifications, the chi-square test is used which compares the entire set of observed 
counts with the set of expected counts.  First, take the difference between each observed 
                                                 
71   McCabe, G.P., Moore, D.S. Introduction to the Practice of Statistics. W.H. Freeman Company, 
NY. 3rd Ed., 1999, Ch 14, p. 4. 
72   Morgan, C.J., and Siegel, A.F. Statistics and Data Analysis, An Inroduction. John Wiley & Sons, 
Inc., 1996, 2nd Ed. p 564. 
73 Morgan, C.J., and Siegel, A.F. Statistics and Data Analysis, An Inroduction. John Wiley & Sons, 
Inc., 1996, 2nd Ed. p 30. 
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count and its corresponding expected count, square these values so that they are all 0 or 
positive.  A large difference means less if it comes from a cell with a large expected  
count, so divide each squared difference by the expected count, a kind of standardization.  
Finally, sum over all cells.  The result is called the chi-square statistic X2.  The chi-
square statistic is a measure of how much the observed cell counts in a two-way table 
diverge from the expected cell counts.  This statistic can be used when no ordering of 
variables is necessary. 
If the expected counts and the observed counts are very different, a large value of 
X2  will result.  So large values of X2 provide evidence against the null hypothesis.  To 
obtain a P-value for the test, we need the sampling distribution of X2 under the 
assumption that HO  (no association between the row and column variables) is true.  We 
once again use the approximation, related to the normal approximation for binomial 
distributions, the chi-square distribution. 
For each of the tests mentioned above, the p-value is sought.  P-value is the 
probability, computed assuming that HO is true, that the test statistic would take a value as 
extreme or more extreme than that actually observed.  This is called the P-value of the 
test.  The smaller the P-value, the stronger the evidence against the HO provided by the 
data. 
The P-value calculated can be compared with a fixed value that is regarded as 
decisive.  This amounts to announcing in advance how much evidence against the HO  
will be required to reject HO.  The decisive value of P is called significance level.  It is 
denoted by the Greek letter alpha.  If alpha= 0.05 is chosen (which was done in this 
study), it requires that the data give evidence against HO so strong that it would happen 
no more than 5% of the time (1 time in 20) when HO is true.   If alpha = 0.01 is chosen, it 
insists on stronger evidence against HO, evidence so strong that it would only appear 1% 
of the time (1 time in 100) of HO is in fact true.  
The following are study questions used to make comparisons between the data 
sets of several specific questions. The logic of this decision was to show some correlation 
between the data.  It was here that the statistical tests were applied. Correlation is a 
measure of association between the data values of X and Y.  Any conclusions about one 
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causing the other may use statistics as supporting evidence, but require additional logic 
from outside the realm of statistics.  The correlation quantifies the extent of the 
association, but usually cannot indicate why things are related.  This, along with other 
methods, provides the evidence needed in determining if there are biases amongst URL 
Navy officerNavy officers towards the media (refer to Appendix C for detailed 
description of questions). 
1. Questions 8 and 9 (political views) vs. Questions 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 10, 11, 12, 
and 13 (demographic: rank, specialty, birth year, year commissioned, 
commissioning source, sex, education level, father’s education level, mother’s 
level of education, home of record, race/ethnicity) -  
************** Q1 vs Q8 ************************************ 
 








very conservative somewhat conservative moderate somewhat liberal very liberal 
 
ENS                 1                     1        2                0            0 
 
LTJG                 0                     1        3                0            0 
 
LT                 7                    23       15                4            1 
 
LCDR                 4                     6        5                0            1 
 
CDR                 1                     5        2                1            0 
 
CAPT                 1                     3        0                0            0 
 
> cor.test(as.numeric(Q1.ordered[tt]),as.numeric(Q8.ordered[tt]), method = 'spearman') 
 
 
Spearman's rank correlation 
 
data:  as.numeric(Q1.ordered[tt]) and as.numeric(Q8.ordered[tt]) 
 
normal-z = -1.3516, p-value = 0.1765 
 
alternative hypothesis: true rho is not equal to 0  









Kruskal-Wallis rank sum test 
 
 
data:  as.numeric(Q8.ordered[tt]) and as.factor(Q1.ordered[tt]) 
 




************************ Q2 vs Q8 ************************************ 
 








very conservative somewhat conservative moderate somewhat liberal very liberal 
 
Submariner                 3                    12        1                0            0 
 





Kruskal-Wallis rank sum test 
 
data:  as.numeric(Q8.ordered[tt]) and Jesse2[tt, 2] 
 
Kruskal-Wallis chi-square = 5.3259, df = 1, p-value = 0.021 
 
alternative hypothesis: two.sided 
 
 
************************** Q3 vs Q8 *********************************** 
 
> cor.test(as.numeric(Jesse2[tt,3]),as.numeric(Q8.ordered[tt]), method = 'spearman') 
 
 
Spearman's rank correlation 
 
data:  as.numeric(Jesse2[tt, 3]) and as.numeric(Q8.ordered[tt]) 
 
normal-z = 2.457, p-value = 0.014 
 
alternative hypothesis: true rho is not equal to 0  






1953 1954 1955 1957 1958 1959 1961 1962 1963 1964 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 
1973 
 
very conservative    0    0    0    0    0    1    0    0    0    1    1    0    3    2    1    0    3    1 
 
somewhat conservative    1    1    1    1    1    0    1    0    2    3    1    2    3    1    2    0    2    4 
 
moderate    0    0    0    0    0    0    0    2    0    0    2    1    1    1    0    3    2    4 
 
somewhat liberal    0    0    0    0    0    0    0    0    0    0    1    0    0    0    0    0    0    0 
 




1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 
 
very conservative    0    0    1    0    0    0 
 
somewhat conservative    4    5    3    0    0    1 
 
moderate    4    2    1    0    2    2 
 
somewhat liberal    3    0    0    1    0    0 
 







**************************** Q4 vs Q8 ************************************ 
 
 












1977 1979 1980 1981 1985 1986 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 
1999 
 
very conservative    0    0    1    1    0    1    0    0    1    1    1    1    1    1    3    0    2    0 
 
somewhat conservative    2    2    0    0    1    2    1    0    0    2    1    1    3    1    6    6    8    0 
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moderate    0    0    0    0    2    0    0    1    0    2    0    4    0    0    7    2    4    1 
 
somewhat liberal    0    0    0    0    0    0    1    0    0    0    0    0    0    0    0    1    2    1 
 
very liberal    0    0    0    0    0    0    0    0    0    1    0    0    0    0    0    0    0    1 
 
 
2001 2002 2003 
 
very conservative    0    0    1 
 
somewhat conservative    1    0    1 
 
moderate    2    2    0 
 
somewhat liberal    0    0    0 
 
very liberal    0    0    0 
 
> cor.test(as.numeric(Jesse2[tt,4]),as.numeric(Q8.ordered[tt]), method = 'spearman') 
 
 
Spearman's rank correlation 
 
 
data:  as.numeric(Jesse2[tt, 4]) and as.numeric(Q8.ordered[tt]) 
 
normal-z = 1.9331, p-value = 0.0532 
 
alternative hypothesis: true rho is not equal to 0 
sample estimates: rho 0.2084567 
 
 
*************************** Q5 vs Q8 ******************************************* 
 








very conservative somewhat conservative moderate somewhat liberal very liberal 
 
Enlisted Commissioning Program                 0                     4        2                0            1 
 
OCS                 3                     8        2                1            0 
 
Other                 2                     1        2                0            0 
 
ROTC                 5                    15       15                1            1 
 






Kruskal-Wallis rank sum test 
 
data:  as.numeric(Q8.ordered[tt]) and as.factor(Jesse2[tt, 5]) 
 
Kruskal-Wallis chi-square = 2.9556, df = 4, p-value = 0.5653 
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Kruskal-Wallis rank sum test 
 
data:  as.numeric(Q8.ordered[tt]) and as.factor(Jesse2[tt, 7]) 
 
Kruskal-Wallis chi-square = 0.6038, df = 1, p-value = 0.4371 
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Kruskal-Wallis rank sum test 
 
data:  as.numeric(Q8.ordered[tt]) and as.factor(Jesse2[tt, 7]) 
 
Kruskal-Wallis chi-square = 0.6038, df = 1, p-value = 0.4371 
 
alternative hypothesis: two.sided 
 
 
****************************Q7 vs Q8 ******************************************* 
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very conservative somewhat conservative moderate somewhat liberal very liberal 
 
high school                 1                     0        0                0            0 
 
some college                 0                     1        0                0            0 
 
college graduate                 4                    10        2                0            2 
 
some graduate work                 5                    15       12                4            0 
 
graduate degree                 5                    13       13                0            0 
 
doctorate degree                 0                     0        0                1            0 
 
> cor.test(as.numeric(Q7.ordered[tt]),as.numeric(Q8.ordered[tt]),method = 'spearman') 
 
 
Spearman's rank correlation 
 
data:  as.numeric(Q7.ordered[tt]) and as.numeric(Q8.ordered[tt]) 
 
normal-z = 1.2274, p-value = 0.2197 
 
alternative hypothesis: true rho is not equal to 0  
sample estimates: rho 0.1316027 
 
 
****************************** Q10 vs Q8************************************* 
 








very conservative somewhat conservative moderate somewhat liberal very liberal 
 
high school                 3                     5        5                0            0 
 
some college                 2                     7        2                1            0 
 
college graduate                 3                    14       10                1            0 
 
some graduate work                 1                     0        3                1            0 
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graduate degree                 5                     8        3                1            0 
 
doctorate degree                 0                     4        4                1            1 
 




Spearman's rank correlation 
 
data:  as.numeric(Q10.ordered[tt]) and as.numeric(Q8.ordered[tt]) 
 
normal-z = 0.993, p-value = 0.3207 
 
alternative hypothesis: true rho is not equal to 0 
 




******************************Q11 vs Q8 *************************************** 
 
 








very conservative somewhat conservative moderate somewhat liberal very liberal 
 
high school                 3                    13        2                1            0 
 
some college                 6                     9        9                0            1 
 
college graduate                 5                    11        9                1            0 
 
some graduate work                 0                     1        1                3            1 
 
graduate degree                 1                     2        6                0            0 
 
doctorate degree                 0                     2        0                0            0 
 




Spearman's rank correlation 
 
data:  as.numeric(Q11.ordered[tt]) and as.numeric(Q8.ordered[tt]) 
 
normal-z = 2.3146, p-value = 0.0206 
 
alternative hypothesis: true rho is not equal to 0 
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sample estimates: rho 0.2495948 
 
2. Questions 1,2,4, and 5 (demographics: rank, specialty, year commissioned, 
commissioning source) vs. Question 17 (how well military fulfills its role to 
keep media and public informed) –  
(Note:  This was the semantic differential questions; attempt to evoke a different response from  
respondent based on different phrasing of same question.) 
 
********Q(1, 17), Spearman, No correlation:************************ 
 
> Q17.ordered <- ordered(Jesse2[,35],c('Not well at all','Not very well','Somewhat well','Very 
well')) 






Levels (first 5 out of 6): 
 
[1] "CAPT" "CDR"  "ENS"  "LCDR" "LT"  
 
> cor.test(Q1.ordered[tt],Q17.ordered,method = 'spearman') 
 
Problem in cor.test(Q1.ordered[tt], Q17.ordered, method = "spearman"..: x and y should be the 
same length   
 
Use traceback() to see the call stack 
 
> cor.test(Q1.ordered[tt],Q17.ordered[tt],method = 'spearman') 
 
 Spearman's rank correlation 
data:  Q1.ordered[tt] and Q17.ordered[tt]  
normal-z = -1.3707, p-value = 0.1705  
alternative hypothesis: true rho is not equal to 0  
sample estimates:  rho -0.1436826 
 
********Q(2, 17), K-Wallis, No correlation:************************ 
 






 Kruskal-Wallis rank sum test 
data:  as.numeric(Q17.ordered[tt]) and Jesse2[, 2]  
Kruskal-Wallis chi-square = 0.0146, df = 1, p-value = 0.904  





                Submariner Surface Warfare Officer  
Not well at all          1                       9 
  Not very well          6                      2 
  Somewhat well          7                      37 
      Very well          2                       8 
 
*********Q(4, 17), Spearman, Weak correlation:************************* 
 
> tt <- Jesse2[,4] < 1900 
> sum(tt) 
[1] 1 
> Jesse2[tt,4] <- NA 




> cor.test(Jesse2[tt,4],Q17.ordered[tt],method = 'spearman') 
 
 Spearman's rank correlation 
data:  Jesse2[tt, 4] and Q17.ordered[tt]  
normal-z = 1.4902, p-value = 0.1362  
alternative hypothesis: true rho is not equal to 0  
sample estimates:   rho 0.1562236 
 
 
********Q(5, 17), K-Wallis, Correlation:************************ 
 






 Kruskal-Wallis rank sum test 
data:  as.numeric(Q17.ordered[tt]) and Jesse2[tt, 5]  
Kruskal-Wallis chi-square = 10.2372, df = 4, p-value = 0.0366  




  Enlisted Commissioning Program OCS Other ROTC USNA  
1                              0   2     0    3    5 
2                              1   5     0   14    9 
3                              5   7     3   19   10 




                Enlisted Commissioning Program OCS Other ROTC USNA  
Not well at all                              0   2     0    3    5 
  Not very well                              1   5     0   14    9 
  Somewhat well                              5   7     3   19   1 
      Very well                              2   1     2    2    3 
 






3. Questions 1,2,4 and 5 (demographics) vs. Questions 18, 19, and 20 (want, 
need, and right to know about military issues and operations) –  
*****Q(1, 18), K-wallis, no correlation************* 
-broken into respective categories: 
> kruskal.test(as.numeric(Q1.ordered[tt]),Jesse2[tt,36]) 
 
 Kruskal-Wallis rank sum test 
data:  as.numeric(Q1.ordered[tt]) and Jesse2[tt, 36]  
Kruskal-Wallis chi-square = 0.7017, df = 1, p-value = 0.4022  




     0 Terrorist threats  
 ENS 2                 2 
LTJG 1                 3 
  LT 6                49 
LCDR 2                14 
 CDR 2                 7 




 Kruskal-Wallis rank sum test 
data:  as.numeric(Q1.ordered[tt]) and Jesse2[tt, 37]  
Kruskal-Wallis chi-square = 0.1298, df = 1, p-value = 0.7186  




      0 Counter-terrorist activities  
 ENS  0                            4 
LTJG  1                            3 
  LT 20                           35 
LCDR  4                           12 
 CDR  3                            6 




 Kruskal-Wallis rank sum test 
data:  as.numeric(Q1.ordered[tt]) and Jesse2[tt, 38]  
Kruskal-Wallis chi-square = 2.058, df = 1, p-value = 0.1514  




     0 Military readiness  
 ENS 2                  2 
LTJG 0                  4 
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  LT 6                 49 
LCDR 2                 14 
 CDR 0                  9 




 Kruskal-Wallis rank sum test 
data:  as.numeric(Q1.ordered[tt]) and Jesse2[tt, 39]  
Kruskal-Wallis chi-square = 0.0059, df = 1, p-value = 0.9387  




      0 Effect on reaching policy goals  
 ENS  0                               4 
LTJG  1                               3 
  LT 19                              36 
LCDR  6                              10 
 CDR  1                               8 




 Kruskal-Wallis rank sum test 
data:  as.numeric(Q1.ordered[tt]) and Jesse2[tt, 40]  
Kruskal-Wallis chi-square = 0.4078, df = 1, p-value = 0.5231  
alternative hypothesis: two.sided  
 
> table(Q1.ordered[tt],Jesse2[tt,40]) 
      0 Physical damage  
 ENS  0               4 
LTJG  2               2 
  LT 22              33 
LCDR  6              10 
 CDR  5               4 




      0 Human casualties  
 ENS  4                0 
LTJG  1                3 
  LT 23               3 
LCDR  6               10 
 CDR  4                5 




 Kruskal-Wallis rank sum test 
data:  as.numeric(Q1.ordered[tt]) and Jesse2[tt, 41]  
Kruskal-Wallis chi-square = 1.031, df = 1, p-value = 0.3099  




 Kruskal-Wallis rank sum test 
data:  as.numeric(Q1.ordered[tt]) and Jesse2[tt, 42]  
Kruskal-Wallis chi-square = 0.2878, df = 1, p-value = 0.5916  




 Kruskal-Wallis rank sum test 
data:  as.numeric(Q1.ordered[tt]) and Jesse2[tt, 43]  
Kruskal-Wallis chi-square = 0.8973, df = 1, p-value = 0.3435  







 Kruskal-Wallis rank sum test 
data:  as.numeric(Q1.ordered[tt]) and Jesse2[tt, 44]  
Kruskal-Wallis chi-square = 0.9714, df = 1, p-value = 0.3243  




 Kruskal-Wallis rank sum test 
data:  as.numeric(Q1.ordered[tt]) and Jesse2[tt, 45]  
Kruskal-Wallis chi-square = 0.0256, df = 1, p-value = 0.8728  
alternative hypothesis: two.sided  
------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
Q(1, 18-20), K-wallis, no correlation: 
 
> for (j in 44:59) { 
+ cat('Column ',j,'\n') 
+ print(kruskal.test(as.numeric(Q1.ordered[tt]),Jesse2[tt,j]))} 
 
Column  44  
 
 Kruskal-Wallis rank sum test 
data:  as.numeric(Q1.ordered[tt]) and Jesse2[tt, j]  
Kruskal-Wallis chi-square = 0.9714, df = 1, p-value = 0.3243  
alternative hypothesis: two.sided  
 
Column  45  
 
 Kruskal-Wallis rank sum test 
data:  as.numeric(Q1.ordered[tt]) and Jesse2[tt, j]  
Kruskal-Wallis chi-square = 0.0256, df = 1, p-value = 0.8728  
alternative hypothesis: two.sided  
 
Column  46  
 
 Kruskal-Wallis rank sum test 
 
data:  as.numeric(Q1.ordered[tt]) and Jesse2[tt, j]  
Kruskal-Wallis chi-square = 1.2388, df = 1, p-value = 0.2657  
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alternative hypothesis: two.sided  
 
Column  47  
 
 Kruskal-Wallis rank sum test 
data:  as.numeric(Q1.ordered[tt]) and Jesse2[tt, j]  
Kruskal-Wallis chi-square = 0.5508, df = 1, p-value = 0.458  
alternative hypothesis: two.sided  
 
Column  48  
 
 Kruskal-Wallis rank sum test 
data:  as.numeric(Q1.ordered[tt]) and Jesse2[tt, j]  
Kruskal-Wallis chi-square = 0.8768, df = 1, p-value = 0.3491  
alternative hypothesis: two.sided  
 
Column  49  
 
 Kruskal-Wallis rank sum test 
data:  as.numeric(Q1.ordered[tt]) and Jesse2[tt, j]  
Kruskal-Wallis chi-square = 2.1117, df = 1, p-value = 0.1462  
alternative hypothesis: two.sided  
 
Column  50  
 
 Kruskal-Wallis rank sum test 
data:  as.numeric(Q1.ordered[tt]) and Jesse2[tt, j]  
Kruskal-Wallis chi-square = 1.2511, df = 1, p-value = 0.2634  
alternative hypothesis: two.sided  
 
Column  51  
 
 Kruskal-Wallis rank sum test 
data:  as.numeric(Q1.ordered[tt]) and Jesse2[tt, j]  
Kruskal-Wallis chi-square = 0.1163, df = 1, p-value = 0.733  
alternative hypothesis: two.sided  
 
Column  52  
 
 Kruskal-Wallis rank sum test 
data:  as.numeric(Q1.ordered[tt]) and Jesse2[tt, j]  
Kruskal-Wallis chi-square = 1.6252, df = 1, p-value = 0.2024  
alternative hypothesis: two.sided  
 
Column  53  
 
 Kruskal-Wallis rank sum test 
data:  as.numeric(Q1.ordered[tt]) and Jesse2[tt, j]  
Kruskal-Wallis chi-square = 0.2678, df = 1, p-value = 0.6048  
alternative hypothesis: two.sided  
 
Column  54  
 
 Kruskal-Wallis rank sum test 
data:  as.numeric(Q1.ordered[tt]) and Jesse2[tt, j]  
Kruskal-Wallis chi-square = 2.2356, df = 1, p-value = 0.1349  
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alternative hypothesis: two.sided  
 
Column  55  
 
 Kruskal-Wallis rank sum test 
data:  as.numeric(Q1.ordered[tt]) and Jesse2[tt, j]  
Kruskal-Wallis chi-square = 0.6198, df = 1, p-value = 0.4311  
alternative hypothesis: two.sided  
 
Column  56  
 
 Kruskal-Wallis rank sum test 
data:  as.numeric(Q1.ordered[tt]) and Jesse2[tt, j]  
Kruskal-Wallis chi-square = 0.1292, df = 1, p-value = 0.7193  
alternative hypothesis: two.sided  
 
Column  57  
 
 Kruskal-Wallis rank sum test 
data:  as.numeric(Q1.ordered[tt]) and Jesse2[tt, j]  
Kruskal-Wallis chi-square = 0.3166, df = 1, p-value = 0.5737  
alternative hypothesis: two.sided  
 
Column  58  
 
 Kruskal-Wallis rank sum test 
data:  as.numeric(Q1.ordered[tt]) and Jesse2[tt, j]  
Kruskal-Wallis chi-square = 0.4372, df = 1, p-value = 0.5085  
alternative hypothesis: two.sided  
 
Column  59  
 
 Kruskal-Wallis rank sum test 
data:  as.numeric(Q1.ordered[tt]) and Jesse2[tt, j]  
Kruskal-Wallis chi-square = 0.0269, df = 1, p-value = 0.8697  
alternative hypothesis: two.sided  
 
 
******Q(2, 18-20), Chisq.test, No Correlation:****************** 
 
> tt <- !is.na(Jesse2[,2]) 
> for (j in 36:59) { 
+ cat('Column ',j,'\n') 
+ print(chisq.test(Jesse2[tt,2],Jesse2[tt,j])) } 
 
Column  36  
 
 Pearson's chi-square test with Yates' continuity correction 
data:  Jesse2[tt, 2] and Jesse2[tt, j]  
X-square = 0.0436, df = 1, p-value = 0.8347  
 
 
Column  37  
 
 Pearson's chi-square test with Yates' continuity correction 
data:  Jesse2[tt, 2] and Jesse2[tt, j]  
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X-square = 0.0842, df = 1, p-value = 0.7717  
 
Column  38  
 
 Pearson's chi-square test with Yates' continuity correction 
data:  Jesse2[tt, 2] and Jesse2[tt, j]  
X-square = 1.1716, df = 1, p-value = 0.2791  
 
Column  39  
 
 Pearson's chi-square test with Yates' continuity correction 
data:  Jesse2[tt, 2] and Jesse2[tt, j]  
X-square = 0.8029, df = 1, p-value = 0.3702  
 
Column  40  
 
 Pearson's chi-square test with Yates' continuity correction 
data:  Jesse2[tt, 2] and Jesse2[tt, j]  
X-square = 1.4355, df = 1, p-value = 0.2309  
 
Column  41  
 
 Pearson's chi-square test with Yates' continuity correction 
data:  Jesse2[tt, 2] and Jesse2[tt, j]  
X-square = 0.1177, df = 1, p-value = 0.7315  
 
Column  42  
 
 Pearson's chi-square test with Yates' continuity correction 
data:  Jesse2[tt, 2] and Jesse2[tt, j]  
X-square = 0.0057, df = 1, p-value = 0.9399  
 
Column  43  
 
 Pearson's chi-square test with Yates' continuity correction 
data:  Jesse2[tt, 2] and Jesse2[tt, j]  
X-square = 0.0786, df = 1, p-value = 0.7792  
 
Column  44  
 
 Pearson's chi-square test with Yates' continuity correction 
data:  Jesse2[tt, 2] and Jesse2[tt, j]  
X-square = 0.0338, df = 1, p-value = 0.8541  
 
Column  45  
 
 Pearson's chi-square test with Yates' continuity correction 
data:  Jesse2[tt, 2] and Jesse2[tt, j]  
X-square = 0.4949, df = 1, p-value = 0.4818  
 
Column  46  
 
 Pearson's chi-square test with Yates' continuity correction 
data:  Jesse2[tt, 2] and Jesse2[tt, j]  
X-square = 0.0036, df = 1, p-value = 0.952  
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Column  47  
 
 Pearson's chi-square test with Yates' continuity correction 
data:  Jesse2[tt, 2] and Jesse2[tt, j]  
X-square = 0.703, df = 1, p-value = 0.4018  
 
Column  48  
 
 Pearson's chi-square test with Yates' continuity correction 
data:  Jesse2[tt, 2] and Jesse2[tt, j]  
X-square = 0.9078, df = 1, p-value = 0.3407  
 
 
Column  49  
 
 Pearson's chi-square test with Yates' continuity correction 
data:  Jesse2[tt, 2] and Jesse2[tt, j]  
X-square = 0.2448, df = 1, p-value = 0.6208  
 
Column  50  
 
 Pearson's chi-square test with Yates' continuity correction 
data:  Jesse2[tt, 2] and Jesse2[tt, j]  
X-square = 0.1037, df = 1, p-value = 0.7474  
 
Column  51  
 
 Pearson's chi-square test with Yates' continuity correction 
data:  Jesse2[tt, 2] and Jesse2[tt, j]  
X-square = 0.0036, df = 1, p-value = 0.952  
 
Column  52  
 
 Pearson's chi-square test with Yates' continuity correction 
data:  Jesse2[tt, 2] and Jesse2[tt, j]  
X-square = 0.0339, df = 1, p-value = 0.8538  
 
Column  53  
 
 Pearson's chi-square test with Yates' continuity correction 
data:  Jesse2[tt, 2] and Jesse2[tt, j]  
X-square = 0.1377, df = 1, p-value = 0.7105  
 
Column  54 
 
 Pearson's chi-square test with Yates' continuity correction 
data:  Jesse2[tt, 2] and Jesse2[tt, j]  
X-square = 0.0016, df = 1, p-value = 0.9685  
 
Column  55  
 
 Pearson's chi-square test with Yates' continuity correction 
data:  Jesse2[tt, 2] and Jesse2[tt, j]  
X-square = 0.0449, df = 1, p-value = 0.8322  
 
Column  56  
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 Pearson's chi-square test with Yates' continuity correction 
data:  Jesse2[tt, 2] and Jesse2[tt, j]  
X-square = 0.0229, df = 1, p-value = 0.8797  
 
Column  57  
 
 Pearson's chi-square test with Yates' continuity correction 
data:  Jesse2[tt, 2] and Jesse2[tt, j]  
X-square = 0.0032, df = 1, p-value = 0.9551  
 
Column  58  
 
 Pearson's chi-square test with Yates' continuity correction 
data:  Jesse2[tt, 2] and Jesse2[tt, j]  
X-square = 0.3689, df = 1, p-value = 0.5436  
 
Column  59  
 
 Pearson's chi-square test with Yates' continuity correction 
data:  Jesse2[tt, 2] and Jesse2[tt, j]  
X-square = 0.552, df = 1, p-value = 0.4575 
 
*****Q(4,18-20), K- Wallis, Column 52(Correlation), Column 54 (Weak Correlation)******** 
 
> tt <- !is.na(Jesse2[,4]) 
> for (j in 36:59) { 
+ cat('Column ',j,'\n') 
+ print(table(Jesse2[tt,4],Jesse2[tt,j])) 
+ print(kruskal.test(Jesse2[tt,4],Jesse2[tt,j])) } 
 
Column  36  
 
         0 Terrorist threats  
1977 0                 2 
1979 0                 2 
1980 0                 1 
1981 0                 1 
1985 1                 2 
1986 1                 3 
1988 0                 2 
1989 0                 1 
1990 0                 1 
1991 2                 4 
1992 0                 2 
1993 1                 5 
1994 0                 4 
1995 0                 2 
1996 0                16 
1997 2                10 
1998 3                14 
1999 0                 3 
2001 1                 2 
2002 2                 0 
2003 0                 2 
 Kruskal-Wallis rank sum test 
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data:  Jesse2[tt, 4] and Jesse2[tt, j]  
Kruskal-Wallis chi-square = 1.0674, df = 1, p-value = 0.3015  
alternative hypothesis: two.sided  
 
Column  37  
 
         0 Counter-terrorist activities  
1977 0                            2 
1979 0                            2 
1980 0                            1 
1981 0                            1 
1985 1                            2 
1986 2                            2 
1988 1                            1 
1989 0                            1 
1990 0                            1 
1991 2                            4 
1992 1                            1 
1993 1                            5 
1994 3                            1 
1995 0                            2 
1996 6                           10 
1997 3                            9 
1998 7                           10 
1999 1                            2 
2001 0                            3 
2002 0                            2 
2003 1                            1 
 Kruskal-Wallis rank sum test 
data:  Jesse2[tt, 4] and Jesse2[tt, j]  
Kruskal-Wallis chi-square = 0.0955, df = 1, p-value = 0.7573  
alternative hypothesis: two.sided  
 
Column  38  
 
     0 Military readiness  
1977 0                  2 
1979 0                  2 
1980 0                  1 
1981 0                  1 
1985 0                  3 
1986 0                  4 
1988 0                  2 
1989 0                  1 
1990 0                  1 
1991 1                  5 
1992 0                  2 
1993 1                  5 
1994 0                  4 
1995 0                  2 
1996 1                 15 
1997 2                 10 
1998 3                 14 
1999 0                  3 
2001 0                  3 
2002 2                  0 
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2003 0                  2 
 Kruskal-Wallis rank sum test 
data:  Jesse2[tt, 4] and Jesse2[tt, j]  
Kruskal-Wallis chi-square = 3.569, df = 1, p-value = 0.0589  
alternative hypothesis: two.sided  
 
Column  39  
 
     0 Effect on reaching policy goals  
1977 0                               2 
1979 1                               1 
1980 0                               1 
1981 0                               1 
1985 0                               3 
1986 1                               3 
1988 1                               1 
1989 0                               1 
1990 0                               1 
1991 3                               3 
1992 2                               0 
1993 3                               3 
1994 2                               2 
1995 0                               2 
1996 2                              14 
1997 5                               7 
1998 6                              11 
1999 1                               2 
2001 1                               2 
2002 0                               2 
2003 1                               1 
 Kruskal-Wallis rank sum test 
data:  Jesse2[tt, 4] and Jesse2[tt, j]  
Kruskal-Wallis chi-square = 0.109, df = 1, p-value = 0.7413  
alternative hypothesis: two.sided 
 
Column  40  
 
     0 Physical damage  
1977 0               2 
1979 2               0 
1980 0               1 
1981 0               1 
1985 3               0 
1986 0               4 
1988 1               1 
1989 0               1 
1990 0               1 
1991 3               3 
1992 1               1 
1993 4               2 
1994 2               2 
1995 0               2 
1996 6              10 
1997 3               9 
1998 9               8 
1999 1               2 
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2001 1               2 
2002 0               2 
2003 1               1 
 Kruskal-Wallis rank sum test 
data:  Jesse2[tt, 4] and Jesse2[tt, j]  
Kruskal-Wallis chi-square = 0.0504, df = 1, p-value = 0.8223  
alternative hypothesis: two.sided  
 
Column  41  
 
     0 Human casualties  
1977 0                2 
1979 1                1 
1980 1                0 
1981 0                1 
1985 3                0 
1986 0                4 
1988 1                1 
1989 1                0 
1990 1                0 
1991 3                3 
1992 0                2 
1993 3                3 
1994 2                2 
1995 0                2 
1996 4               12 
1997 5                7 
1998 9                8 
1999 1                2 
2001 1                2 
2002 2                0 
2003 2                0 
 Kruskal-Wallis rank sum test 
data:  Jesse2[tt, 4] and Jesse2[tt, j]  
Kruskal-Wallis chi-square = 0.7967, df = 1, p-value = 0.3721  
alternative hypothesis: two.sided  
 
Column  42  
 
     0 Quality of life  
1977 0               2 
1979 0               2 
1980 1               0 
1981 0               1 
1985 2               1 
1986 2               2 
1988 1               1 
1989 1               0 
1990 1               0 
1991 3               3 
1992 2               0 
1993 2               4 
1994 2               2 
1995 0               2 
1996 4              12 
1997 3               9 
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1998 9               8 
1999 0               3 
2001 2               1 
2002 2               0 
2003 0               2 
 Kruskal-Wallis rank sum test 
data:  Jesse2[tt, 4] and Jesse2[tt, j]  
Kruskal-Wallis chi-square = 0.0145, df = 1, p-value = 0.9042  
alternative hypothesis: two.sided  
 
Column  43  
 
      0 Sexual misconduct  
1977  0                 2 
1979  2                 0 
1980  1                 0 
1981  0                 1 
1985  3                 0 
1986  2                 2 
1988  2                 0 
1989  1                 0 
1990  1                 0 
1991  5                 1 
1992  2                 0 
1993  4                 2 
1994  3                 1 
1995  1                 1 
1996 14                 2 
1997  9                 3 
1998 16                 1 
1999  3                 0 
2001  3                 0 
2002  0                 2 
2003  2                 0 
 Kruskal-Wallis rank sum test 
data:  Jesse2[tt, 4] and Jesse2[tt, j]  
Kruskal-Wallis chi-square = 1.7916, df = 1, p-value = 0.1807  
alternative hypothesis: two.sided  
 
 
Column  44  
 
     0 Terrorist threats  
1977 0                 2 
1979 1                 1 
1980 0                 1 
1981 0                 1 
1985 1                 2 
1986 1                 3 
1988 0                 2 
1989 0                 1 
1990 0                 1 
1991 0                 6 
1992 0                 2 
1993 1                 5 
1994 0                 4 
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1995 0                 2 
1996 3                13 
1997 2                10 
1998 5                12 
1999 0                 3 
2001 0                 3 
2002 2                 0 
2003 0                 2 
 Kruskal-Wallis rank sum test 
data:  Jesse2[tt, 4] and Jesse2[tt, j]  
Kruskal-Wallis chi-square = 1.3508, df = 1, p-value = 0.2451  
alternative hypothesis: two.sided  
 
Column  45  
 
      0 Counter-terrorist activities  
1977  1                            1 
1979  0                            2 
1980  0                            1 
1981  0                            1 
1985  1                            2 
1986  3                            1 
1988  2                            0 
1989  0                            1 
1990  0                            1 
1991  1                            5 
1992  1                            1 
1993  4                            2 
1994  3                            1 
1995  0                            2 
1996  6                           10 
1997  6                            6 
1998 10                            7 
1999  1                            2 
2001  1                            2 
2002  0                            2 
2003  1                            1 
 Kruskal-Wallis rank sum test 
data:  Jesse2[tt, 4] and Jesse2[tt, j]  
Kruskal-Wallis chi-square = 0.2143, df = 1, p-value = 0.6434  
alternative hypothesis: two.sided  
 
Column  46  
 
     0 Military readiness  
1977 0                  2 
1979 0                  2 
1980 0                  1 
1981 0                  1 
1985 1                  2 
1986 0                  4 
1988 1                  1 
1989 0                  1 
1990 0                  1 
1991 0                  6 
1992 0                  2 
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1993 1                  5 
1994 0                  4 
1995 0                  2 
1996 2                 14 
1997 3                  9 
1998 5                 12 
1999 0                  3 
2001 0                  3 
2002 2                  0 
2003 0                  2 
 Kruskal-Wallis rank sum test 
data:  Jesse2[tt, 4] and Jesse2[tt, j]  
Kruskal-Wallis chi-square = 3.3539, df = 1, p-value = 0.067  
alternative hypothesis: two.sided  
 
Column  47  
 
     0 Effect on reaching policy goals  
1977 0                               2 
1979 1                               1 
1980 0                               1 
1981 0                               1 
1985 1                               2 
1986 1                               3 
1988 0                               2 
1989 0                               1 
1990 0                               1 
1991 3                               3 
1992 1                               1 
1993 3                               3 
1994 3                               1 
1995 0                               2 
1996 7                               9 
1997 5                               7 
1998 7                              10 
1999 2                               1 
2001 1                               2 
2002 0                               2 
2003 0                               2 
 Kruskal-Wallis rank sum test 
data:  Jesse2[tt, 4] and Jesse2[tt, j]  
Kruskal-Wallis chi-square = 0.2095, df = 1, p-value = 0.6471  
alternative hypothesis: two.sided  
 
Column  48  
 
      0 Physical damage 
1977  2               0 
1979  1               1 
1980  1               0 
1981  0               1 
1985  2               1 
1986  2               2 
1988  0               2 
1989  0               1 
1990  0               1 
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1991  5               1 
1992  0               2 
1993  3               3 
1994  2               2 
1995  1               1 
1996  8               8 
1997  6               6 
1998 11               6 
1999  3               0 
2001  1               2 
2002  2               0 
2003  1               1 
 Kruskal-Wallis rank sum test 
data:  Jesse2[tt, 4] and Jesse2[tt, j]  
Kruskal-Wallis chi-square = 0.8282, df = 1, p-value = 0.3628  
alternative hypothesis: two.sided  
 
Column  49  
 
      0 Human casualties  
1977  2                0 
1979  1                1 
1980  1                0 
1981  0                1 
1985  2                1 
1986  1                3 
1988  0                2 
1989  0                1 
1990  1                0 
1991  4                2 
1992  0                2 
1993  4                2 
1994  2                2 
1995  1                1 
1996  7                9 
1997  5                7 
1998 11                6 
1999  3                0 
2001  1                2 
2002  2                0 
2003  2                0 
 Kruskal-Wallis rank sum test 
data:  Jesse2[tt, 4] and Jesse2[tt, j]  
Kruskal-Wallis chi-square = 1.6263, df = 1, p-value = 0.2022  
alternative hypothesis: two.sided  
 
Column  50  
 
      0 Quality of life  
1977  2               0 
1979  0               2 
1980  1               0 
1981  0               1 
1985  1               2 
1986  3               1 
1988  1               1 
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1989  1               0 
1990  1               0 
1991  2               4 
1992  1               1 
1993  3               3 
1994  2               2 
1995  0               2 
1996  5              11 
1997  7               5 
1998 10               7 
1999  2               1 
2001  1               2 
2002  2               0 
2003  1               1 
 Kruskal-Wallis rank sum test 
data:  Jesse2[tt, 4] and Jesse2[tt, j]  
Kruskal-Wallis chi-square = 0.463, df = 1, p-value = 0.4962  
alternative hypothesis: two.sided  
 
Column  51  
 
      0 Sexual misconduct  
1977  2                 0 
1979  1                 1 
1980  1                 0 
1981  0                 1 
1985  3                 0 
1986  4                 0 
1988  2                 0 
1989  1                 0 
1990  1                 0 
1991  6                 0 
1992  2                 0 
1993  5                 1 
1994  3                 1 
1995  1                 1 
1996 14                 2 
1997  9                 3 
1998 13                 4 
1999  3                 0 
2001  3                 0 
2002  2                 0 
2003  2                 0 
 Kruskal-Wallis rank sum test 
data:  Jesse2[tt, 4] and Jesse2[tt, j]  
Kruskal-Wallis chi-square = 0.0607, df = 1, p-value = 0.8054  
alternative hypothesis: two.sided  
 
Column  52  
 
     0 Terrorist threats  
1977 1                 1 
1979 0                 2 
1980 0                 1 
1981 0                 1 
1985 2                 1 
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1986 1                 3 
1988 0                 2 
1989 0                 1 
1990 0                 1 
1991 1                 5 
1992 0                 2 
1993 0                 6 
1994 1                 3 
1995 0                 2 
1996 1                15 
1997 4                 8 
1998 6                11 
1999 1                 2 
2001 2                 1 
2002 2                 0 
2003 0                 2 
 Kruskal-Wallis rank sum test 
data:  Jesse2[tt, 4] and Jesse2[tt, j]  
Kruskal-Wallis chi-square = 4.2853, df = 1, p-value = 0.0384  
alternative hypothesis: two.sided  
 
Column  53  
 
      0 Counter-terrorist activities  
1977  1                            1 
1979  0                            2 
1980  1                            0 
1981  1                            0 
1985  2                            1 
1986  3                            1 
1988  1                            1 
1989  0                            1 
1990  0                            1 
1991  5                            1 
1992  2                            0 
1993  4                            2 
1994  4                            0 
1995  1                            1 
1996 10                            6 
1997  7                            5 
1998 12                            5 
1999  1                            2 
2001  3                            0 
2002  0                            2 
2003  1                            1 
 Kruskal-Wallis rank sum test 
data:  Jesse2[tt, 4] and Jesse2[tt, j]  
Kruskal-Wallis chi-square = 0.0777, df = 1, p-value = 0.7804  
alternative hypothesis: two.sided  
 
Column  54  
 
     0 Military readiness  
1977 0                  2 
1979 0                  2 
1980 0                  1 
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1981 1                  0 
1985 0                  3 
1986 1                  3 
1988 0                  2 
1989 0                  1 
1990 0                  1 
1991 2                  4 
1992 0                  2 
1993 1                  5 
1994 1                  3 
1995 0                  2 
1996 2                 14 
1997 2                 10 
1998 6                 11 
1999 0                  3 
2001 2                  1 
2002 2                  0 
2003 0                  2 
 Kruskal-Wallis rank sum test 
data:  Jesse2[tt, 4] and Jesse2[tt, j]  
Kruskal-Wallis chi-square = 3.5469, df = 1, p-value = 0.0597  
alternative hypothesis: two.sided  
 
Column  55  
 
     0 Effect on reaching policy goals  
1977 1                               1 
1979 1                               1 
1980 0                               1 
1981 1                               0 
1985 0                               3 
1986 1                               3 
1988 0                               2 
1989 0                               1 
1990 0                               1 
1991 5                               1 
1992 1                               1 
1993 2                               4 
1994 3                               1 
1995 0                               2 
1996 8                               8 
1997 3                               9 
1998 7                              10 
1999 3                               0 
2001 1                               2 
2002 2                               0 
2003 1                               1 
 Kruskal-Wallis rank sum test 
data:  Jesse2[tt, 4] and Jesse2[tt, j]  
Kruskal-Wallis chi-square = 0.8618, df = 1, p-value = 0.3532  
alternative hypothesis: two.sided  
 
Column  56  
 
      0 Physical damage  
1977  1               1 
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1979  1               1 
1980  1               0 
1981  1               0 
1985  1               2 
1986  2               2 
1988  0               2 
1989  0               1 
1990  0               1 
1991  5               1 
1992  1               1 
1993  3               3 
1994  2               2 
1995  1               1 
1996  6              10 
1997  8               4 
1998 12               5 
1999  2               1 
2001  1               2 
2002  2               0 
2003  1               1 
 Kruskal-Wallis rank sum test 
data:  Jesse2[tt, 4] and Jesse2[tt, j]  
Kruskal-Wallis chi-square = 1.4851, df = 1, p-value = 0.223  
alternative hypothesis: two.sided  
 
Column  57  
 
      0 Human casualties  
1977  1                1 
1979  1                1 
1980  1                0 
1981  1                0 
1985  1                2 
1986  1                3 
1988  0                2 
1989  1                0 
1990  1                0 
1991  5                1 
1992  1                1 
1993  3                3 
1994  2                2 
1995  1                1 
1996  6               10 
1997  7                5 
1998 10                7 
1999  2                1 
2001  1                2 
2002  2                0 
2003  2                0 
 Kruskal-Wallis rank sum test 
data:  Jesse2[tt, 4] and Jesse2[tt, j]  
Kruskal-Wallis chi-square = 0.7006, df = 1, p-value = 0.4026  
alternative hypothesis: two.sided  
 
Column  58  
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      0 Quality of life  
1977  1               1 
1979  0               2 
1980  1               0 
1981  1               0 
1985  1               2 
1986  4               0 
1988  0               2 
1989  1               0 
1990  1               0 
1991  5               1 
1992  1               1 
1993  3               3 
1994  2               2 
1995  0               2 
1996  8               8 
1997  4               8 
1998 10               7 
1999  3               0 
2001  1               2 
2002  2               0 
2003  1               1 
 Kruskal-Wallis rank sum test 
data:  Jesse2[tt, 4] and Jesse2[tt, j]  
Kruskal-Wallis chi-square = 0.0019, df = 1, p-value = 0.9654  
alternative hypothesis: two.sided  
 
Column  59  
 
      0 Sexual misconduct  
1977  1                 1 
1979  1                 1 
1980  1                 0 
1981  1                 0 
1985  3                 0 
1986  4                 0 
1988  1                 1 
1989  1                 0 
1990  1                 0 
1991  6                 0 
1992  1                 1 
1993  4                 2 
1994  3                 1 
1995  1                 1 
1996 10                 6 
1997  8                 4 
1998 13                 4 
1999  2                 1 
2001  2                 1 
2002  2                 0 
2003  2                 0 
 Kruskal-Wallis rank sum test 
data:  Jesse2[tt, 4] and Jesse2[tt, j]  
Kruskal-Wallis chi-square = 0.0874, df = 1, p-value = 0.7675  
alternative hypothesis: two.sided 
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********Q(5, 18-20) Chisq.test, no correlation: ************ 
> tt <- !is.na(Jesse2[,5]) 
> sum(tt) 
[1] 93 
> for (j in 36:59) { 
+ cat('Column ',j,'\n') 
+ print(table(Jesse2[tt,5],Jesse2[tt,j])) 
+ print(chisq.test(Jesse2[tt,5],Jesse2[tt,j])) } 
Column  36  
                             0 Terrorist threats  
Enlisted Com. Prog. 1                 7 
                           OCS 1                14 
                         Other 0                 5 
                          ROTC 6                32 
                          USNA 5                22 
 Pearson's chi-square test without Yates' continuity correction 
data:  Jesse2[tt, 5] and Jesse2[tt, j] 
X-square = 2.0604, df = 4, p-value = 0.7246  
Column  37  
                                0 Counter-terrorist activities  
Enlisted Commissioning Program  3                            5 
                           OCS  5                           10 
                         Other  1                            4 
                          ROTC 11                           27 
                          USNA  9                           18 
 Pearson's chi-square test without Yates' continuity correction 
data:  Jesse2[tt, 5] and Jesse2[tt, j]  
X-square = 0.6192, df = 4, p-value = 0.9609  
Column  38  
                               0 Military readiness  
Enlisted Commissioning Program 2                  6 
                           OCS 1                 14 
                         Other 0                  5 
                          ROTC 4                 34 
                          USNA 3                 24 
 Pearson's chi-square test without Yates' continuity correction 
data:  Jesse2[tt, 5] and Jesse2[tt, j]  
X-square = 2.5612, df = 4, p-value = 0.6337  
Column  39  
                                0 Effect on reaching policy goals  
Enlisted Commissioning Program  6                               2 
                           OCS  3                              12 
                         Other  1                               4 
                          ROTC 11                              27 
                          USNA  8                              19 
 Pearson's chi-square test without Yates' continuity correction 
data:  Jesse2[tt, 5] and Jesse2[tt, j]  
X-square = 8.442, df = 4, p-value = 0.0767  
Column  40  
                                0 Physical damage 
Enlisted Commissioning Program  1                
                           OCS  8               7 
                         Other  3               2 
                          ROTC 14              24 
                          USNA 11              16 
 Pearson's chi-square test without Yates' continuity correction 
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data:  Jesse2[tt, 5] and Jesse2[tt, j] 
X-square = 4.636, df = 4, p-value = 0.3267  
Column  41 
                                0 Human casualties  
Enlisted Commissioning Program  5                3 
                           OCS  7                8 
                         Other  3                2 
                          ROTC 16               22 
                          USNA  9               18 
 Pearson's chi-square test without Yates' continuity correction 
data:  Jesse2[tt, 5] and Jesse2[tt, j] 
X-square = 2.9546, df = 4, p-value = 0.5655  
Column  42  
                                0 Quality of life  
Enlisted Commissioning Program  4               4 
                           OCS  5              10 
                         Other  1               4 
                          ROTC 15              23 
                          USNA 12              15 
 Pearson's chi-square test without Yates' continuity correction 
data:  Jesse2[tt, 5] and Jesse2[tt, j]  
X-square = 1.6723, df = 4, p-value = 0.7957  
Column  43  
                                0 Sexual misconduct  
 
Enlisted Commissioning Program  8                 0 
                           OCS 11                 4 
                         Other  4                 1 
                          ROTC 31                 7 
                          USNA 21                 6 
 Pearson's chi-square test without Yates' continuity correction 
data:  Jesse2[tt, 5] and Jesse2[tt, j]  
X-square = 2.5986, df = 4, p-value = 0.6271  
Column  44  
 
                               0 Terrorist threats  
Enlisted Commissioning Program 0                 8 
                           OCS 2                13 
                         Other 0                 5 
                          ROTC 7                31 
                          USNA 7                20 
 Pearson's chi-square test without Yates' continuity correction 
data:  Jesse2[tt, 5] and Jesse2[tt, j]  
X-square = 4.3404, df = 4, p-value = 0.3619  
 
 
Column  45  
 
                                0 Counter-terrorist activities  
Enlisted Commissioning Program  4                            4 
                           OCS  7                            8 
                         Other  2                            3 
                          ROTC 15                           23 
                          USNA 14                           13 
 Pearson's chi-square test without Yates' continuity correction 
data:  Jesse2[tt, 5] and Jesse2[tt, j]  
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X-square = 1.1275, df = 4, p-value = 0.8899  
Column  46  
 
                               0 Military readiness  
Enlisted Commissioning Program 1                  7 
                           OCS 4                 11 
                         Other 0                  5 
                          ROTC 6                 32 
                          USNA 4                 23 
 Pearson's chi-square test without Yates' continuity correction 
data:  Jesse2[tt, 5] and Jesse2[tt, j]  
X-square = 2.3084, df = 4, p-value = 0.6792  
Column  47  
 
                                0 Effect on reaching policy goals  
Enlisted Commissioning Program  5                               3 
                           OCS  7                               8 
                         Other  0                               5 
                          ROTC 13                              25 
                          USNA 10                              17 
 Pearson's chi-square test without Yates' continuity correction 
data:  Jesse2[tt, 5] and Jesse2[tt, j]  
X-square = 5.84, df = 4, p-value = 0.2114  
Column  48  
 
                                0 Physical damage  
Enlisted Commissioning Program  3               5 
                           OCS 11               4 
                         Other  3               2 
                          ROTC 18              20 
                          USNA 16              11 
 Pearson's chi-square test without Yates' continuity correction 
data:  Jesse2[tt, 5] and Jesse2[tt, j]  
X-square = 4.1659, df = 4, p-value = 0.384  
Column  49  
 
                                0 Human casualties  
Enlisted Commissioning Program  5                3 
                           OCS  9                6 
                         Other  3                2 
                          ROTC 17               21 
                          USNA 16               11 
 Pearson's chi-square test without Yates' continuity correction 
data:  Jesse2[tt, 5] and Jesse2[tt, j]  
X-square = 2.1322, df = 4, p-value = 0.7115  
 
Column  50  
 
                                0 Quality of life  
Enlisted Commissioning Program  6               2 
                           OCS  9               6 
                         Other  1               4 
                          ROTC 17              21 
                          USNA 13              14 
 Pearson's chi-square test without Yates' continuity correction 
data:  Jesse2[tt, 5] and Jesse2[tt, j]  
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X-square = 4.8479, df = 4, p-value = 0.3033  
Column  51  
 
                                0 Sexual misconduct  
Enlisted Commissioning Program  8                 0 
                           OCS 13                 2 
                         Other  4                 1 
                          ROTC 32                 6 
                          USNA 21                 6 
 Pearson's chi-square test without Yates' continuity correction 
data:  Jesse2[tt, 5] and Jesse2[tt, j]  
X-square = 2.4248, df = 4, p-value = 0.6582  
Column  52  
 
                               0 Terrorist threats  
Enlisted Commissioning Program 0                 8 
                           OCS 5                10 
                         Other 0                 5 
                          ROTC 8                30 
                          USNA 9                18 
 Pearson's chi-square test without Yates' continuity correction 
data:  Jesse2[tt, 5] and Jesse2[tt, j]  
X-square = 6.3487, df = 4, p-value = 0.1746  
Column  53  
 
                                0 Counter-terrorist activities  
Enlisted Commissioning Program  4                            4 
                           OCS 10                            5 
                         Other  5                            0 
                          ROTC 23                           15 
                          USNA 17                           10 
 Pearson's chi-square test without Yates' continuity correction 
data:  Jesse2[tt, 5] and Jesse2[tt, j]  
X-square = 3.7136, df = 4, p-value = 0.4461  
Column  54  
 
                                0 Military readiness  
Enlisted Commissioning Program  2                  6 
                           OCS  4                 11 
                         Other  1                  4 
                          ROTC 10                 28 
                          USNA  3                 24 
 Pearson's chi-square test without Yates' continuity correction 
data:  Jesse2[tt, 5] and Jesse2[tt, j]  
X-square = 2.5503, df = 4, p-value = 0.6357  
 
Column  55  
 
                                0 Effect on reaching policy goals  
Enlisted Commissioning Program  3                               5 
                           OCS  9                               6 
                         Other  2                               3 
                          ROTC 18                              20 
                          USNA  8                              19 
 Pearson's chi-square test without Yates' continuity correction 
data:  Jesse2[tt, 5] and Jesse2[tt, j]  
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X-square = 4.1506, df = 4, p-value = 0.386  
Column  56  
 
                                0 Physical damage  
Enlisted Commissioning Program  2               6 
                           OCS 10               5 
                         Other  5               0 
                          ROTC 19              19 
                          USNA 15              1 
 Pearson's chi-square test without Yates' continuity correction 
data:  Jesse2[tt, 5] and Jesse2[tt, j]  
X-square = 8.2059, df = 4, p-value = 0.0843  
Column  57  
 
                                0 Human casualties  
Enlisted Commissioning Program  5                3 
                           OCS  8                7 
                         Other  5                0 
                          ROTC 17               21 
                          USNA 15               12 
 Pearson's chi-square test without Yates' continuity correction 
data:  Jesse2[tt, 5] and Jesse2[tt, j] 
X-square = 5.8272, df = 4, p-value = 0.2124  
Column  58  
 
                                0 Quality of life  
Enlisted Commissioning Program  5               3 
                           OCS  9               6 
                         Other  1               4 
                          ROTC 21              17 
                          USNA 14              13 
 Pearson's chi-square test without Yates' continuity correction 
data:  Jesse2[tt, 5] and Jesse2[tt, j]  
X-square = 2.8473, df = 4, p-value = 0.5837  
Column  59  
 
                                0 Sexual misconduct  
Enlisted Commissioning Program  7                 1 
                           OCS 11                 4 
                         Other  4                 1 
                          ROTC 27                11 
                          USNA 19                 8 
 Pearson's chi-square test without Yates' continuity correction 
data:  Jesse2[tt, 5] and Jesse2[tt, j]  
X-square = 1.1489, df = 4, p-value = 0.8864  
 
4. Questions 1,2,4, and 5 (demographics) vs. Question 23 (factors affecting 
officers’ willingness to share information with the media) – 
********Q(1, 23), Spearman, No correlation:******************** 
> for (j in 77:92) { 
+ tt <- !is.na(Q1.ordered) & !is.na(Jesse2[,j]) 
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+ cat(' *************** Column ',j,' ********************','\n') 
+ print(cor.test(Q1.ordered[tt],Jesse2[tt,j],method = 'spearman')) } 
 
 *************** Column  77  ********************  
 Spearman's rank correlation 
data:  Q1.ordered[tt] and Jesse2[tt, j]  
normal-z = 1.2331, p-value = 0.2175  
alternative hypothesis: true rho is not equal to 0  
sample estimates: rho 0.1292729 
 
 *************** Column  78  ********************  
 
 Spearman's rank correlation 
data:  Q1.ordered[tt] and Jesse2[tt, j]  
normal-z = -0.3022, p-value = 0.7625  
alternative hypothesis: true rho is not equal to 0  
sample estimates: rho -0.0316716 
 
 *************** Column  79  ********************  
 
 Spearman's rank correlation 
data:  Q1.ordered[tt] and Jesse2[tt, j]  
normal-z = -1.0993, p-value = 0.2717  
alternative hypothesis: true rho is not equal to 0  
sample estimates: rho -0.115226 
 
 *************** Column  80  ********************  
 
 Spearman's rank correlation 
data:  Q1.ordered[tt] and Jesse2[tt, j]  
normal-z = -0.0113, p-value = 0.991  
alternative hypothesis: true rho is not equal to 0  
sample estimates: rho  -0.001172467 
 
 *************** Column  81  ********************  
 
 Spearman's rank correlation 
data:  Q1.ordered[tt] and Jesse2[tt, j]  
normal-z = -0.0477, p-value = 0.9619  
alternative hypothesis: true rho is not equal to 0  
sample estimates: rho -0.004994562 
 
 *************** Column  82  ********************  
 
 Spearman's rank correlation 
data:  Q1.ordered[tt] and Jesse2[tt, j]  
normal-z = -1.147, p-value = 0.2514  
alternative hypothesis: true rho is not equal to 0  
sample estimates: rho -0.1202272 
 
 *************** Column  83  ********************  
 
 Spearman's rank correlation 
data:  Q1.ordered[tt] and Jesse2[tt, j]  
normal-z = 0.2225, p-value = 0.8239  
alternative hypothesis: true rho is not equal to 0  
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 *************** Column  84  ********************  
 
 Spearman's rank correlation 
data:  Q1.ordered[tt] and Jesse2[tt, j]  
normal-z = -0.4996, p-value = 0.6174  
alternative hypothesis: true rho is not equal to 0  
sample estimates: rho -0.05235937 
 
 *************** Column  85  ********************  
 
 Spearman's rank correlation 
data:  Q1.ordered[tt] and Jesse2[tt, j]  
normal-z = -0.6565, p-value = 0.5115  
alternative hypothesis: true rho is not equal to 0  
sample estimates: rho -0.06881313 
 
 *************** Column  86  ********************  
 
 Spearman's rank correlation 
data:  Q1.ordered[tt] and Jesse2[tt, j]  
normal-z = -0.796, p-value = 0.4261  
alternative hypothesis: true rho is not equal to 0  
sample estimates: rho -0.08343094 
 
 *************** Column  87  ********************  
 
 Spearman's rank correlation 
data:  Q1.ordered[tt] and Jesse2[tt, j]  
normal-z = -0.2542, p-value = 0.7993  
alternative hypothesis: true rho is not equal to 0  
sample estimates: rho -0.02664063 
 
 *************** Column  88  ********************  
 
 Spearman's rank correlation 
data:  Q1.ordered[tt] and Jesse2[tt, j]  
normal-z = -0.0364, p-value = 0.971  
alternative hypothesis: true rho is not equal to 0  
sample estimates: rho -0.003805152 
 
 *************** Column  89  ********************  
 
 Spearman's rank correlation 
data:  Q1.ordered[tt] and Jesse2[tt, j]  
normal-z = 0.2004, p-value = 0.8412  
alternative hypothesis: true rho is not equal to 0  
sample estimates: rho 0.02101146 
 
 *************** Column  90  ********************  
 
 Spearman's rank correlation 
data:  Q1.ordered[tt] and Jesse2[tt, j]  
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normal-z = -1.4559, p-value = 0.1454  
alternative hypothesis: true rho is not equal to 0  
sample estimates: rho  -0.1526098 
 
 *************** Column  91  ********************  
 
 Spearman's rank correlation 
data:  Q1.ordered[tt] and Jesse2[tt, j]  
normal-z = -0.5185, p-value = 0.6041  
alternative hypothesis: true rho is not equal to 0  
sample estimates: rho -0.05434149 
 
 *************** Column  92  ********************  
 
 Spearman's rank correlation 
data:  Q1.ordered[tt] and Jesse2[tt, j]  
normal-z = -0.791, p-value = 0.429  
alternative hypothesis: true rho is not equal to 0  
sample estimates: rho  -0.08290931 
 
 
*****Q(2, 23), Wilcoxon, Correlation: ****************************** 
 
> for (j in 77:92) { 
+ tt1 <- !is.na(Jesse2[,j]) & Jesse2[,2] == 'Submariner' 
+ tt2 <- !is.na(Jesse2[,j]) & Jesse2[,2] != 'Submariner' 
+ cat(' *************** Column ',j,' ********************','\n') 
+ print(wilcox.test(Jesse2[tt1,j],Jesse2[tt2,j])) } 
 
 *************** Column  77  ********************  
 
 Wilcoxon rank-sum test 
data:  Jesse2[tt1, j] and Jesse2[tt2, j]  
rank-sum normal statistic with correction Z = 0.4716, p-value = 0.6372  
alternative hypothesis: true mu is not equal to 0  
 
 *************** Column  78  ********************  
 
 Wilcoxon rank-sum test 
data:  Jesse2[tt1, j] and Jesse2[tt2, j]  
rank-sum normal statistic with correction Z = 0.7245, p-value = 0.4688  
alternative hypothesis: true mu is not equal to 0  
 
 
 *************** Column  79  ********************  
 
 Wilcoxon rank-sum test 
data:  Jesse2[tt1, j] and Jesse2[tt2, j]  
rank-sum normal statistic with correction Z = -1.0425, p-value = 0.2972  
alternative hypothesis: true mu is not equal to 0  
 
 *************** Column  80  ********************  
 
 Wilcoxon rank-sum test 
data:  Jesse2[tt1, j] and Jesse2[tt2, j]  
rank-sum normal statistic with correction Z = -0.6557, p-value = 0.512  
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alternative hypothesis: true mu is not equal to 0  
 
 *************** Column  81  ********************  
 
 Wilcoxon rank-sum test 
data:  Jesse2[tt1, j] and Jesse2[tt2, j]  
rank-sum normal statistic with correction Z = 0.0821, p-value = 0.9346  
alternative hypothesis: true mu is not equal to 0  
 
 *************** Column  82  ********************  
 
 Wilcoxon rank-sum test 
data:  Jesse2[tt1, j] and Jesse2[tt2, j]  
rank-sum normal statistic with correction Z = -0.0666, p-value = 0.9469  
alternative hypothesis: true mu is not equal to 0  
 
 *************** Column  83  ********************  
 
 Wilcoxon rank-sum test 
data:  Jesse2[tt1, j] and Jesse2[tt2, j]  
rank-sum normal statistic with correction Z = 0.3644, p-value = 0.7155  
alternative hypothesis: true mu is not equal to 0  
 
 *************** Column  84  ********************  
 
 Wilcoxon rank-sum test 
data:  Jesse2[tt1, j] and Jesse2[tt2, j]  
rank-sum normal statistic with correction Z = -1.1875, p-value = 0.235  
alternative hypothesis: true mu is not equal to 0  
 
 
 *************** Column  85  ********************  
 
 Wilcoxon rank-sum test 
data:  Jesse2[tt1, j] and Jesse2[tt2, j]  
rank-sum normal statistic with correction Z = -0.1795, p-value = 0.8576  
alternative hypothesis: true mu is not equal to 0  
 
 *************** Column  86  ********************  
 
 Wilcoxon rank-sum test 
data:  Jesse2[tt1, j] and Jesse2[tt2, j]  
rank-sum normal statistic with correction Z = -1.1066, p-value = 0.2685  
alternative hypothesis: true mu is not equal to 0  
 
 *************** Column  87  ********************  
 
 Wilcoxon rank-sum test 
data:  Jesse2[tt1, j] and Jesse2[tt2, j]  
rank-sum normal statistic with correction Z = -1.578, p-value = 0.1146  
alternative hypothesis: true mu is not equal to 0  
 
 *************** Column  88  ********************  
 
 Wilcoxon rank-sum test 
data:  Jesse2[tt1, j] and Jesse2[tt2, j]  
163 
rank-sum normal statistic with correction Z = -0.8916, p-value = 0.3726  
alternative hypothesis: true mu is not equal to 0  
 
 *************** Column  89  ********************  
 Wilcoxon rank-sum test 
data:  Jesse2[tt1, j] and Jesse2[tt2, j]  
rank-sum normal statistic with correction Z = -0.8144, p-value = 0.4154  
alternative hypothesis: true mu is not equal to 0  
 
 *************** Column  90  ********************  
 
 Wilcoxon rank-sum test 
data:  Jesse2[tt1, j] and Jesse2[tt2, j]  
rank-sum normal statistic with correction Z = -1.1133, p-value = 0.2656  
alternative hypothesis: true mu is not equal to 0  
 
 *************** Column  91  ********************  
 
 Wilcoxon rank-sum test 
data:  Jesse2[tt1, j] and Jesse2[tt2, j]  
rank-sum normal statistic with correction Z = -2.1544, p-value = 0.0312  
alternative hypothesis: true mu is not equal to 0  
 
 *************** Column  92  ********************  
 
 Wilcoxon rank-sum test 
data:  Jesse2[tt1, j] and Jesse2[tt2, j]  
rank-sum normal statistic with correction Z = -1.672, p-value = 0.0945  
alternative hypothesis: true mu is not equal to 0  
 
There were 32 warnings (use warnings() to see them) 
> table(Jesse2[,91],Jesse2[,2]) 
   Submariner Surface Warfare Officer  
 0          2                       6 
 1          7                      24 
 2          3                       3 
 3          2                      11 
 4          1                       8 
 5          1                      10 
 6          0                       1 
 7          0                       5 
 8          0                       4 
 9          0                       2 
10          0                       3 
 
> table(Jesse2[,92],Jesse2[,2]) 
  Submariner Surface Warfare Officer  
0          5                       6 
1          6                      37 
2          1                      10 
3          1                       7 
4          2                       5 
5          1                       7 
6          0                       1 
7          0                       1 
8          0                       3 
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*****Q(4, 23), Spearman, No correlation: *************************** 
> for (j in 77:92) { 
 
+ tt <- !is.na(Jesse2[,j]) & !is.na(Jesse2[,4]) 
+ cat(' *************** Column ',j,' ********************','\n') 
+ print(cor.test(Jesse2[tt,4],Jesse2[tt,j],method = 'spearman')) } 
 
 *************** Column  77  ********************  
 
 Spearman's rank correlation 
data:  Jesse2[tt, 4] and Jesse2[tt, j]  
normal-z = -0.7395, p-value = 0.4596  
alternative hypothesis: true rho is not equal to 0  
sample estimates: rho -0.07751452 
 
 
 *************** Column  78  ********************  
 
 Spearman's rank correlation 
data:  Jesse2[tt, 4] and Jesse2[tt, j]  
normal-z = -0.4253, p-value = 0.6706  
alternative hypothesis: true rho is not equal to 0  
sample estimates: rho -0.0445787 
 
 *************** Column  79  ********************  
 
 Spearman's rank correlation 
data:  Jesse2[tt, 4] and Jesse2[tt, j]  
normal-z = 0.3909, p-value = 0.6959  
alternative hypothesis: true rho is not equal to 0  
sample estimates: rho 0.04098054 
 
 *************** Column  80  ********************  
 
 Spearman's rank correlation 
data:  Jesse2[tt, 4] and Jesse2[tt, j]  
normal-z = -0.7033, p-value = 0.4819  
alternative hypothesis: true rho is not equal to 0  
sample estimates: rho -0.07371331 
 
 *************** Column  81  ********************  
 
 Spearman's rank correlation 
data:  Jesse2[tt, 4] and Jesse2[tt, j]  
normal-z = -0.079, p-value = 0.937  
alternative hypothesis: true rho is not equal to 0  
sample estimates: rho -0.008278442 
 
 *************** Column  82  ********************  
 
 Spearman's rank correlation 
data:  Jesse2[tt, 4] and Jesse2[tt, j]  
normal-z = 1.2821, p-value = 0.1998  
alternative hypothesis: true rho is not equal to 0  
sample estimates: rho  0.1344131 
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 *************** Column  83  ********************  
 
 Spearman's rank correlation 
data:  Jesse2[tt, 4] and Jesse2[tt, j]  
normal-z = -0.5352, p-value = 0.5925  
alternative hypothesis: true rho is not equal to 0  
sample estimates: rho  -0.05610024 
 
 *************** Column  84  ********************  
 Spearman's rank correlation 
data:  Jesse2[tt, 4] and Jesse2[tt, j]  
normal-z = -0.1065, p-value = 0.9152  
alternative hypothesis: true rho is not equal to 0  
sample estimates: rho -0.01116092 
 
 *************** Column  85  ********************  
 
 Spearman's rank correlation 
data:  Jesse2[tt, 4] and Jesse2[tt, j]  
normal-z = -0.0629, p-value = 0.9499  
alternative hypothesis: true rho is not equal to 0  
sample estimates: rho -0.006582267 
 
 *************** Column  86  ********************  
 
 Spearman's rank correlation 
data:  Jesse2[tt, 4] and Jesse2[tt, j]  
normal-z = 0.3645, p-value = 0.7155  
alternative hypothesis: true rho is not equal to 0  
sample estimates: rho 0.03822136 
 
 *************** Column  87  ********************  
 
 Spearman's rank correlation 
data:  Jesse2[tt, 4] and Jesse2[tt, j]  
normal-z = -0.0829, p-value = 0.934  
alternative hypothesis: true rho is not equal to 0  
sample estimates: rho -0.008679933 
 
 *************** Column  88  ********************  
 
 Spearman's rank correlation 
data:  Jesse2[tt, 4] and Jesse2[tt, j]  
normal-z = -0.6103, p-value = 0.5417  
alternative hypothesis: true rho is not equal to 0  
sample estimates: rho  -0.06396682 
 
 *************** Column  89  ********************  
 
 Spearman's rank correlation 
data:  Jesse2[tt, 4] and Jesse2[tt, j]  
normal-z = -1.0676, p-value = 0.2857  
alternative hypothesis: true rho is not equal to 0  
sample estimates: rho -0.1119067 
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 *************** Column  90  ********************  
 
 Spearman's rank correlation 
data:  Jesse2[tt, 4] and Jesse2[tt, j]  
normal-z = 0.1189, p-value = 0.9054  
alternative hypothesis: true rho is not equal to 0  
sample estimates: rho 0.01246728 
 
 *************** Column  91  ********************  
 
 Spearman's rank correlation 
data:  Jesse2[tt, 4] and Jesse2[tt, j]  
normal-z = 0.063, p-value = 0.9498  
alternative hypothesis: true rho is not equal to 0  
sample estimates: rho 0.006607873 
 
 *************** Column  92  ********************  
 
 Spearman's rank correlation 
data:  Jesse2[tt, 4] and Jesse2[tt, j]  
normal-z = -0.443, p-value = 0.6578  
alternative hypothesis: true rho is not equal to 0  
sample estimates: rho -0.04642898 
 
*********Q(5, 23), K-Wallis, No corellation: *************************** 
> for (j in 77:92) { 
+ tt <- Jesse2[,5] != 'Other' & !is.na(Jesse2[,j]) 
+ cat(' *************** Column ',j,' ********************','\n') 
+ print(kruskal.test(Jesse2[tt,j],as.factor(as.character(Jesse2[tt,5])))) 
+ print(table(as.character(Jesse2[tt,5]),Jesse2[tt,j])) } 
 
 *************** Column  77  ********************  
 
 Kruskal-Wallis rank sum test 
data:  Jesse2[tt, j] and as.factor(as.character(Jesse2[tt, 5]))  
Kruskal-Wallis chi-square = 7.7244, df = 3, p-value = 0.0521  
alternative hypothesis: two.sided  
 
                               0 1 3 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Enlisted Commissioning Program 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 1  4 
                           OCS 3 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 10 
                          ROTC 1 0 0 3 0 1 4 1 28 
                          USNA 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 25 
 
 *************** Column  78  ********************  
 
 Kruskal-Wallis rank sum test 
data:  Jesse2[tt, j] and as.factor(as.character(Jesse2[tt, 5]))  
Kruskal-Wallis chi-square = 1.5171, df = 3, p-value = 0.6783  
alternative hypothesis: two.sided  
 
                               0 1 2 3 5 6 7 8 9 10  
Enlisted Commissioning Program 0 2 0 0 1 0 1 1 1  2 
                           OCS 3 0 0 1 0 1 2 3 5  0 
                          ROTC 1 5 0 1 4 1 5 9 5  7 
                          USNA 1 1 4 1 5 1 5 3 2  4 
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 *************** Column  79  ********************  
 
 
 Kruskal-Wallis rank sum test 
data:  Jesse2[tt, j] and as.factor(as.character(Jesse2[tt, 5]))  
Kruskal-Wallis chi-square = 1.7372, df = 3, p-value = 0.6287  
alternative hypothesis: two.sided  
 
                               0 1 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10  
Enlisted Commissioning Program 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 2 2  3 
                           OCS 3 0 1 0 0 0 2 2 3  4 
                          ROTC 2 1 0 1 1 1 3 9 5 15 
                          USNA 1 0 2 1 0 1 3 5 7  7 
 
 *************** Column  80  ********************  
 
 Kruskal-Wallis rank sum test 
data:  Jesse2[tt, j] and as.factor(as.character(Jesse2[tt, 5]))  
Kruskal-Wallis chi-square = 2.0887, df = 3, p-value = 0.5542  
alternative hypothesis: two.sided  
 
                               0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10  
Enlisted Commissioning Program 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 2 2 1  1 
                           OCS 3 0 0 3 0 2 1 1 1 2  2 
                          ROTC 2 3 0 3 3 5 4 7 5 3  3 
                          USNA 1 2 3 3 1 2 3 6 2 1  3 
 
 *************** Column  81  ********************  
 
 Kruskal-Wallis rank sum test 
data:  Jesse2[tt, j] and as.factor(as.character(Jesse2[tt, 5]))  
Kruskal-Wallis chi-square = 2.0745, df = 3, p-value = 0.5571  
alternative hypothesis: two.sided  
 
                               0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7  8 9 10  
Enlisted Commissioning Program 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 1  1 2  1 
                           OCS 3 0 0 1 1 1 3 3  1 2  0 
                          ROTC 3 1 3 3 2 2 3 2 10 4  5 
                          USNA 1 2 1 2 4 0 3 2  6 3  3 
 
 *************** Column  82  ********************  
 
 Kruskal-Wallis rank sum test 
data:  Jesse2[tt, j] and as.factor(as.character(Jesse2[tt, 5]))  
Kruskal-Wallis chi-square = 1.0089, df = 3, p-value = 0.7991  
alternative hypothesis: two.sided  
 
                               0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10  
Enlisted Commissioning Program 0 2 0 0 0 1 1 1 3 0  0 
                           OCS 3 1 0 2 1 1 1 1 4 1  0 
                          ROTC 3 3 4 4 3 6 2 3 6 1  3 
                          USNA 1 3 3 2 2 5 5 4 2 0  0 
 
 *************** Column  83  ********************  
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 Kruskal-Wallis rank sum test 
data:  Jesse2[tt, j] and as.factor(as.character(Jesse2[tt, 5]))  
Kruskal-Wallis chi-square = 6.3752, df = 3, p-value = 0.0947  
 
alternative hypothesis: two.sided  
 
                               0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10  
Enlisted Commissioning Program 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 2  3 
                           OCS 3 0 0 1 0 1 0 2 3 5  0 
                          ROTC 3 1 2 2 1 2 1 6 7 7  6 
                          USNA 1 1 2 3 3 2 3 4 4 3  1 
 
 *************** Column  84  ********************  
 
 Kruskal-Wallis rank sum test 
data:  Jesse2[tt, j] and as.factor(as.character(Jesse2[tt, 5]))  
Kruskal-Wallis chi-square = 1.0409, df = 3, p-value = 0.7914  
alternative hypothesis: two.sided  
 
                               0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10  
Enlisted Commissioning Program 0 2 1 0 0 2 0 0 1 1  1 
                           OCS 4 0 1 1 0 3 2 1 1 1  1 
                          ROTC 3 4 1 4 1 6 3 5 4 2  5 
                          USNA 1 3 3 1 4 3 2 3 1 3  3 
 
 *************** Column  85  ********************  
 
 Kruskal-Wallis rank sum test 
data:  Jesse2[tt, j] and as.factor(as.character(Jesse2[tt, 5]))  
Kruskal-Wallis chi-square = 5.7184, df = 3, p-value = 0.1261  
alternative hypothesis: two.sided  
 
                               0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10  
Enlisted Commissioning Program 0 1 0 0 0 4 0 1 1 1  0 
                           OCS 4 0 2 3 2 2 0 0 1 1  0 
                          ROTC 3 4 2 4 2 6 9 0 5 1  2 
                          USNA 1 4 6 2 2 3 3 4 1 0  1 
 
 *************** Column  86  ********************  
 
 Kruskal-Wallis rank sum test 
data:  Jesse2[tt, j] and as.factor(as.character(Jesse2[tt, 5]))  
Kruskal-Wallis chi-square = 1.267, df = 3, p-value = 0.737  
alternative hypothesis: two.sided  
 
                               0  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10  
 
Enlisted Commissioning Program 0  5 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 1  0 
                           OCS 4  0 1 4 2 3 0 0 1 0  0 
                          ROTC 3 12 2 2 5 6 2 2 3 0  1 
                          USNA 1 15 0 1 3 3 2 1 0 0  1 
 
 *************** Column  87  ********************  
 
 Kruskal-Wallis rank sum test 
data:  Jesse2[tt, j] and as.factor(as.character(Jesse2[tt, 5]))  
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Kruskal-Wallis chi-square = 2.809, df = 3, p-value = 0.422  
alternative hypothesis: two.sided  
 
 
                               0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10  
Enlisted Commissioning Program 0 3 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 1  0 
                           OCS 5 0 1 3 2 4 0 0 0 0  0 
                          ROTC 4 5 3 4 6 8 1 1 2 0  4 
                          USNA 1 5 4 3 4 5 3 0 1 0  1 
 








data:  Jesse2[tt, j] and as.factor(as.character(Jesse2[tt, 5]))  
 
Kruskal-Wallis chi-square = 3.6647, df = 3, p-value = 0.3  
 




                               0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 10  
 
Enlisted Commissioning Program 0 5 0 1 0 1 1 0 0  0 
 
                           OCS 5 1 1 2 3 2 1 0 0  0 
 
                          ROTC 4 8 7 1 5 4 2 2 3  2 
 
                          USNA 1 8 2 1 4 4 1 4 1  1 
 
 *************** Column  89  ********************  
 
 Kruskal-Wallis rank sum test 
data:  Jesse2[tt, j] and as.factor(as.character(Jesse2[tt, 5]))  
Kruskal-Wallis chi-square = 5.087, df = 3, p-value = 0.1655  
alternative hypothesis: two.sided  
 
                               0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10  
Enlisted Commissioning Program 0 3 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1  1 
                           OCS 4 1 0 1 0 4 3 1 1 0  0 
                          ROTC 4 4 2 1 2 3 2 6 7 4  3 
                          USNA 1 3 1 1 2 3 4 4 4 0  4 
 
 *************** Column  90  ********************  
 
 Kruskal-Wallis rank sum test 
data:  Jesse2[tt, j] and as.factor(as.character(Jesse2[tt, 5]))  
Kruskal-Wallis chi-square = 2.3409, df = 3, p-value = 0.5047  
alternative hypothesis: two.sided  
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                               0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10  
Enlisted Commissioning Program 0 4 0 1 1 2 0 0 0 0  0 
                           OCS 5 1 0 1 1 5 1 0 0 1  0 
 
                          ROTC 4 9 0 4 3 5 4 1 6 1  1 
                          USNA 1 9 3 0 2 6 1 2 3 0  0 
 
 *************** Column  91  ********************  
 
 Kruskal-Wallis rank sum test 
data:  Jesse2[tt, j] and as.factor(as.character(Jesse2[tt, 5]))  
Kruskal-Wallis chi-square = 0.6457, df = 3, p-value = 0.8859  
alternative hypothesis: two.sided  
 
                               0  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10  
Enlisted Commissioning Program 0  2 0 2 1 3 0 0 0 0  0 
                           OCS 3  2 2 2 1 3 0 0 2 0  0 
                          ROTC 4 14 1 5 4 3 1 0 2 2  2 
                          USNA 1 10 3 4 2 1 0 5 0 0  1 
 
 *************** Column  92  ********************  
 
 Kruskal-Wallis rank sum test 
data:  Jesse2[tt, j] and as.factor(as.character(Jesse2[tt, 5]))  
Kruskal-Wallis chi-square = 2.2573, df = 3, p-value = 0.5208  
alternative hypothesis: two.sided  
 
                               0  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8  
Enlisted Commissioning Program 0  4 2 1 0 1 0 0 0 
                           OCS 6  3 1 2 1 1 0 0 1 
                          ROTC 4 19 4 2 4 3 1 0 1 
                          USNA 1 13 4 3 2 2 0 1 1 
 
 
5. Questions 1,2,4, and 5 (demographics) vs. Question 25 (media access to 
military)– 
*******Q(1, 25), K-wallis, No correlation:********************** 
 






 Kruskal-Wallis rank sum test 
data:  as.numeric(Q1.ordered[tt]) and Jesse2[tt, 94]  
Kruskal-Wallis chi-square = 0.7601, df = 2, p-value = 0.6838  
alternative hypothesis: two.sided  
 
> t(table(as.numeric(Q1.ordered[tt]),Jesse2[tt,94])) 
                          1 2  3 4 5 6  
 
During military conflict? 1 1  8 4 1 2 
            In peacetime? 1 2 20 8 4 1 
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                          ENS LTJG LT LCDR CDR CAPT  
During military conflict?   1    1  8    4   1    2 
            In peacetime?   1    2 20    8   4    1 
                    Other   2    1 23    4   4    1 
 
 
*******Q(2, 25), Chisq.Test, No correlation:********************** 
 








  Expected counts < 5. Chi-square approximation may not be appropriate. in: 
chisq.test(Jesse2[tt,2], 
 
 Jesse2[tt, 94]) 
 
 Pearson's chi-square test without Yates' continuity correction 
data:  Jesse2[tt, 2] and Jesse2[tt, 94]  




                        During military conflict? In peacetime? Other  
             Submariner                         2             8     6 
Surface Warfare Officer                        15            28    30 
********Q(4, 25), K-wallis, Weak correlation:********************** 
 





 Kruskal-Wallis rank sum test 
data:  Jesse2[tt, 4] and Jesse2[tt, 94]  
Kruskal-Wallis chi-square = 4.8527, df = 2, p-value = 0.0884  




                          1977 1979 1980 1981 1985 1986 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 
1996 1997 1998  
 
During military conflict?    2    0    0    0    0    0    1    0    0    2    1    1    0    0    2    3    3 
            In peacetime?    0    2    1    0    2    2    0    1    1    3    1    3    3    1    5    4    4 
                    Other    0    0    0    1    1    2    1    0    0    1    0    2    1    1    7    4    9 
 
                          1999 2001 2002 2003  
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During military conflict?    0    1    0    1 
            In peacetime?    2    1    0    0 




     During military conflict? In peacetime? Other  
 
1977                         2             0     0 
1979                         0             2     0 
1980                         0             1     0 
1981                         0             0     1 
1985                         0             2     1 
1986                         0             2     2 
1988                         1             0     1 
1989                         0             1     0 
1990                         0             1     0 
1991                         2             3     1 
1992                         1             1     0 
1993                         1             3     2 
1994                         0             3     1 
1995                         0             1     1 
1996                         2             5     7 
1997                         3             4     4 
1998                         3             4     9 
1999                         0             2     1 
2001                         1             1     1 
2002                         0             0     2 
2003                         1             0     1 
 
********Q(5, 25), Chisq.test, Weak Correlation:**************************** 
(this method used when there are no ordering in variables) 
 





  Expected counts < 5. Chi-square approximation may not be appropriate. in: 
chisq.test(Jesse2[tt,5], 
 
 Jesse2[tt, 94]) 
 
 Pearson's chi-square test without Yates' continuity correction 
data:  Jesse2[tt, 5] and Jesse2[tt, 94]  




                               During military conflict? In peacetime? Other  
 
Enlisted Commissioning Program                         1             5     2 
                           OCS                         4             5     6 
                         Other                         1             2     2 
                          ROTC                         6            14    14 
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                          USNA                         5            10    12 
 






  Expected counts < 5. Chi-square approximation may not be appropriate. in: chisq.test(Xtab[c(2, 
4, 5),  ]) 
 
 Pearson's chi-square test without Yates' continuity correction 
data:  Xtab[c(2, 4, 5),  ]  




     During military conflict? In peacetime? Other  
 
 OCS                         4             5     6 
ROTC                         6            14    14 
USNA                         5            10    12 
 
 
6. Questions 1,2,4, and 5 (demographics) vs. Question 26 (PAOs role in media-






 Agree Disagree Strongly agree Strongly disagree  
    20       54              5                10 
 
> Q26.ordered <- ordered(Jesse2[,96],c('Strongly disagree','Disagree','Agree','Strongly agree')) 
> table(Q26.ordered) 
 
 Strongly disagree Disagree Agree Strongly agree  
                10       54    20              5 
> ?cat 
> print(table(Jesse2[,90])) 
  0  1 2 3 4  5 6 7  8 9 10  
 10 26 3 6 7 19 6 3 10 2  1 
 
> ?kruskal.test 










Strongly disagree Disagree Agree Strongly agree 
ENS                 1        0     2              0 
LTJG                 0        4     0              0 
LT                 6       36     8              3 
LCDR                 2        9     4              1 
CDR                 0        4     4              1 
CAPT                 1        1     2              0 
 
> # 
> # Spearman test on Q1 vs Q26 




> cor.test(as.numeric(Q1.ordered[tt]),as.numeric(Q26.ordered[tt]), method = 'spearman') 
 
Spearman's rank correlation 
 
data:  as.numeric(Q1.ordered[tt]) and as.numeric(Q26.ordered[tt]) 
normal-z = 1.5393, p-value = 0.1237 
alternative hypothesis: true rho is not equal to 0  
sample estimates: rho 0.1640969 
 
> # 




Kruskal-Wallis rank sum test 
data:  as.numeric(Q26.ordered[tt]) and as.factor(Q1.ordered[tt]) 
Kruskal-Wallis chi-square = 5.2441, df = 5, p-value = 0.3868 alternative hypothesis: two.sided 
 
 




 Kruskal-Wallis rank sum test 
data:  as.numeric(Q26.ordered[tt]) and as.factor(Jesse2[tt, 2])  
Kruskal-Wallis chi-square = 8.8254, df = 1, p-value = 0.003  




                        Strongly disagree Disagree Agree Strongly agree  
             Submariner                 5       10     1              0 
Surface Warfare Officer                 5       44    19              5 
- 
 
*******Q(4,26), Spearman's, Weak Correlation:***************** 
 
> tt <- !is.na(Q26.ordered) & !is.na(Jesse2[,4]) 
> sum(tt) 
[1] 89 
> cor.test(Q26.ordered[tt],Jesse2[tt,4],method = 'spearman') 
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 Spearman's rank correlation 
 
data:  Q26.ordered[tt] and Jesse2[tt, 4]  
normal-z = -1.9231, p-value = 0.0545  
alternative hypothesis: true rho is not equal to 0  




1897 1977 1979 1980 1981 1985 1986 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 
1998  
 
Strongly disagree    0    0    0    0    1    0    1    0    1    0    0    0    0    1    0    2    1    2 
         Disagree    0    1    0    0    0    2    3    0    0    1    4    1    3    3    1    8    9   12 
            Agree    1    1    2    1    0    0    0    2    0    0    1    1    3    0    0    4    0    3 
   Strongly agree    0    0    0    0    0    1    0    0    0    0    1    0    0    0    1    0    2    0 
 
 
                  1999 2001 2002 2003  
Strongly disagree    0    0    1    0 
         Disagree    3    3    0    0 
            Agree    0    0    0    1 
   Strongly agree    0    0    0    0 
 
 
(Note: Got rid of 1897 date that was entered wrong) 
 
 




> cor.test(Q26.ordered[tt],Jesse2[tt,4],method = 'spearman') 
 
 Spearman's rank correlation 
data:  Q26.ordered[tt] and Jesse2[tt, 4]  
normal-z = -1.7112, p-value = 0.087  
alternative hypothesis: true rho is not equal to 0  





     Strongly disagree Disagree Agree Strongly agree  
1977                 0        1     1              0 
1979                 0        0     2              0 
1980                 0        0     1              0 
1981                 1        0     0              0 
1985                 0        2     0              1 
1986                 1        3     0              0 
1988                 0        0     2              0 
1989                 1        0     0              0 
1990                 0        1     0              0 
1991                 0        4     1              1 
1992                 0        1     1              0 
1993                 0        3     3              0 
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1994                 1        3     0              0 
1995                 0        1     0              1 
1996                 2        8     4              0 
1997                 1        9     0              2 
1998                 2       12     3              0 
1999                 0        3     0              0 
2001                 0        3     0              0 
2002                 1        0     0              0 
2003                 0        0     1              0 
 
> cor.test(as.numeric(Q26.ordered[tt]),Jesse2[tt,4],method = 'spearman') 
 
 Spearman's rank correlation 
 
data:  as.numeric(Q26.ordered[tt]) and Jesse2[tt, 4]  
normal-z = -1.7112, p-value = 0.087  
alternative hypothesis: true rho is not equal to 0  
sample estimates:  rho  -0.1834534 
*******Q(5, 26), K-wallis test, Weak Correlation:****************** 
 
> tt <- !is.na(Q26.ordered) & !is.na(Jesse2[,5]) 
> kruskal.test(as.numeric(Q26.ordered[tt]),Jesse2[tt,5])) 
 




 Kruskal-Wallis rank sum test 
data:  as.numeric(Q26.ordered[tt]) and Jesse2[tt, 5]  
Kruskal-Wallis chi-square = 0.4155, df = 4, p-value = 0.9812  
alternative hypothesis: two.sided 
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SUBJ:  COMMANDERS AND PUBLIC AFFAIRS 
 
THIS MESSAGE IS AN UNCLASSIFIED RE-TRANSMISSION OF A SECDEF-CJCS P4 MESSAGE 
TO ALL COMBATANT COMMANDERS REGARDING SUPPORT OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS 
ACTIVITIES IN POTENTIAL FUTURE MILITARY OPERATIONS. IT IS BEING RE-TRANSMITTED 
AS A GENSER MESSAGE TO FACILITATE WIDER DISTRIBUTION TO ALL COMMANDERS, 
INTELLIGENCE, OPERATIONS, LOGISTICS AND COMMUNICATIONS OFFICERS AS WELL AS 
PAOS. THE ORIGINAL IS QUOTED BELOW: 
 
1. (QUOTE) THIS IS A SECRETARY OF DEFENSE/CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF 
MESSAGE. 
 
2. MEDIA COVERAGE OF POTENTIAL FUTURE MILITARY OPERATIONS WILL, TO A LARGE 
EXTENT, SHAPE PUBLIC PERCEPTION OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY ENVIRONMENT NOW 
AND IN THE YEARS AHEAD.  THIS HOLDS TRUE FOR THE US PUBLIC; THE PUBLIC IN 
ALLIED COUNTRIES, WHOSE OPINION CAN AFFECT THE DURABILITY OF OUR COALITION; 
AND PUBLICS IN COUNTRIES WHERE WE CONDUCT OPERATIONS, WHOSE PERCEPTIONS 
OF US CAN AFFECT THE COST AND DURATION OF OUR INVOLVEMENT. 
 
3. THEREFORE, WE MUST: 
 
A. ORGANIZE FOR AND FACILITATE ACCESS OF NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL 
MEDIA TO OUR FORCES, INCLUDING THOSE ENGAGED IN GROUND OPERATIONS.  OUR 
GOAL IS TO GET IT RIGHT FROM THE START, NOT DAYS OR WEEKS INTO AN OPERATION.  
WE WILL COMMIT COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEMS AND TRAINED JOINT PUBLIC AFFAIRS 
TEAMS TO FACILITATE THE INTERNATIONAL PRESS GETTING A FIRST-HAND LOOK AT 
COALITION OPERATIONS. 
 
B. PLAN TO DEDICATE LIFT AND LOGISTICAL SUPPORT TO MOVE PA AND MEDIA 
PERSONNEL AS WELL AS MEDIA PRODUCTS TO AND FROM THE FORWARD LOCATION.  
THIS WILL BE NECESSARY TO PRESENT OUR STORY IN A TIMELY MANNER. 
 
C. HOLD DAILY BRIEFS IN THEATER WITH A LARGE GROUP OF INTERNATIONAL AS 
WELL AS NATIONAL PRESS.  A NATURAL IMPULSE IS TO TALK TO REPORTERS FROM OUR 
OWN NATION -- WE ENCOURAGE YOU TO AGGRESSIVELY REACH OUT TO THOSE OF THE 
INTERNATIONAL PRESS AS YOU TELL OUR STORY - THEY, AND THE PUBLICS THEY SERVE, 
ALSO MUST UNDERSTAND WHY WE ARE ENGAGED. 
 
D. PUT IN PLACE MECHANISMS AND PROCESSES FOR THE RAPID DISSEMINATION 
OF WEAPONS SYSTEMS VIDEO, ISR FOOTAGE, AND OPERATIONAL COMBAT CAMERA 
FOOTAGE BEFORE COALITION FORCES MOVE.  WE WILL DELEGATE THE AUTHORITY FOR 
THE DECLASSIFICATION AND RELEASE OF THESE PRODUCTS TO THE LOWEST POSSIBLE 
LEVEL. APPROACH THESE DECISIONS WITH 'WHY NOT' RATHER THAN 'WHY?' 
OPERATIONAL PLANNING SHOULD INCORPORATE AND SUPPORT THESE EFFORTS AND 
INCLUDE A PUSH/PULL MECHANISM TO MAKE THE PRODUCTS READILY AVAILABLE TO A 
WIDER DOD AUDIENCE FOR EVENTUAL USE IN A VARIETY OF PUBLIC COMMUNICATION 
ACTIVITIES. THESE PLANS SHOULD ALSO SUPPORT THE EXPEDITIOUS MOVEMENT OF 
MEDIA PRODUCTS THAT TELL OUR STORY -- BOTH GOOD NEWS AND BAD -- FROM THE 
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FRONT LINES.  THE GOAL FOR MOVING BOTH MEDIA PRODUCTS AND IMAGES SHOULD BE 
MINUTES OR HOURS NOT DAYS. 
 
4. ALTHOUGH THE PA/MEDIA EFFORT MAY NOT BE PRECISELY SPELLED OUT, LIKE IN ANY 
OP PLAN TASK LIST, PROCEED ON THE BASIS THAT IT IS AN IMPLIED TASK FOR ALMOST 
ALL MISSIONS.  OUR ULTIMATE STRATEGIC SUCCESS IN BRINGING PEACE AND SECURITY 
TO THIS REGION WILL COME IN OUR LONG-TERM COMMITMENT TO SUPPORTING THESE 
DEMOCRATIC IDEALS.  LET'S TELL THE FACTUAL STORY -- GOOD OR BAD --BEFORE 
OTHERS SEED THE MEDIA WITH DISINFORMATION AND DISTORTIONS AS THEY MOST 
CERTAINLY WILL CONTINUE TO DO.  OUR PEOPLE IN THE FIELD NEED TO TELL OUR 
STORY - ONLY COMMANDERS CAN ENSURE THE MEDIA GET TO THE STORY ALONGSIDE 
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